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The thesis is a critical feminist analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, as it is 
currently constructed in feminist legal scholarship and the surrounding debate. Violence 
against women, in particular sexual violence has been a greatly topical issue within recent 
years in both scholarship and the popular imagination. There have been important legal 
developments within international law, which have provoked much academic, and in 
particular, legal commentary. On one level, the thesis contributes to this commentary. At the 
same time, it aims to contribute to a broader feminist theory, which engages with questions of 
human rights, identity, gender, armed conflict, culture and violence. It therefore explores how 
female identity, bodily injury, ethnic identity and culture have become intertwined in the 
debate surrounding wartime sexual violence. Specifically, it analyses the legal modalities 
through which wartime sexual violence has been inscribed into ICTY judgements and it asks 
whether these have further entrenched strongly essentialised portrayals of women in 
international law as victims, mothers or wives in times of armed conflict. Moreover, it asks 
what the visibility of wartime sexual violence and gender-based violence, more broadly, 
signifies for women in the current political and legal moment.1 The research question of this 
project is therefore threefold:  
 
How do wartime identities currently materialise in sexual violence jurisprudence? What 
does the increasing juridicalisation of wartime sexual violence represent for women in 
the contemporary political and legal moment? Are current feminist investments with the 






                                            
1
 This is a variation of Diane Otto’s model that she has developed in relation to her analysis of the recurring 
gender narratives that inform human rights law. She describes three subjectivities in particular- the figure of the 
wife and mother, who needs ‘protection’ during times of both war and peace’ and is more object than subject of 
international law; secondly, the woman, who is ‘formally equal with men’, at least in the realm of public life, and 
thirdly, the victim subject, who is produced by colonial narratives of gender, as well as by notions of women’s 
sexual vulnerability’-produced by earlier international instruments In D. Otto, ‘Lost in Translation: Re-scripting the 
Sexed Subjects of International Human Rights Law’ in Anne Orford, (ed.), International Law and Its Others, 
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Chapter I  
 
         Introduction 
 
In times of extreme crisis, identities may become vague or else, perhaps more often, they are 






Wartime sexual violence against women is one of the central preoccupations animating 
international feminist scholarship today, primarily, because it is an obviously feminist issue, 
but also because armed conflict, in particular 'inter-ethnic' conflict, has proliferated over the 
past two decades generating very modern typologies of war that have resulted in increasing 
casualties amongst civilians.2 Crucial legal successes have been achieved in international law 
with respect to the advancement of the twin feminist normative aims of gender equality and 
gender justice. In particular the acknowledgment by international human rights law, whose 
principal aims are the promotion of equality and anti-discrimination in all areas of public life, 
that women’s rights are human rights, has been a landmark development. Moreover, an 
undisputed milestone for women’s human rights has been achieved by way of the prosecution 
of wartime sexual violence cases in international criminal tribunals.  International human 
                                            
2
 The rise of one-sided violence and the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians has been a very particular 
form of modern-day armed conflict. Relatively low-scale but constant one-sided violence appears to be the 
overriding pattern in most areas of conflict. One-sided violence is defined in a recent report on modern-day 
trends in armed conflict as 'the intentional use of armed force against civilians by a government or formally 
organised group that results in at least 25 deaths in a calendar year.' Further, it directly and intentionally targets 
civilians who cannot defend themselves with arms. It is also distinct from battle-related violence that incidentally 
harms civilians, who for example, are caught up in the crossfire between combatants. According to the report, 99 
percent of fatalities from one-sided violence occur in countries affected by armed conflict. Interestingly, there has 
been a relative decline in states' direct involvement in one-sided violence and a growing reliance on 'government-
aligned' actors, such as clan militias or breakaway rebel factions-these actors may be attached to government 
forces, or be relatively autonomous and motivated by their own socio-political interests, or clan divisions. This 
could be deemed a form of 'outsourcing' one-sided violence and other tasks to loosely affiliated and less 
accountable actors, who often prove to be particularly brutal in their treatment of civilians. In E. Stepanova, 
‘Trends in Armed Conflicts: One-sided violence against Civilians‘, Stockholm Peace Research Institute Yearbook 
2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39.  
8 
 
rights law has been of vital importance to this development, having notably turned its gaze to 
armed conflict in an effort to extend rights protections to civilians.3 The turn of human rights 
to armed conflict is at the same time emblematic of the contemporary liberal moment, which 
has focused strongly on the suffering of civilians during armed conflict4 resulting in what this 
thesis believes to be a ‘hypervisible’5  degree of attention paid to sexual violence against 
women in contemporary international legal scholarship.  
 
The thesis argues that this type of attention has not necessarily been an unequivocal success 
for women, or for the feminist movement. The prosecution of wartime sexual violence against 
women has provoked some strong regulatory responses and achieved significant legal 
victories, but it has also caused controversy and debate (at least initially) in feminist quarters 
about how to respond to such acts having further distanced feminism from its original politics. 
That these responses have not always been helpful for the advancement of the twin normative 
feminist aims of gender justice and equality is the central argument of the thesis.6 This project 
                                            
3
 The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory held that international human rights was applicable and intersected 
with international humanitarian law in times of armed conflict to the extent that Israel was bound to comply with 
its obligations under both regimes to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. It was, 
thus, under an obligation under international law to put an end to the violations of its international obligations 
flowing from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian territory, and to allow access to the Holy 
Places that came under its control following the 1967 War. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 9 
July 2004, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, paras. 149, 
150. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf. (last accessed in May, 2011).  
4
 Civilians play an increasingly complex role as both victims and perpetrators in modern-day armed conflict. There 
has, however, undoubtedly been a rise in civilian casualties in armed conflicts, thus, casualties not resulting from 
direct military engagement, as figures obtained by the International Red Cross from the armed conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) attest. In the DRC, it is estimated that there were 2.5 million deaths between 
1998 and 2001, yet only 350, 000 of those were killed in actual battle. For an overview, see: A. Wenger & S. J. A. 
Mason, ' The Civilianization of Armed Conflict: Trends and Implications’, 827 International Review of the Red Cross 
(Dec, 2008), 835 at 836. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-wenger-mason.pdf. 
(last accessed in May, 2011) 
5
 I borrow the term ‘hypervisible' from Doris Buss, who argues that rape has almost taken on a 'hypervisible' 
quality in the international wartime sexual violence jurisprudence with problematic consequences for an 
understanding of the more nuanced forms of gender-based violence perpetrated during armed conflict. In D. 
Buss, 'The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law’, 25 Windsor 
Journal of Access to Justice, (2007), 3-22. In a similar vein, Alice Miller has argued that until the 1980s it was 
exceedingly difficult to get the human rights world to pay either attention to women as rights claimants or to 
sexual harm as a form of harm. However, once ‘sex’ became accepted as an area of concern, a ‘hyper attention’ 
to sex ironically operated to exclude attention to other types of harm. In A. Miller, ‘Sexuality, Violence against 
Women, and Human Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection’, 7(2) Health and Human Rights 
(2004), 16 at 18, 19.  
6
 As Anne Orford points out in the context of feminist complicity in the 'imperialist project' of international law, 
the production or reproduction of knowledge about the 'real world' of women is one of the ways in which some 
feminist international legal texts continue to be part of a tradition of imperialism. In this way, the appropriate 
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thus explores, on the one hand, how international criminal law currently absorbs wartime 




I) The Purpose, Concept and Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter intends to provide a preliminary sense of the importance of wartime sexual 
violence for a feminist legal analysis, while revealing some of its concerns with the parameters 
in which the debate is currently conducted. Part I introduces its concern in relation to the 
visibility of the violated body in current wartime sexual violence discourses opening up the 
debate on what this might imply for women in the contemporary political and legal moment. 
Part II reveals the original contribution of this thesis, while also outlining its concept and 
structure. Moreover, it introduces counterpoint as a methodological tool for interrogating 
contemporary feminist approaches towards wartime sexual violence. Part III in turn analyses 
the underlying salient discourses that inform this thesis and reviews their centrality to a 
discussion as significant as wartime sexual violence in feminist legal scholarship.  
 
Part II  
i)  The Violated Body of the Woman as a Subject of Analysis  
Rape has received particular prominence in the feminist and non-feminist literature 
surrounding the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia due to the widespread reporting of 
such incidents. Both the Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts have given feminism new epistemic 
purchase in the debate around the regulation of wartime sexual violence in international law 
reiterating the sense that rape most vividly encapsulates the symbolism of sexuality during 
wartime. By catapulting the violated body of the woman onto the front pages, debates around 
victimisation, nationality, and female suffering in wartime have been reawakened and feminist 
insights have suddenly become en vogue. From that moment onwards, rape has been a 
constant concern of legal feminist scholarship, as Chapters II, II and IV map out in further 
detail. But, as this thesis aims to show, the focus on rape has wittingly or unwittingly created 
                                                                                                                                           
disciplinary role of feminist theory is to render the Third World Woman the object of knowledge of First World 
International lawyers. Feminists, as she points out, can take their place as part of a set of human sciences by 
establishing the ‘native as the self-consolidating other’. In A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59.  
10 
 
problematic consequences for feminism as it has intertwined female identity with notions of 
victimhood. Thus, this thesis asks whether, paradoxically, feminists themselves have 
contributed to the sense that women civilians when caught up in armed conflict will inevitably 
be subjected to some form of sexual violence and are therefore inescapable victims of war, as 
well as victims of their cultural identity.7  
 
That victimisation is a problematic conceptualisation of female identity has been persuasively 
demonstrated by legal feminist historian Joanna Bourke, who has analysed the historical 
trajectory characterising the shifting meanings of rape and female identity. As she has put it,  
 
‘If Man becomes an amorphous threat, free-floating, signifying danger then Woman is 
(always) scared. Before His body, she quakes. In this analysis, the female body is 
portrayed as already and always violated8. Further, by virtue of being female, the 
woman is already the victim9, the wounded, suffering, gendered subject. She is defined 
in relation to ‘it’-the penis. In this sense, the words fear and rape10 have become 
‘intimately connected.’11  
 
However, history suggests that this has not always been the case.12 Thanks in large part to the 
advent of psychoanalysis in the early twentieth century with its understandings of the 
                                            
7
 In the context of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the term 'mass rape' has assumed increasing valence within 
feminist discourses the argument being that there are specific patterns of war crimes against women, which not 
only destroy the physical and psychological existence of the women concerned, but also inflict harm on the 
culture and the collective identity of the whole group, ethnicity, or nation under attack. Feminists of this 
persuasion would argue that war crimes against women have symbolic meaning and must be analysed within the 
symbolic contexts of the nation and gender system. See for example R. Seifert, 'The Second Front: The Logics of 
Sexual Violence in Wars', 19 Women's Studies International Forum, (1996), 35-43; J. Barkan, ‘As Old as War Itself: 
Rape in Foča', 2002 Dissent, 1-7; A. Stiglmayer, 'The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina' in Mass Rape: The War against 
Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina', (Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 82-164; C. MacKinnon, ‘Rape, 
Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights’ in A. Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-
Herzegovina', (Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 183-195, C. MacKinnon, ‘Rape, Genocide, and 
Women’s Human Rights’, 17 Harvard Women’s Law Journal (1994), 5; B. Allen, Rape, Warfare: The Hidden 
Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
8
 (emphasis added) 
9
 (emphasis added) 
10
 (emphasis added) 
11
 J. Bourke Rape: Sex, Violence and History', (Berkley, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 2007), 421.  
12
 As Bourke points out, the rapist endangered the 19th Century woman by attempting to undermine her class 
position, earning power and respectability. Sexual attack then was less a matter of offence to sexual identity than 
an affront to a woman's ability to support herself. As a consequence, women placed emphasis on physical injury 
11 
 
relationship between the mind and body, sexual violence came to be regarded as an attack 
upon a woman's sexual identity creating a 'psychic wound', a violation of the self. As sex 
became increasingly linked to psychological events shifting away from genitals and 
reproduction, the 'wrong' of acts such as date rape or marital rape acquired much greater 
significance. These attacks became construed not only as attacks on the body but on the very 
integrity of the self.13  Whereas rape in nineteenth century Britain and America, for example, 
was seen as an attempt to undermine women’s class position, their earning power and 
respectability, by the twentieth century, the consequences of rape were no longer seen as ‘a 
question of debauchery’ but were rather seen as a shattering of identity, an incurable wound 
to which the victim seems doomed’.14 As Bourke has noted:   
 
‘This intense focus on the body as marker of identity and as locus of truth is a 
profoundly modern conception.’15 
 
While during the nineteenth-century rape was typically conceptualised less as a matter of 
identity, or ‘inner trauma’ but more as an external harm, by the time of the twentieth century, 
rape was conceived of as an affront against identity, a rupture against the very self.  
 
According to Bourke:  
 
‘The historically inflected balance between social (‘external’) and psychological 
(‘internal’) trauma resulting from sexual violation has had a major impact upon 
feminist strategy. Earlier generations of feminists were keen to portray women as 
resilient in the face of sexual violence. The threat to sexual violence was to be fought 
through comprehensive intervention in social structures.’16 
 
By the time of the 1970s and 1980s, a specific temporal juncture that saw a strong 
reinvigoration of liberal ideas, one influential strand (to be discussed in greater detail in 
                                                                                                                                           
and the threat of pregnancy. The accuser was 'spoiling' or 'ruining' a female victim's gendered social position. Ibid 
at 425.  
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Ibid (original emphasis).  
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid at 426.  
12 
 
Chapter IV) moved ‘decisively towards a trauma model and the notion of women’s pervasive 
victimisation thus entirely abandoning the idea of earlier female resilience when confronted 
with sexual assault.17 So-called ‘second-wave’ Western (mainly US-based) feminists insisted on 
emphasising emotion and insight into feelings, which were deemed to be sources of ‘unique 
truth’. While on the one hand still compassionately committed to building up women’s power 
and resisting oppressive male institutions, these feminists shifted their emphasis onto female 
emotional and psychic fragility in the face of injurious social structures. More specifically, 
femininity became defined as ‘victimhood’, while the related sense of unhappiness was tied to 
subjugation. The concept of the victim as the ‘revelatory voice’ of experience, thus, naturalised 
the experience of sexual violence by individualising it.18  The narratives surrounding female 
victimisation have therefore undergone a notable development to the extent that they have 
become disengaged from earlier assertions of collective female agency. According to Bourke:  
 
‘Against the persistence of male violence and its destructive effects, many women 
retain the subject position of victimhood, but in a context where the supportive 
community has largely fragmented. Feminist camaraderie vanished. Rape certainly did 
not.’19 
 
The recent turn in international feminist legal scholarship to ‘governance feminism’ can 
therefore perhaps be understood as a way of bringing back the sense of lost camaraderie, or 
solidarity that Bourke so eloquently refers to. At the same time this renewed form of female 
solidarity with the plight of the rape victims of the Yugoslav war might not have been 
uniformly positive, as it came at the expense of women, who were deemed to be on the 
‘wrong’ side of the war, and were left out of the legal narratives and the resulting ‘victories’ 
celebrated in international criminal tribunals.  
 
                                            
17
 Ibid at 428. 
18
 As Bourke suggest, while the  deployment of the ‘victim’ label to refer to women served as an effective strategy 
from which to confront patriarchal institutions and customs, paradoxically, however, the very success of second-
wave feminists created difficulties for the next generation of feminists, who used their newfound partial 
freedoms to forge even more individualistic paths to power and self-fulfilment. Ibid at 428-429.  
19
 Ibid at 429.  
13 
 
This thesis considers violence against women to be a widespread and endemic offence against 
female autonomy affecting the lives of millions of women around the world.20 Moreover, this 
project does not aim to diminish in any way the widespread and grave sexual violence 
offences committed against women during the Yugoslav war, or the horrors inflicted on 
civilians in detention camps, a state of exception that turned into a tragic metaphor of the 
conflict. The purpose of this thesis is rather to revisit the feminist discourses that have 
informed the debate around wartime sexual violence produced as a result of the Yugoslav war. 
It is animated by a strong concern around the ‘depoliticisation’ of wartime sexual violence in 
contemporary feminist scholarship and the renaissance of identity politics.  Specifically, it 
believes that a disproportionate amount of attention has been placed on culture as a lens for 
understanding armed conflict.21 It has been argued, for example, that the specific character of 
Yugoslavia, (and of the Balkans) stemming from patterns of patriarchal, pastoral and 
communal life22 with its own mythical views of heroism and a specific code of shame23 is to 
                                            
20
 A 2007 UNIFEM-sponsored report asserts that some 70 percent of the casualties in recent conflicts have been 
non-combatants, most of whom have been women and children. With respect to gender-based violence 
committed in conflicts that have catapulted the phenomenon onto the front pages, it is estimated that in 
Rwanda, up to half a million women were raped during the 1994 genocide, and around 60,000 during the 
Yugoslav war. Moreover, in Sierra Leone, the number of incidents of war-related sexual violence among internally 
displaced women from 1991 to 2001 was as high as 64,000.  UNIFEM ‘Facts and Figures on Violence against 
Women-Gender Issues: Violence Against Women’ Available at: 
http://www.unifem.org/attachments/gender_issues/violence_against_women/facts_figures_violenceagainst_wo
men_2007.pdf.  (last accessed in June 2011). 
The number of victims from the Yugoslav conflict is highly contested and the precise figures are unknown-for a 
discussion see, C. Niarchos, ‘Women, War and Rape’, 17 (4) Human Rights Quarterly (1995), 649. The commonly 
accepted estimate of victims is 20,000 first given in the EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim 
Women in the former Yugoslavia (The Warburton Mission II) (1993), at para. 14. As the Mission states, direct 
evidence from them women is extremely difficult to obtain, as women are ‘understandably reluctant’ to recall 
details of the atrocities done to them. Nonetheless, the Mission estimates that it is possible to speak of many 
thousands of victims with estimates varying widely and ranging from 10,000 to as many as 60,000. The most 
‘reasoned’ estimates, as the Mission puts it, are of 20,000 victims of sexual violence. Available at: 
http://www.womenaid.org/press/info/humanrights/warburtonfull.htm (last accessed in August 2010). This figure 
is confirmed by Cherif Bassiouni in Sexual Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia 
(Occasional Paper No.1 International Human Rights Law Institute, De Paul University College of Law, 1996). It is 
interesting to note that the EC decided to commission an investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim 
women during the conflict, but failed to do the same for Croat or Serbian women.  
21
 As Susan Brownmiller had previously pointed out in her discussion of the mass rape in Bangladesh, which is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter II, mass rape in war is not unique. The number of rapes per capita during the 
nine-month occupation of Bangladesh, for example, had not been greater than the incidence of rape during one 
month of occupation in the city of Nanking in 1937 (estimated at up to 400,000), than per capita incidence of 
rape in Belgium and France as the German army marched unchecked during the first three months of World War 
I, nor greater than the violation of women in ‘every village’ in Soviet Russia in World War I. In S. Brownmiller, 
‘War’, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, (London: Penguin Books, 1975), at 86.  
22
 Thus, in accounting for the emergence of Serbian nationalism, for example, Spyros Sofos has argued that this 
was promoted by mobilising elements of popular and folk culture, including historically conditioned fears and 
anxieties.  Slobodan Milošević, then a still relatively young leader, placed himself at the heart of the emerging 
14 
 
blame for the high incidence of sexual violence against women-a perspective that has in many 
instances been embraced by leading feminist scholars. This tendency, as the thesis goes on to 
argue, has reified Yugoslav women as a cultural species quite apart from similarly constructed 
Western women. In this way, dominant feminist discourses have failed to ask pressing and 
urgent questions regarding the impact of women's material status during wartime thus never 
fully exploring the extent to which underlying socio-economic conditions contributed to the 
outbreak of armed conflict, as well as seldom distinguishing between differently situated 
groups of women, according to education, occupation, and other criteria, as the case law 
analysis in Chapters V and VI reveal. Moreover, cultural framings of conflict have not been able 
to account for the absence of sexual violence in certain modern-day armed conflicts, which is 
just as important a topic for feminism.24    
 
Part III 
i) Counterpoint as a Method of Feminist Inquiry 
As was stated earlier, the thesis is a critical feminist analysis of wartime sexual violence, as it is 
constructed in international criminal jurisprudence and the surrounding debate. It thus asks: 
what is the adjudication of wartime sexual violence in international criminal tribunals (more 
specifically in ad-hoc Tribunals) considered to represent for women in the current historical 
                                                                                                                                           
nationalist movement after his 1987 visit to Kosovo Polje, where he pledged to protect the members of the 
Serbian and Montenegrin minority in the province from ‘persecution by the Albanian majority.’ By adopting a 
nationalist rhetoric, allying himself with the Serbian Orthodox church and reinforcing the moral panic regarding 
the ‘Albanization’ of Kosovo by mobilising aspects of folk and popular culture, Miloševic was then able to capture 
the leadership. For a more in-depth discussion, see S. Sofos, ‘Inter-Ethnic Violence and Gendered Constructions of 
Ethnicity in the Former Yugoslavia', 2 Social Identities (1), (1996) 73 at 79. 
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be explained by anthropological research on the pastoralist cultures of the rural and mountainous areas of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, from which most of the Serb, Croat, and Muslim irregulars and the 
majority of their leadership originated. These were also the areas, where most of the conflict took place. Thus, 
according to Sofo’s anthropological readings of the marginalisation of women in kinship groups and in the cultural 
life of the community, it is Balkan pastoralist culture, where women are not deemed significant components the 
nation that is to blame for the high incidence of rape. It is this pastoralist culture that perceives rape as an act of 
‘fertilization’ of women, an acceptable way of rectifying historical injustice, the loss of contested lands, and the 
sacrifices of each of the warring communities. Ibid at 87. 
24
 Political theorist Elizabeth Jane Wood has produced interesting research into the variations of the use of sexual 
violence during war arguing that whereas in some conflicts sexual violence is widespread, such as in Rwanda or 
Yugoslavia, in others -including ethnic conflicts-such as Sri Lanka, or Israel/Palestine it is relatively limited. The 
assertion that sexual violence against women necessarily accompanies war strategies is thus placed in doubt, and 
it contradicts the more dominant discourses on violence against women, which locate it across the spectrum of 
modern-day armed conflict affecting women on a widespread scale. In E. Wood, 'Variation in Sexual Violence 
during War’, 34 Politics & Society, (2006), 307-341; see also: E. J. Wood, ‘Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: 
When is Wartime Rape Rare?'37 Politics & Society, (2009), 131.  
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and political moment? In essence, this question is a variation of a critical method that has 
been formulated by Wendy Brown as follows:  
 
‘What kind of subject, produced by what kind of politics is led to seek what kind of 
rights, in the context of what kind of legal, cultural and state discourses with what kind 
of effects?’25  
 
The thesis is predominantly concerned with the effects and implications of debating wartime 
sexual violence issues within a contemporary liberal, universalist international legal 
framework. In this way, it does not purport to produce a comprehensive doctrinal legal 
analysis of all recent developments in international criminal jurisprudence. Rather, it uses the 
legal materials as a springboard to consider wider issues of gender, ethnicity, culture and 
violence, as they are manifested in the contemporary violence against women debate. It thus 
aims to contribute to the wider feminist literature that engages with these discourses. The 
thesis is a 'critical feminist’ analysis, which implies engagement with the very parameters of 
the debate, rather than advocating straightforward legal change. This is not to minimise the 
merit of other feminist (as well as non-feminist) contributions, which might pursue such a 
course. Rather, the method adopted in the thesis can be described as guided by the idea of 
counterpoint.  
 
This has been described as:  
‘A deliberate practice of multiplicity that exceeds simple opposition and does not carry 
the mythological or methodological valence of dialectics or contradiction. At once 
open-ended and tactical, counterpoint emanates from and promotes an anti-
hegemonic sensibility and requires a modest and carefully styled embrace of 
multiplicity in which contrasting elements, featured simultaneously, do not simply war, 
harmonise, blend or compete, but rather bring out the complexity that cannot emerge 
through a monolithic or single melody. This complexity does not add up to a whole but, 
rather, sets off a theme by providing an elsewhere to it, indeed, it can even highlight 
and thus contest dominance through its work of juxtaposition.’26 
                                            
25
 W. Brown, ‘Revealing Critique: A Response to Kenneth Baynes’, 28 Political Theory (2000), 469 at 477.  
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Thus, counterpoint provides a technique for a critical analysis, which does not insist on the 
correctness of its approach. Rather, it presents a set of observations in counterpoint to other 
arguments advanced on the subject. It offers a perspective, rather than objectivity or 
comprehensiveness. In this way, the thesis chooses to explore certain angles and advance 
arguments and perspectives in opposition to currently prevailing positions. This does not 
necessarily imply disagreement with those rather it complicates them by providing an 
alternative vision. The thesis therefore advocates for certain perspectives that are believed to 
be under-represented in the current debate, yet are desirable from a 'critical feminist' point.  
 
 
ii) The Contribution of the Thesis to Original Knowledge  
There is only so much that can be said on an issue as topical as wartime sexual violence 
without repeating others. Nonetheless, it is believed that the thesis makes an original 
contribution to the violence against women debate in current feminist scholarship, as it seeks 
to emphasise angles, which have not been explored sufficiently, or which merit further 
elaboration in different contexts.  
 
Three key contributions to knowledge can be specifically listed. First, the thesis assesses 
whether contemporary feminist investments with international criminal law are desirable for 
women in the current political and legal moment.  It contributes to the growing literature on 
ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence by focusing closely on the case law arising from 
the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (with its attendant phenomena such as the mass sexual 
violence perpetrated inside the detention camps), from a critical feminist perspective. But 
unlike many contemporary feminist texts, it aims to provide a platform for further reflection 
and analysis on the existing debate, rather than a prescription of how wartime sexual violence 
ought to be legally regulated.  
 
Secondly, through the adoption of a counterpoint methodology, the thesis offers an analysis of 
how wartime identities materialise in key ICTY decisions, and how identity categories, such as 
gender and ethnicity intersect. At the same time, it draws attention to the legal modalities by 
which female agency has been erased from international criminal jurisprudence through the 
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deployment of gendered stereotypes that construe women as either mothers, wives or victims 
of war.  It builds on the existing critical legal scholarship pursued by, for example Doris Buss, 
Karen Engle and Janet Halley, while adopting a more critical angle that links the turn to 
identity politics in feminist debates around the Yugoslav war to the 'ethnicisation' of the 
conflict in popular discourse. Hereby, the project ties in the representation of wartime identity 
in international criminal tribunals with the 'depoliticisation' strategy identified by Wendy 
Brown in the context of tolerance discourses surfacing in a post-September the 11th world. By 
examining ‘governance feminism’ (a variation of structural or radical feminism) as the 
paradigmatic manifestation of the consensual approach currently adopted by feminists in the 
wartime sexual violence debate, it, moreover, questions whether, at this moment, feminism is 
transmitting a new tradition for which it may be the sovereign authority itself.27  
 
Thirdly, the thesis reinstates critique as an important methodological tool for current feminist 
legal scholarship. It thus examines in detail the current feminist anxiety about critique (also 
ubiquitous in contemporary political and legal culture), built around the idea that the 
destabilisation of female subjectivity might rob feminists of elements of theory and practice 
that are indispensible to their goals. This is particularly so in light of feminism's close 
association with activism and practice over the past two decades, which the thesis goes on to 
explore in detail in subsequent chapters. This project thus adds an important alternative 
perspective to the debate by arguing that the distancing from critique often blocks intellectual 
and practical developments within feminist theory, which might be neither intellectually 
justifiable, not politically desirable. Despite its disquieting quality, critique is thus advocated as 
an invaluable tool, which can provide a ‘relief effect’ by addressing ‘one’s political anxieties or 
discontents.’28 In sum, the thesis contributes insight into what has been 'lost or unseen when 
ethnicity becomes unquestionably the explanatory framework’29 through which wartime 
identities are represented in feminist and non-feminist discourses.  
 
                                            
27
 D. Otto, ‘Lost in Translation: Re-scripting the Sexed Subjects of International Human Rights Law’ in Anne Orford, 
(edt.), International Law and Its Others, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 320. 
28
 W. Brown & J. Halley (eds.), ‘Introduction’ in Left Legalism/Left Critique, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2002), 28. 
29
 In Buss (2007), 6.  
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iii) The Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis pursues a simple structure-the opening three chapters, including the present one, 
provide a discussion and analysis of the salient developments concerning gender-based 
violence and wartime sexual violence. The middle stage of the thesis is constituted by Chapter 
IV, which serves as the transitional stage from the overview of the salient legal developments 
to their critical feminist analysis, which is fully carried out in Chapters V and VI.  
 
Chapter II examines the genealogy of gender-based violence in international human rights law 
and it revisits the recognition of women’s rights as human rights as significant junctures in 
feminist scholarship and activism, which ultimately have propelled wartime sexual violence to 
the top of the international legal agenda. It thus explains why gender-based violence is 
significant from a legal feminist perspective and it reflects on the visibility of the Violence 
against Women movement (VAW) within contemporary human rights discourses. Moreover, it 
provides the background for the ensuing critical analysis pursued in later chapters by showing 
how the definitional and legal evolution of gender-based violence paved the way for the later 
incorporation of wartime sexual violence into international criminal law. It also offers a 
critique of specific institutional policies such as a ‘gender mainstreaming’, which have become 
prevalent across international legal institutions, thus, opening the debate on what these 
developments signify for women in the current political and legal moment.   
 
This provides the stepping stone for Chapter III, which focuses in detail on the key 
developments in contemporary wartime sexual violence jurisprudence achieved by the ad-hoc 
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It provides a historical and legal overview of wartime 
sexual violence against women in armed conflict in order to illuminate upon some of the 
traditional reasons for its marginalisation from the annals of history and from international 
criminal law until the 1990s. It thus maps out the evolution of wartime sexual violence in 
international criminal law by reflecting on some of the salient legal achievements such as the 
definition of rape in international criminal law, or the recognition of rape as a form of torture 
produced by the tribunals. In this way, it sketches out the critical legal approach adopted by 
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the thesis, while at the same time making room for a stronger critique to emerge in the 
remaining chapters.  
 
Chapter IV acts as the first pillar in the methodological transition from the discussion of 
wartime sexual violence developments to their actual analysis pursued in chapters IV, V and 
VI. It provides the theoretical backdrop to the thesis by mapping out and analysing various 
feminist approaches to human rights, gender, ethnicity culture and armed conflict in order to 
crystallise the actual ‘critical feminist’ method that subsequent chapters employ. This chapter 
is largely a ‘ground-clearing' exercise: it overviews these approaches in order to highlight their 
advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of engaging with an issue such as 
wartime sexual violence against women. The types of approaches overviewed are first, 
liberal/universalist, second, radical and ‘governance’ feminists, third, poststructuralist 
feminists and, fourth, postcolonial and intersectionality feminists. This chapter suggests an 
alternative perspective that focuses on the impact of economic globalisation, military 
intervention and structural violence as a more desirable option to the feminist approaches 
currently in play. It argues that although each of the approaches reviewed is not without 
merit, new inquires drawing away from identity politics might offer a more refreshing and 
alternative insight into the complex power relations that characterise modern-day armed 
conflict. In this way, the chapter raises the possibility that it might be opportune for feminism 
to take a step back and reconsider its own investment with institutional power.   
 
Chapter V provides a critical overview of the most significant recent legal developments in 
ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. Its aim is not to cover all developments, but to 
provide an insight into the legal and semantic modalities deployed by the tribunal in 
interpreting the Yugoslav conflict, which in turn provides ground for the critical feminist 
approach pursued in Chapter VI. The chapter briefly documents the historical trajectory of the 
conflict in Yugoslavia, and it crystallises the methodological approach adopted by the thesis in 
its selection of case law. The cases selected are deemed landmark decisions in the area of 
wartime sexual violence jurisprudence and they feature specific gendered phenomena, such as 
the mass rape in detention camps that have become closely associated with the Yugoslav 
conflict in the popular imagination. Moreover, they illustrate how gender and ethnicity 
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intersect in the legal decisions in a manner that depoliticises, or removes the significance of 
the Yugoslav conflict as a political event from the historical powers that shaped it. This 
chapter, alongside chapter IV, constitutes a methodological bridge between the discussion of 
wartime sexual violence developments, provided in Chapters I, II and III, and their critical 
analysis pursued in Chapters V and VI.  
 
Chapter VI is where the critical feminist analysis of wartime sexual violence is actually 
crystallised. The chapter, thus, purports to assert the value of critique as itself a worthwhile 
transformative academic and political strategy in contrast with some feminist preoccupations 
with legal reform and the theory/practice division. Using counterpoint as its methodological 
tool, it argues that the absence of a unified subject need not block certain feminist pursuits. It 
highlights two salient trends in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence: the reading of 
gendered identity through an ethnic lens, and the portrayal of women as either mothers or 
victims that form the feminist core of the debate on wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. 
These legal tactics are believed to have produced a problematic narrative of gendered identity 
in wartime. The chapter, thus, suggests that there are current limitations to viewing women in 
this way and it proposes adding another layer to the analysis by conceptualising wartime 
agency in different terms. It argues that women’s subordination and inequality might not be 
solved by feminism alone and that an alternative framework, which is not necessarily inspired 
by feminist thinking, nor relies on the increased criminalisation of sexual violence might be the 
way forward in conceptualising female identity in wartime differently.  
 
Part IV 
Some Underlying ‘Depoliticising’ Discourses  
The thesis pursues a critical feminist analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence 
and the surrounding debate. In order to facilitate this task, it is necessary to provide an 
account of some background discourses and tendencies, cutting across much of contemporary 
feminist and identity politics, as well as their underlying political and legal formations.  Wendy 
Brown regards these discourses and tendencies as manifestations of the late modern 
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phenomenon of depoliticisation.30 This entails an array of contemporary depoliticising 
discourses, such as liberalism, individualism, human rights, 'culturalisation of politics' and 
tolerance. All of these are complicit in each other’s operation. Given that all these discourses 
are taken as underlying assumptions of the thesis and provide the backdrop of the chapters, a 
brief explanation of each is provided here. In broad strokes, Brown defines depoliticisation as 
‘removing a political phenomenon from comprehension of its historical emergence and from 
recognition of the powers that produce and contour it’.31 The construction and representation 
of the subject in such discourses inevitably reinforces certain ‘ontological naturalness or 
essentialism’ in our understanding of the sources of deep political and social problems’.32 
 
 
i) ‘Naturalisation/Culturalisation/Personalisation’  
The first strand of depoliticisation is ‘naturalisation/culturalisation’ the deployment of which 
serves to characterise ‘instances of inequality and social injury’ as ‘matters of individual or 
group prejudice.’33 The second strand, personalisation, refers to the substitution of ‘emotional 
and personal vocabularies for formulating solutions to political problems’.34 Historical injustice 
so often underlying the outbreak of conflict is thus reduced to the phenomenon of difference 
rendering identity itself, comprising of certain ‘practices and beliefs’, the problem that needs 
to be tolerated and managed. Power and history are equally overlooked and ignored in the 
quest to find the formulation of solutions to these problems. The consequence of substituting 
justice or equality in favour of tolerance results in historically induced suffering being reduced 
to ‘difference’, or a problem of personal feeling. The field in which the ‘political battle’ and 
‘political transformation’ ought to take place thus gets replaced with an agenda of emotional 
practices.35  
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 In Brown (2006), 15. 
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 Ibid at 15. 
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 Brown's understanding of 'politicisation' is far broader than the classical liberal understanding, which is largely 
limited to the democratic legislative process. In Brown (2000), 475.  
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 Ibid at 16.  
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ii) Liberalism/ Individualism 
Brown terms liberalism as the most profound achievement of depoliticisation. She attributes 
the excessive emphasis on the individual and tropes such as self-making, agency, and a 
‘relentless responsibility for itself’ as contributing factors in the personalisation of politically 
contoured conflicts and inequalities. The result of these tendencies is the elimination from 
view of various norms and social relations, especially those relating to capital, race, gender 
and sexuality that construct and position subjects in liberal democracies.36  
 
Individualism is another depoliticising discourse, inextricably tied to liberalism. Rooted in the 
American cultural emphasis on the importance of individual belief and behaviour and of 
individual heroism and failure it is at the same time ‘relentlessly depoliticising.’37 In a similar 
vein, Costas Douzinas has argued that human rights have been ‘triumphant’ in modernity 
because nature has ceased to be the standard of right meaning that all individual desires could 
be turned into rights.38 Hence, rights in postmodernity have become the legal recognition of 
individual will.  People acquire their humanity and subjectivity by having rights, and a general 
agreement that a desire or interest is constitutive of humanity is sufficient for the creation of a 
new legal right. In this way, ‘[i]s and ought are collapsed, rights are reduced to facts and 
agreements expressed in legislation, or, in a more critical vein, to the disciplinary priorities of 
power and domination.’39 The individual has become the ‘triumphant’40 centre of our 
postmodern world, which is evident in the relentlessly recurring turn to identity and identity-
related politics, which intersect with a return of morality to politics and a return of humanism 
to law in the proceedings of the ICTY.41 With its firm focus on the prosecution of the individual 
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 The reduction of freedom to rights and of equality to equal standing before the law often eliminates from view 
many sources of subordination, marginalisation, and inequality that organise liberal democratic societies and 
fashion their subjects. Ibid.  
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 Ibid, at 17  
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 C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11.  
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 Ibid, at 11.  
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 Ibid, at 17 (original emphasis).  
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mind creating an institution that would give the ‘appearance’ of moral concern. These considerations thus point 
to the infusion of morality into the law as a means of addressing serious violations of international humanitarian 
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and the attribution of responsibility for gross human rights violations on individual actors, it 
could be argued that the ICTY strategy behind the individualisation of international criminal 
law is to create the perception that deep social problems are fully redressable through 
individual litigation. As Martti Koskenniemi has argued in his discussion of the Milošević trial:  
 
‘Focusing on the individual abstracts the political context, that is to say, describes it in 
terms of the actions and intentions of particular, well-situated individuals.’42  
 
The thesis agrees with this view, as it is believed that the intentions and actions of individuals 
can be grasped only by attention to structural causes, such as economic or functional 
necessities, or institutional frameworks that in the first place allow certain individuals to 
create potent social effects through their actions.43 From a feminist perspective, the emphasis 
on rights might create the illusion that deep social problems are (fully) redressable through 
individual legal litigation, as they are, in essence, matters of ‘remarks, attitudes, and speech.’44 
The invocation of the individual in human rights law has often also been critiqued for its 
construction of a masculinist worldview, which occludes women from the picture.45  
Moreover, it can be contended that the prosecution of certain key individuals, but sometimes 
marginal figures, too,46 has not brought about a basis for political peace and reconciliation in 
post-conflict situations.  
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iii) Human Rights 
Human Rights is a particularly prominent late modern liberal depoliticising discourse. 
According to Douzinas human rights are ‘both creations and creators of modernity, the 
greatest political and legal invention of modern political philosophy and jurisprudence.’47 On 
his view, their essential characteristics in the modern turn can be described as follows:  
 
‘[f]irst, they mark a profound turn in political thought from duty to right, from civitas 
and communitas to civilization and humanity. Secondly, they reverse the traditional 
priority between the individual and society. While classical and medieval natural law 
expressed the right order of the cosmos and of human communities within it, an order 
that gave the citizen his place, time and dignity, modernity emancipates the human 
person, turns him from citizen to individual and establishes him at the centre of social 
and political organization and activity’.48  
 
Human rights with its emphasis on reason as a chief virtue is supposed to transcend 
geographical and historical differences, its narrative looking to teloi and ends as the way 
forward on the path to human emancipation. As Douzinas sees it,  
 
‘Human rights have won the ideological battle of modernity’, and yet if the twentieth 
century is the epoch of human rights, their triumph is something of a paradox, given 
that the modern age has witnessed more violations of their principles than any of the 
previous and less ‘enlightened’ epochs.49 There is thus a huge discrepancy between 
theory and practice of human rights, which is not helped by the fact that official 
thinking and action on human rights has been entrusted in the hands of triumphalist 
columnist writers, bored diplomats and rich international lawyers in New York and 
Geneva, people whose experience of human rights violations is confined to being 
served a bad bottle of red wine. In the process, human rights have mutated from a 
discourse of rebellion and dissent into that of state legitimacy’.50 
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The recent repercussions of this historic depoliticising move are thus paradoxical: on the one 
hand, universal rights operate on the assumption of the autonomous, rational 'relentlessly 
self-interested subject of liberalism', which discursively erases differences and the 
disadvantage hinging on them. On the other, rights, refashioned for and by the particular 
subject as pertaining to a specific identity (be it women, blacks, or gays, or even Bosnian 
Muslim women), further entrench what Brown calls the ‘identity's constitutive injury’, as well 
as the discourses that frame it. In this way, human rights become inextricably linked with the 
markedly anti-emancipatory function of identity, which she conceptualises drawing on the 
theorisation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s slave mentality, and his view of 'ressentiment' as the 
impulse driving those who see themselves as disenfranchised from the system.51 
 
Human rights and international law as depoliticising discourses, informed by identity politics, 
are of tremendous relevance to the critical feminist analysis of the wartime sexual violence 
debate, which this thesis pursues. This is because the discourse of human rights provides the 
primary framework through which sexual violence in times of armed conflict is articulated in 
the international legal system. Indeed a recent collection on the anthropology of human rights 
summarises, ‘human rights is to modernity what culture is to tradition’, explaining that  
 
‘[a]s a language of social transformation and even emancipation, rights interventions 
are teleologically focused on the transformation of tradition to modernity, and of 
culture to rights.’52  
 
                                            
51
 Brown argues that contemporary identity politics (including feminism) is traceable to Nietzschean slave 
morality, in which the subject (of feminism/identity politics) feels morally right and politically righteous because 
she is disadvantaged. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment channels the subject’s otherwise unendurable 
suffering into a ‘negative form of action’, deploring the nature’s ‘true reaction’, as well as denouncing power and 
action as themselves morally wrong. Brown sees in identity politics the enactment of the moralising revenge of 
the powerless, ‘the triumph of the weak as the weak’, which is as likely to seek generalised political paralysis...as 
it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment.’ W. Brown, 'Postmodern Exposures, Feminist 
Hesitations', States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 43-45.  
52
 B. Rajagopal, ‘Introduction: Encountering Ambivalence’ in M. Goodale & S.E. Merry (eds.), The Practice of 
Human Rights: Tracking the Law between the Global and the Local, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 273 and 274.  
26 
 
It is now widely accepted that human rights have become the quintessence of the project of 
modernity, alongside other institutionalised discourses such as secularism, market freedom 
and democracy.53 As former ICTY President Antonio Cassese has observed, human rights have 
today assumed the status of a ‘quasi secular religion’.54 They have become the global 
expression of the Western liberal tradition having diminished other previously useful 
vocabularies such as socialism, the labour movement and even Christianity.55 Moreover, from 
a feminist liberal perspective, human rights have been central in seeking redress for gender-
based violence. This is because the human rights idea is one of the few moral visions ascribed 
to internationally striking ‘deep chords of response among many.’56 Thus, human rights have 
been seen as the vehicle that allowed the specific experiences of women to be made visible in 
international law.  
 
The contemporary ascendancy of human rights also involves a certain conflation between local 
and international discourses of human rights. This conflation has been theorised as the ‘global 
diffusion of norms’, which implies growing interpenetration of the different systems of legal 
norms and related discourses. Domestic rights frameworks increasingly embrace ‘international 
standards’ not just through classic incorporation, but also through a range of innovative ways 
such as judges using international human rights law as ‘persuasive’ authority. On the other 
hand, it has become common for international tribunals to refer to the practice of other 
international bodies/ and or domestic courts. These tendencies turn international law into a 
process both of ‘particularisation of the universal’ and ‘universalisation of the particular.’57 The 
result is that a rigid distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ jurisdictions becomes 
somewhat artificial in the discussion of human rights entailing significant repercussions for the 
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feminist movement. Indeed, it has been observed that ‘the [domestic] legal feminist 
enterprise increasingly seems incomplete where it lacks an international aspect.’58 
International law has thus firmly become ‘the official language of human rights, quite distinct 
from customary or even constitutional rights regimes’. 59 Its language, moreover, has been 
seen as the ‘only, sole legitimate discourse of resistance recognised by law.’60 But as the thesis 
goes on to argue, the production and reproduction of knowledge about the ‘real world’ of 
women is one of the ways in which some feminist international legal texts continue to be part 
of traditional imperialism that perpetuates problematic gender stereotypes.61 In this version of 
the appropriate disciplinary role for feminist theory, the suffering of the ‘Third World Woman’ 
becomes the object of knowledge of ‘First World International Lawyers’62.  
 
iv) The Culturalisation of Politics  
As to the other depoliticising discourses, Wendy Brown highlights the recent phenomenon of 
the culturalisation of politics, which helps to illustrate how tolerance can be utilised ‘[i]n a 
manner that equates or conflates non-commensurable subjects and practices’ with ethnicity, 
race, religion and culture being especially interchangeable.63 This overdetermination is 
profoundly asymmetrical and to a large degree patronising, as it is marked by a division 
between those who ‘have culture’ and those whom ‘culture has’: the late modern versus the 
pre-modern non-West. Culture is not only the driving force of political conflict or the dividing 
line between the civilised and the uncivilised, but also the problem for which liberalism itself is 
proffered as a solution.64 A poignant example of the turn to liberalism as the solution for those 
‘whom culture has’ is offered in Hagan’s account of the political motivations driving the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, as the transformation of then U.S. President Bill Clinton’s initially firm 
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stance on sending troops to Bosnia shows. Based on this version of events, it was Clinton’s 
reading of the book Balkan Ghosts65 that convinced him that the region was ‘chronically 
violent’ persuading him to distance himself from the Vance-Owen Plan, which had proposed to 
divide Bosnia into ‘ethnic cantons’ and had cautioned against using air strikes against Bosnian 
Serbs.66 In this way the decision to launch a significant military intervention was allegedly 
taken based on essentialised assumptions about a region and its people as cultural entities 
that had to be rescued from themselves and ultimately 'civilised' at the hands of the benign 
West.  
 
v) The International Community 
International community norms are widely considered to be a major feature of modernity and 
indeed liberalism. According to Gerry Simpson, the public pronouncements of key officials are 
careful to invoke the international community at ‘every turn’.67 The 'Great Powers' do not 
purport to act in the name of narrow self-interest, but on behalf of community interests, or 
humanity itself lending credence to their mission through the invocation of 'common values.' 
A necessary corollary to this rhetorical and legal tradition is the presence of states and groups 
operating outside of the universal community acting in the ‘cause of inhumanity.'68 Thus, wars 
are not fought between adversaries but between the international community and 
international outlaws, or between the 'universal and the particular', so human rights, for 
instance, are posited against Islamic terrorism. But such discourses do not necessarily lead to a 
questioning of the broader international legal commitment to trade and financial 
liberalisation, nor to challenges of the international community’s support of certain kinds of 
militarism, while outlawing the conduct of ‘terrorists’ or ‘rogue states’.69   
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In the context of the run-up to the Yugoslav war, Susan Woodward has, for example, shown 
that rather than acting as a benign influence the international community strengthened the 
causes of violence: it contributed to the weakness of the federal government and its state 
capacity; it legitimised the people and ideas that would eventually win and it failed to 
understand the hard work needed to make peace when it accepted the peacemakers' role.70 
An example of such initiative was the EC-sponsored Badinter Commission designed to address 
legal questions around international statehood and to encourage negotiations with the 
presidents of the then Yugoslav republics. But rather than leading to stability in the region its 
findings arguably accelerated the war.71  Significantly and not by accident, the creation of the 
ICTY was set against the backdrop of expansionist terminology that accompanied the 
redefinition of the ‘international community’ away from a sovereign state-centric notion of 
international law to a cosmopolitan ideal understood as a form of international public law that 
binds sovereign nations.72 But often the same international community has served as a ‘self-
congratulatory’ and elusive mechanism, allowing trials to be conducted by foreign prosecutors 
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and before foreign judges. As such, it can be argued that no moral community has been 
affirmed, as no judgement has been sufficient to restore the dignity of the victims and no 
symbolism persuasive enough to justify drawing a thick line between past and future.73 The 
only ‘community’ that has thus stood to benefit from such processes is the symbolic 
‘international community’, whose official stamp of approval has largely served to legitimise its 
own moral authority.74 Moreover, the thesis contends that the international community 
paradigm has contributed to the sense that 'ethnic ancient rivalries' informed by notions of 
'barbarism and primitivism' accounted for the violence witnessed during the Yugoslav conflict. 
In this way, the international community has posited its own superior sense of morality against 
the perceived barbarism of the uncivilised natives.75 This has reinstated the clash between the 
‘civilised’ West against less exalted civilisations driven by cultural values and ways of life, 
which stultify both their political and economic development and from which they cannot 
escape. To sum up, the depoliticising discourses of liberalism, individualism, human rights, the 
culturalisation of politics and international community provide the essential background 
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Chapter II  
The Evolution of Gender-based Violence in International Law  
Part I 
Introduction 
As stated previously, this thesis is a critical feminist analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence, as it is currently constructed in feminist legal scholarship and the surrounding 
discourses. Violence against women, in particular sexual violence has been a greatly topical 
issue within recent years in both feminist and non-feminist legal scholarship and the popular 
imagination. There have been important legal developments within international law, which 
have provoked much academic and, in particular, legal commentary. On one level, the thesis 
contributes to this commentary. At the same time, it aims to contribute to a broader feminist 
theory, which engages with questions of human rights, identity, gender, armed conflict, 
culture and violence.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a sense of the status of women’s human rights in 
international law and to revisit the incorporation of gender-based violence in the human rights 
framework as a significant moment for feminist activism and scholarship.  In fact this chapter 
aims to show the symbiotic relationship between the evolution of gender-based violence in 
international human rights law and the recognition of acts of wartime sexual violence in 
international criminal law. By charting the most crucial human rights developments from a 
feminist perspective, it aims to provide a sense of the importance of sexual violence in 
feminist discourses, while at the same tightening its analytical grip by interrogating the effects 
produced by the criminalisation of gender-based violence in international law. In this vein, it 
adopts a contrapuntal analysis by questioning whether in spite of the incorporation of gender-
specific harms against women, or the adoption of gender mainstreaming policies, feminist 
inclusion strategies might have nonetheless reproduced unequal relations of power in their 











The aim is pursued as follows: Part II provides a brief definitional background of how gender 
replaced the term ‘women’ in the international legal vocabulary and it explains why it has 
become the preferred strategic trope for feminist legal scholars. It also outlines why gender-
based violence is a topic of constant interest to feminist legal scholarship and it looks at the 
conceptual and definitional hurdles of incorporating the term ‘gender’ into the Rome Statute. 
Part III gives some essential background in respect of the institutionalisation and incorporation 
of gender-based violence into international law by charting the key stages in the recognition of 
women’s rights as human rights. In this way, it prepares the ground for the ensuing analysis, 
which turns increasingly critical as the thesis proceeds. Part IV addresses the policy of gender 
mainstreaming, which has been described as having become the ‘mantra’76 in international 
institutions, and is a technique used for responding to the inequalities between men and 
women that is prevalent across the majority of United Nations institutions. Gender 
mainstreaming strategies have increasingly been deployed in UN Security Council Resolutions 
as a means of visibilising gender-based violence against women during armed conflict, while at 
the same time seeking to increase female participation in peace processes and truth and 
reconciliation mechanisms. The segment also overviews the salient feminist criticism made in 
relation to these strategies, thus adding critical perspective to the debate by quering the 
potential of international humanitarian law to achieve substantive gender equality. Part V 
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The Emergence of ‘Gender’ in Contemporary Human Rights Discourses 
The use of the term gender is ubiquitous in international human rights discourses today. It has 
(to a large extent) replaced ‘the woman’ from international legal texts. It is thus of interest to 
this thesis to explore, albeit in brief contours, what gender stands for and why it is the 
preferred feminist signifier for the ‘woman question.’ According to feminist historian Joan 
Wallach Scott, gender denotes the social organisation of the relationship between the two 
sexes.77 In its simplest usage, gender is a synonym for women. But, rather than using the 
politically charged term ‘women’, American feminists in particular began to make usage of this 
trope to evoke the fundamental sense of social inequality based on distinctions around sex. 
Gender, thus, carries an implicit rejection of the biological determinism inherent in the use of 
terms such as ‘sex’ or ‘sexual difference’. Moreover, gender stresses the relational aspect of 
normative definitions of femininity, a key advantage from a feminist perspective.78 As a 
substitute term for women, it also carries the suggestion that information about women is 
necessarily information about men, that one implies the study of the other. As Scott has put it 
‘[t]his usage insists that the world of women is part of the world of men, created in and by 
it.’79  
 
Given its focus on social relations between the sexes and its explicit rejection of biological 
explanations, (such as those that locate diverse forms of female subordination in women’s 
ability to give birth and men’s greater muscular strength), gender is thus understood as a 
cultural construct, a system of relationships that may include sex, but is not entirely 
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determined by sex or sexuality.80 From the point of view of this thesis, the most significant 
development in relation to the deployment of gender in contemporary human rights 
discourses is its disassociation from the politics of feminism. As Scott has put it:  
 
‘[g]ender does not carry with it a necessary statement about inequality or power, nor 
does it name the aggrieved and (hitherto invisible) party.’81  
 
This, for instance, renders it distinctly different from the term ‘women’s history’, which 
proclaims its politics by asserting that women are valid and historical subjects. Gender includes 
but does not name women and therefore seems to pose no critical threat to the official 
language of international law.82  The advantage of including the less politically charged term 
into human rights language was that it allowed for a broader conceptualisation of women’s 
lived realities in this way paving the way for a better understanding of the specific gendered 
harms experienced by women in their everyday lives. According to this thesis, however, the 
contemporary usage of gender in human rights discourses and related institutions could 
potentially be seen as another form of depoliticisation. The use of gender could therefore 
imply a certain disassociation of women’s lived realities from the political and historical 
powers that constitute them.  
 
 
i) The Rome Diplomatic Conference  
By the time of the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference83, which had seen an unprecedented and 
sustained feminist lobbying and advocacy, gender no longer seemed a controversial term, but 
an acceptable part of the international legal vocabulary with a majority of states having 
expressed support for the integration of gender-specific provisions. The Rome Diplomatic 
                                            
80
 Ibid at 1056-1057. 
81
 Ibid at 1056.  
82
 The term gender was, for example, only included in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action after 
states agreed that it was to be interpreted according to its ‘ordinary, generally accepted usage’, and that no new 
connotation differing from its original usage would be deployed in the Beijing Platform for Action. For a 
discussion, see: B. Bedont & K. Hall Martinez, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International 
Criminal Court’, VI The Brown Journal of World Affairs (1999) 66,67; V. Oosterveldt (2005), 55, 56.  
83
 The Preparatory Commission and Assembly of State Parties [hereinafter PrepComI] conducted the drafting and 
promulgation of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the ICC Elements of Crime. For an extensive critical 
feminist overview of this process, see: Halley (2008-2009), at 18.  
35 
 
Conference served as the precursor to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
the world’s first permanent international criminal court.84 In 1998, the term ‘gender’ was used 
and defined for the first time in a legally-binding international treaty, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. While gender was not specifically incorporated into the statutes 
of the previous two ad-hoc tribunals, feminist advocates made sure that it would be defined 
this time. The incorporation of gender as a separate identity category in Article 7(3) of the 
Rome Statute was the result of highly contentious negotiations and discussions over its 
meaning serving as a lightening road for conservatives who held strong concerns over its 
perceived sexual connotations. Article 7(3) reads as follows:  
 
‘For the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the 
two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not 
indicate any meaning different from the above.’85 
 
The adoption of this term mirrored the increasingly common use of the term in international 
human rights law over past decades. Naming crimes committed in armed conflict as gender 
crimes was, moreover, seen as raising increased global awareness of the sexually targeted 
nature of the crimes,86 which historically had been accepted as inevitable bi-products or ‘spoils 
of war’ and were at the time consistent with women’s status in international law, as Chapter 
III goes on to discuss. The incorporation of gender within the Rome Statute, moreover, 
highlighted the strong, organised women’s movement represented by the Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice (WCGJ), whose objective was to ensure that a gender perspective would be 
integrated throughout the Statute.87 Women’s Caucus members were, thus, active lobbying in 
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their countries and capitals before participating in the PrepComs and the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference.88  But as mentioned previously, unlike with other identity markers such as race 
and ethnicity, the definition and incorporation of gender drew far louder protest.  From the 
very beginning, but especially during the negotiations, the Women’s Caucus had to deal with 
fierce opposition from an alliance between anti-choice groups, and delegations representing 
states where discriminatory treatment is justified through religion.89 The Women’s Caucus 
pushed for the term gender as opposed to sex because of the latter’s reference to the 
biological differences between men and women, whereas gender typically denotes the socially 
constructed roles of men and women.90 It similarly regarded the term ‘gender crimes’ 
preferable to sexual violence because of its inclusion of crimes which target men or women 
because of their gender roles regardless of any sexual element.91 
 
Given the tensions underlying the negotiations, some feminist commentators viewed the 
outcome as a victory for women’s rights because the narrower terms- ‘sex’ and ‘sexual 
violence’ had been eschewed in favour of the term ‘gender crime’ to denote the sociological 
differences between men and women.92 But other observers disagreed pointing out that the 
definition was ‘oddly worded’, ‘circular’ and reflective of the ‘constructive ambiguity’ 
underlying the negotiations.93 This reflected the tension within feminist legal discourse 
between those who hailed the definition as a spectacular victory for women’s human rights, 
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and others who decried the conflation of gender and sex, the limitations of the reference to 
the ‘context of society,’ the potential for the exclusion of sexual orientation, and the sidelining 
of other gender issues.94 
 
The ICC gender definition is likely to have a direct impact on the kinds of cases that the court 
will prosecute in future, on the prosecutor’s duties, and on the protection and participation of 
victims and witnesses. Yet while gender is today the preferred legal strategy from a feminist 
perspective, this would not have been possible without the sustained feminist advocacy of the 
1990s, which first identified gender-based violence against women as a human rights issue. 
The next segment thus charts the social, political and moral difficulties encountered by 
advocates, who waged notable battles in order to gain acknowledgment of gender-based 
violence as a serious human rights violation mirroring the conceptual struggles described 
earlier at Rome. 
 
 
ii) The Strategy of Promoting Women’s Specificities in the New Era of Universality 
Gender-based Violence as Subject of Analysis  
 
Gender-based violence is an obviously feminist issue, as it is a violation that affects 
predominantly women.95 It is also an issue that has long preoccupied feminist and human 
rights advocates. The Committee charged with enforcing the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Violence against Women (the CEDAW Committee) in General Recommendation 
No. 19 (also known as the 1992 Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women,) 
defines gender-based violence a 
 
‘[a] form of discrimination which seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental 
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or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and any other deprivations 
of liberty.’96 
 
In international law gender-based violence is now the most broadly accepted term used to 
denote differential acts of violence committed against women given that its broad remit 
encompasses harms of a non-sexual nature. It has therefore largely been embraced by 
feminist scholars. Kelly Dawn Askin, for example, has defined gender-based violence as 
violence that ‘[t]argets or affects women exclusively or disproportionately primarily because of 
their gender.’97 The former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, has described it as a major impediment to women’s fulfilment and 
enjoyment of human rights around the world, such as their participation in social and public 
life, which prevents the exercise of their democratic rights.98 The definition also includes 
violence perpetuated along socially constructed or stereotyped gender roles and it has been 
understood to refer to violence directed against women because they are women. While 
gender-based violence denotes wide-ranging acts of harm against women such as economic 
deprivation sexual violence is a more specific form of gendered violence, which has been seen 
as a direct attack on female honour. Traditional definitions of sexual violence against women 
thus referred to gender-specific acts carried out against distinct female traits, such as their 
reproductive capacity. The legal differentiation between gender-based violence and sexual 




iii) The public/private dichotomy and the hidden nature of gender-based violence 
The path towards full international legal recognition has not been a smooth one as Sally Engle 
Merry, a leading anthropologist concerned with the interplay of culture and gender, has 
shown. The location of gender-based violence within the private realm of the family and 
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personal relationships had insulated this form of violence from state scrutiny for a long time, 
while at the same time naturalising the practice as something inevitable.99 In this vein, 
Christine Chinkin has argued that the binary division in international law between the public 
and the private world and the conceptualisation of the former as superior to the latter has 
marginalised women from public life.100 It is therefore unsurprising that gender-based violence 
has remained hidden from view, as the family is often the site, where the most severe forms of 
violations against women’s physical and mental integrity take place. In some contexts, the 
state has perpetuated this status quo by exercising power over family or privacy rights with 
detrimental consequences for women pushing certain groups even further into the margins of 
society.101 
 
Due to its confinement in the private sphere, the recognition of gender-based violence in 
international human rights law has been slow. Crimes such as domestic violence, which 
disproportionately affect women, for instance, have been entirely silenced by international 
law, as Rhonda Copelon has powerfully demonstrated. She has argued that the public/ private 
dichotomy has ensured that only the more sensationalist forms of violence, (of which intimate 
violence is not a part), get visibilised in international legal texts.102 Given the more systemic 
and structural nature of domestic violence, which often takes place in secret, such offences 
are not made subjects of international law. On her view, this is also a direct result of the 
patriarchal structure ingrained in the social fabric, which serves to perpetuate male superiority 
and female inferiority not only in international law, but in everyday life.103 This stands in stark 
contrast to the way in which torture is approached in international law. Although widely 
practised, torture is universally condemned as one of the most heinous forms of violence, 
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while domestic violence consisting of equivalent elements is omitted from the narrative.104 
Copelon’s concerted activism around the reconceptualisation of domestic violence as a form 
of torture has significantly contributed to the recognition of rape as torture in international 
criminal law, as Chapters III and V analyse in more detail.  Her interpretation of the sexual 
violence perpetrated during the Yugoslav conflict will, moreover, constitute the focus of the 




The Genealogy of Women’s Human Rights in International Law 
In order to appreciate how gender-based violence became, first, a cause for feminist activism, 
and, second, a violation of international human rights law it is necessary to resort to feminist 
activism of the late 1970s and early 1980s when feminist scholars first began to articulate 
radical strategies.105 Constructions of sexuality began to be seen as crucial to women’s 
oppression, and feminists argued that women’s oppression was not a side effect of patriarchy, 
but rather that it was central to the construction of the world along male lines.106 The key 
strategies of the feminist movement of the 1990s thus sought to dismantle the binary division 
between male/ female roles, to protect women’s reproductive autonomy and to incorporate 
violence against women into the international agenda.107 More specifically, the aim of the 
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movement was to create international consensus about the eradication of violence against 
women in all societies.108 The liberalist environment of the 1990s was especially conducive to 
such concerns allowing feminists to embrace the ‘women’s rights-as human rights strategy’ 
seeking explicit recognition of gender-specific rights abuses as human rights violations.109 The 
very public nature of gender-based violence committed during the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which propelled the issue to the very top of feminist advocacy in the 
early 1990s in many ways therefore collided with a feminist liberal renaissance in international 
law. This visibility of women’s human rights issues later also allowed feminists to refocus their 
attentions to other types of female empowerment, such as the ‘mainstreaming’ of women’s 
human rights, as a paradigmatic institutional strategy seeking to promote gender justice in 
international law.110 As will be seen in Chapter III these feminist strategies and achievements 
proved decisive in the later evolution of wartime sexual violence in international criminal 
jurisprudence.  
 
Feminist calls for the reconceptualisation of gender-based violence as a human rights violation 
reflected the mindset of a majority of Western feminist activists, who in the 1990s had gained 
a high-profile platform for their ideas. This has, for example, been illustrated by the Violence 
against Women (VAW) campaign, which has sought to bring to the world's attention the 
multiple ways in which women face discrimination, as well as drawing attention to the physical 
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and emotional abuse they endure in all areas of life.111  The VAW movement has been 
overwhelmingly successful in translating very specific violations experienced by individual 
women into a more general human rights discourse, having incorporated gender-specific 
concerns into the fabric of international criminal law through the deployment of legal 
modalities that create particular subjectivities, as Chapters V and VI reveal. According to Ratna 
Kapur the VAW campaign has succeeded partly because of its ‘appeal to the victim subject’, 
which has quickly morphed into a shared location from which women from different cultural 
and social contexts can speak. The victim status thus provided women with a subject that 
repudiated the ‘atomized, decontextualized, and ahistorical’ subject of liberal rights 
discourses, while offering to women a unitary subject enabling them to continue to make 
claims based on  their commonality of experience.112  
 
In spite of these apparent successes, many of the current feminist debates around the 
representation of wartime sexual violence reveal a profound feminist anxiety at destabilising 
the female subject and rupturing the perceived successes achieved to date in international 
law. Those that have sought to question current representations of wartime identity in 
international law and have proposed critical introspection have thus often been sidelined from 
the dominant debate and activism for fear that their concerns would lead to a renewed denial 
of feminist subjectivity, as is discussed in Chapters V and VI. The thesis therefore seeks to 
present the voices of feminists, whose views have been largely drowned out in the current era 
of feminist triumphalism, which witnessed the incorporation of women’s human rights into 
mainstream international legal frameworks. The thesis, therefore, suggests that in the present 
moment it might be opportune to take a step back and to reflect whether women have truly 
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achieved substantive equality in international law, or whether these advancements have been 
largely cosmetic and, ultimately, have helped maintain the status quo.  
 
i) The paternalistic approach to women in early international human rights treaties 
For as long as masculine subjects have been constituted by international law, so too have 
women been produced as the necessary ‘Other’ against which the masculinity of the regime’s 
normative actors could be projected.113 Right from the outset advocates for women’s rights 
did not start ‘with a clean slate’, for women had already been constituted as a subjugated 
category, more often implicitly than explicitly, by international legal instruments that defined 
what was ‘possible in the post-war moment.’114 In one of the earliest manifestations of 
international law’s production of women as objects of masculine and legal protection, the 
1919 Constitution of the International Labour Organization (ILO)115 described its goals as:  
 
‘[t]he protection of the workers against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his 
employment; and the protection of children, young persons and women.’116 
 
Subsequent protective instruments included banning women from night work, from exposure 
to lead, while also mandating maternity leave for six weeks following the birth of the child.’117 
The preoccupation of these instruments was ‘patently’ with the rights of men, thus, women 
were brought into being only as objects of international law, rather than as its full subjects. 
But this did not mean that women were entirely absent from international law, rather it was 
suggestive of the fact that they were implicit in every representation as masculinity’s ‘Other’.  
The early treaties in particular took a paternalistic approach to women, reconstituting the 
traditional gender hierarchies as ‘natural’ and thereby misrepresenting the constructed nature 
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of human experience and removing it from discursive contestation.118 By the time of the 
adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, however, a new space was opened for feminist 
engagement with international law, primarily, through the recognition of the ‘equal rights of 
men and women’, and the international community’s emphasis on the principle of non-
discrimination, which sought to ensure universal respect for fundamental human rights 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’119  
 
The UN Charter thus directly propagated the idea of universality as an opening that had the 
potential to jettison the earlier exclusionary gender tropes and constitute a fully inclusive 
subject in the new era of human rights law. But as Dianne Otto has argued in her critical 
analysis of the then newly established Commission on Human Rights (CHR), this promise was 
not fulfilled,120  as is demonstrated through a review of the work of the Commission on the 
Status of Women (CSW), which had been established under the guise of the CHR in 1946. One 
of the central goals of the CSW was the promotion of women’s equality, as its members had 
rejected the idea that sex was an entirely natural category.  Their strategy revolved around 
ensuring that explicit reference was made to rights that were specific to women’s experiences, 
but within the framework of women’s equality with men, rather than as protective 
measures.121 The members thus understood their project primarily in the context of the 
tensions between protectionism and equality, but this perspective ran contrary to more 
classical liberal ideas, illustrated by the formal approach to equality and the distinction 
between public and private spheres ultimately adopted.122   
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The CSW’s views most notably clashed with those of the majority of the CHR, including former 
U.S. First Lady and President of the Commission Eleanor Roosevelt, who felt that the general 
prohibition of discrimination based on sex (Article 2) was sufficient to ensure women’s equal 
enjoyment of universal human rights, and that explicit references to women would weaken 
their position by undermining the meaning of ‘everyone,’ and by introducing rights that were 
not universal in nature.123 But as Otto has noted, the majority failed to understand that the 
imagined universal subject was already gendered and that the ‘abstract bearer of human 
rights’ already possessed masculine characteristics, which were reflected in legal standards of 
equality and non-discrimination. Thus, the CSW tried to solve this problem by having women’s 
specific human rights recognised as universal.’124 In line with its equality approach, it, thus, 
sought to explicitly include women as bearers of all human rights, which would make it more 
difficult to relegate such rights to special categories requiring protective measures.125 But the 
inclusion of gendered language was only partial, as the masculine pronoun remained in 
fourteen of the UDHR’s thirty articles. The only successful provision was Article 16 on family 
rights, which recognised the equal rights of men and women ‘to marriage, during marriage, 
and its dissolution’ in a hitherto unprecedented development in international law. 126 Article 
16 has, thus, been considered a significant achievement, given that it moved against the grain 
of the major traditions that had informed the drafting of the UDHR, while challenging 
entrenched gender hierarchies. But one of the problems with this declaration, as with so many 
other international human rights instruments, was that the trope of the wife and mother 
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 Committee of the General Assembly was responsible for the ultimate formulation, which survived by a 
very close vote despite the resistance from Christian groups to the reference to divorce. Ibid at 332.  
46 
 
(expounded upon in great detail in Chapter VI) in need of protection survived in the text.127 
This is significant for the critical feminist perspective adopted by this thesis, as the 
‘reinvigoration’ of all three of the marginalised female subjectivities-‘the figure of the wife and 
mother, who needs ‘protection’ during times of both war and peace’, the woman, who is 
‘formally equal with men’, at least in the realm of public life, and thirdly, the victim subject, 
who is produced by colonial narratives of gender, as well as by notions of women’s sexual 
vulnerability’ produced by earlier international instruments survived in the refashioned 
international legal texts, despite the CSW’s best efforts not to replicate these stereotypes.128 
 
The CSW’s acceptance of these provisions is thus suggestive of the continuing ambivalence in 
the feminist imagination about protective conceptions of women, especially notions revolving 
around motherhood. It is also reminiscent of the cultural feminist ‘Ethics of Care’ argument, 
which holds on to the existence of a female core based on women’s natural characteristics of 
caring and nurturing, which are seen as diametrically opposed to the traits of rationality,  
objectivity and abstractness, as the central characteristics defining male subjectivity.129 
Despite some important changes including the opening up of the private sphere to human 
rights scrutiny and formal equality replacing protectionism as the dominant approach, the 
main subject of international law remained ‘tenaciously masculine’ leading Otto to wonder 
whether the persistence of marginalising representations of women suggests that the 
discourse of human rights is itself built on histories and structures of domination, and 
therefore, ironically, ‘reliant’ for its existence on the reproduction of hierarchical gender 
subjectivities.130 It is with this question in mind that subsequent international legal 
instruments for the protection of women’s human rights are analysed. 
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The CSW was thus unable to effectively promote the rights associated with women’s physical 
integrity and sexual autonomy (also central to contemporary feminist discourses around 
wartime sexual violence) meaning that the UDHR remained silent in relation to gendered 
violence and reproductive rights. As Otto has summarised it, the CSW delegates were left with 
the ‘[I]mpossible task of conceptualizing women’s different experiences in a framework of 
equality; pressing against the established discourses of protection, salvation and formal 
equality.’131 But while their efforts resulted in several important references to equality in the 
UDHR’s substantive provisions,132 they did not achieve the CSW’s goals of including rights that 
could reflect women’s specific gendered experiences.  The gendered subjects produced by the 
UDHR in 1948 were, thus, on the one hand, rendered formally equal, while women’ specific 
gendered experiences were left in the realm of protection.133  
 
 
ii)  CEDAW 
At the outset and despite decade-long feminist activism in the areas of rape and gender 
violence, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW or the Women’s Convention) did not mention violence against women.134 
Nonetheless, it has been central to the incorporation of women into the human rights 
framework and has thus occupied centre stage in feminist discourses on international law. 
Constituting an amalgam of ideas about women’s status developed during the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s, and situated in the ‘hopeful context’135 of the UN’s International Decade for 
Women (1976-85) CEDAW has been described as an international bill for women’s rights.136 In 
calling for universal gender equality, the treaty requires the elimination of laws and 
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institutional practices that violate the core human rights principles of equal rights and respect 
for human dignity.137 From a feminist perspective, CEDAW’s achievement lies in its articulation 
of gender equality and state responsibility principles, as well as in its application of these 
principles to the countries under scrutiny.138 Moreover, its drafters challenged the conceptual 
boundaries of human rights law by explicitly reconstituting the universal subject as a woman, 
139 while strongly endorsing affirmative action principles through promoting goals based on 
notions of substantive equality.140 Another virtue of CEDAW is its distinction of affirmative 
action principles from protectionist ideas, which is reflected in its advocacy against the 
maintenance of unequal or separate standards.’141 CEDAW has also been emphatic in the 
prohibition of discrimination against women in the private sphere, rejecting the boundaries 
between the public and private space that have often served to perpetuate protective ideas 
about women. As stated earlier, the public/private dichotomy in international law has often 
served to obscure the extent of gender-based violence perpetrated in the private sphere, such 
as domestic violence, through failing to regulate violence in the home by, for example, 
imposing appropriate sanctions against the perpetrators.142  As Rebecca Cook has pointed out, 
the Women’s Convention stands out from other human rights treaties for its eschewal of 
sexually neutral norms ‘usually measured by how men are treated’, in favour of a recognition 
of the distinctive characteristics of women and their specific vulnerabilities to 
discrimination.143 Despite the absence of state responsibility for private acts of sexual 
discrimination, it requires states to take responsibility in accordance with their international 
obligations under customary or treaty law for substantive breaches originating in the private 
sphere committed by individuals acting in a non-official capacity. It follows that the state is 
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bound to undertake means to eliminate or mitigate the incidence of private discrimination, 
despite not being formally bound in international law.144 CEDAW has, thus, effectively 
contributed towards the visibilisation of women in the public sphere, by reinterpreting human 
rights in order to reconstitute its subject as a woman.145  In relation to the right to education, 
for instance, it has ensured that gender-specific issues affecting women’s equal enjoyment 
such as the elimination of stereotypical representations from educational materials were 
abolished, or that school retention strategies directed specifically at women and girls were 
implemented.146 It has also dispensed-in some instantiations-with the model of comparison 
with men, such as when it addresses issues around pregnancy and motherhood.147 Given these 
significant developments, CEDAW has naturally provided a fertile ground for discussion in 
feminist legal circles, not all of which have celebrated its achievements.  
 
CEDAW’s omissions are therefore just as significant a topic for this analysis as are its successes. 
Its initial failure to address gender-based violence, such as domestic sexual violence or rape, 
was a particularly glaring shortcoming.148 Moreover, rights regarding consensual sex were not 
included in Article 16 (1), which asks state parties to ensure equal rights between men and 
women with regards to the ‘ownership of property, choice of spouse and choice of 
occupation.’149 In addition, and despite its innovative and detailed elaboration of substantive 
equality, its understanding of sex equality largely continues to evolve around women’s 
functions as mothers and wives. It thus fails to include abortion among the guaranteed rights 
                                            
144
 As Cook points out, state responsibility arises when a state fails to act appropriately under municipal law in 
terms of failing to punish offenders, or failing to provide compensation for violations of international human 
rights law. A state also bears liability when it has failed to act to prevent anticipated violation of human rights. 
Ibid at 237. 
145
 For example in the sphere of work, unfair dismissal has been redefined to include dismissal on the grounds of 
pregnancy, maternity leave and marital status. As Otto points, out Art. 1 of CEDAW does not limit its prohibition 
of discrimination to the public sphere. Otto (2006), 339.  
146
 Arts. 10 (c) and Art. 10 (f), cited in: Ibid at 340.  
147
 Ass Otto points out, it makes available maternity leave with pay or comparable benefits’, without the 
attendant loss of ‘employment, seniority, or social allowance’, and women’s health-related rights have been 
drafted to include autonomous access to appropriate, reproductive health care services, not conditioned on 
equality with men. Ibid.  
148
 For a critique, see, for example: S Zearfoss, ‘The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women: Radical, Reasonable or Reactionary?’ 12 Michigan Journal of International Law, (1997), 912. 
149
 Ibid at 913.  
50 
 
instead deferring to protective domestic legislation, which possibly impairs women’s 
employment rights on this matter.150  
 
Protective representations of women also survive in Article 6 of CEDAW, which requires the 
‘suppress[ion]…of the exploitation of prostitution of women’151. As such, it does not recognise 
the rights of women, either as the victims of forced prostitution, or as workers in the sex 
industry. Instead, it casts all prostitution as ‘exploitation’ and all prostitutes as always needing 
protection, thus, resurrecting the victim subject evoked by Kapur, while at the same time 
oversimplifying the complexity of women’s economic decision-making, which denies women’s 
agency and reflects gendered anxieties about women’s sexuality.152 Most significantly from 
the point of view of this thesis is the impression, first advanced by Otto, that CEDAW retains 
all three marginalised subjectivities alluded to earlier on.  As she points out:  
 
‘The ‘victim’ subject of the discourse of (neo) colonialism is also evident in CEDAW. She 
overlaps, to some extent, with the protected figure of the prostitute in that the 
problem driving the adoption of Article 6 in 1979 was no longer the ‘white’ slave trade 
but the movement of women from developing countries to the West.’153 
 
As postcolonial feminist scholars have widely argued, such images have kept alive a distinction 
between Western women and those ‘native’ others, who still need the West to speak for 
them. Such imagery, moreover, has ensured the continued marginalisation of women from the 
universal frame of human rights,154 despite the adoption of a treaty specifically to promote 
women’s equality and the innovative efforts of the CEDAW Committee to promote the 
understanding of equality in substantive terms. CEDAW’s failure to promote substantive 
equality at the outset, thus, possibly explains why it took the CEDAW Committee until 1989 to 
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develop an initial recommendation-General Recommendation 12-which finally urged states to 
consider gender-based violence as a serious issue affecting women around the world.155  
Amongst its key objectives was the requirement on states to produce statistics on gender-
based violence. This led to a broader recommendation in 1992 that defined gender-based 






iii) The Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) and the Vienna 
Conference  
 
The 1992 Declaration placed violence against women firmly within the rubric of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and made clear that states were obliged to eliminate violence 
perpetrated by public authorities and by private persons.156 Although lacking in binding force, 
it has nonetheless been described as a comprehensive document that defines violence against 
women broadly to encompass physical, sexual, and psychological harm or threats of harm in 
public or private life.157 Significantly, the Declaration names gender-based violence as a 
violation of human rights and an instance of sex discrimination and inequality, while 
attributing the roots of gender violence to historically unequal power relations between men 
and women based on socially constructed realities rather than on ‘natural’ or biological 
attributes, which have prevented the full advancement of women in society.158 Moreover, it 
                                            
155
 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 
Committee) General Recommendation No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (Eighth session, 1989). 
156 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 19, U.N. Doc A/47/38 (Eleventh session, 1992). [Hereinafter General Recommendation, 
No.19].   
157
 Merry Engle (2006), at 23.  
158
 General Recommendation No.19, Preamble. According to Engle Merry, this statement ‘[p]laced violence 
against women squarely within the rubric of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and it made clear that 
states would be obliged to eliminate violence perpetrated by public officials or authorities , as well as private 
actors. See: Engle Merry (2006), at 21. On Otto’s view, moreover, the CEDAW framework has by way of these 
General Recommendations strengthened the substantive equality framework that advance then project of ‘re-
imagination’ of women’s rights by further releasing CEDAW’s subject from comparison with men. A further 
example Otto provides is of General Recommendation 16, which urges State parties to recognise and value 
women’s unpaid contributions and makes it clear that the Committee considers unpaid wok in family enterprises 
to be a form of exploitation of women contrary to CEDAW. See: Otto (2006) at 340. 
52 
 
affirms that wartime violence against women violates international human rights and 
international humanitarian law:  
 
‘Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are violations 
of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. All 
violations of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, 
and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective response.’159 
 
As mentioned previously, the Declaration provides a definition of gender-based violence, and 
highlights the ways in which violence against women is of relevance to each of the articles of 
the Women’s Convention by identifying that traditional attitudes around the globe contribute 
to women’s subordinate status, most typically perpetuated through certain stereotypes about 
women, which allow gender-based violence to be maintained as a legitimate form of women’s 
suppression.160  Violence against women is, thus, conceptualised as one of the crucial social 
mechanisms, which forces women into a subordinate position compared to men. Further, the 
Declaration enumerates the rights and freedoms infringed through gendered violence, such as 
the right to equality in the family and the right to equal protection under the law. Thus, 
CEDAW now prohibits discrimination and disparaging treatment, including violence against 
women on the basis of gender, thanks to the Committee’s realisation of the importance of this 
matter, despite the treaty’s initial silence. The DEVAW has also proved inspirational to other 
treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention on Violence, which urges protection against all 
forms of violence against women, including sexual violence, whether committed in peacetime 
or in wartime, in the public sphere or in the private sphere.161 This has prompted Radhika 
Coomaraswamy to declare the Declaration as the most important international legal effort in 
the prevention of violence against women. It has been especially singled out for not allowing 
states the discretion to invoke considerations of custom, tradition or religion as a way of 
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justification for non-compliance with treaty obligations. In this vein, it certainly symbolises the 
joint effort of the international community in seeking to combat gender-based violence on a 
universal scale.162  
 
Given the significance of the Declaration, the year 1994 saw the universal condemnation of 
gender-based violence by the UN Commission on Human Rights, which culminated in the 
appointment of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women whose mandate includes 
the collection of information relating to violence against women, and the issuing of 
recommendations and measures to states to remedy the situation on the ground.163 
Overwhelmingly regarded as positive developments in international law both the DEVAW and 
the post of the Special Rapporteur were instituted within six months of the joint appeal of 
governments and feminist advocates present at the 1993 Vienna Conference. It was the latter 
forum with its promulgation of the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action that 
proved to be the pivotal moment for women’s human rights. 164 The Vienna Conference 
demonstrated how women could organise successfully at the regional and global level to 
advocate on behalf of women’s rights. It also provided a forum for women's advocates to 
express their condemnation of gender-based violence in situations of armed conflict by calling 
on governments to integrate women’s rights into the mainstream of the UN system.165 The 
work of diverse groups of feminists who had advocated against key rights violations such as 
domestic violence, rape and sexual harassment, trafficking in women, forced prostitution and 
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forced labour, as well as traditional practices such as female genital mutilation, dowry deaths, 
sati and other practices considered harmful to the health of women saw in the Vienna 











Gender Mainstreaming  
i) The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action  
 
The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Human Rights held in Beijing built on the women’s 
human rights momentum earlier created at Vienna and most significantly, perhaps, gave 
expression to and prioritised the term ‘gender mainstreaming’ as the mechanism to achieve 
gender equality.166 Gender mainstreaming has been defined by the UN Economic and Social 
Council as follows:  
 
‘Mainstreaming of gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for 
women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, 
in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s 
concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, 
societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not 
perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.’167 
 
Gender mainstreaming was, moreover, identified as one of the most important mechanisms 
whereby to achieve the ambitious goal of formal equality for women across all United Nations 
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agencies and non-governmental organisations. It encompassed specifically the adoption of the 
terminology of gender equality; stipulated that a gender mainstreaming policy be put into 
place and that gender mainstreaming be uniformly implemented.168 By the time of the Beijing 
Conference, it was evident that the concept of ‘gender mainstreaming’ had achieved great 
popularity.169 It appeared throughout the lengthy Beijing Platform for Action in twelve critical 
area of concern, including education,170health,171as victims of violence,172 armed conflict,173 
the economy,174 decision-making,175 and human rights.176 The Platform for Action also asked 
governments to promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in 
all its policies and programmes, so that before decisions were taken, an analysis of its impact 
on women and men, respectively, was made.177 According to observers, although a non-
binding legal instrument, the Beijing Platform represented a global agenda for change used by 
women’s rights activist to advocate for reform in their respective countries.178 Given these 
ambitions, the Beijing Platform commitment to gender mainstreaming was taken up by other 
U.N. bodies, such as the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women,179the U.N. Secretary-
General, and then by the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which organised a high-
level panel discussion on gender mainstreaming in 1997.180 Moreover, the U.N. General 
Assembly has ever since been continuously encouraged to incorporate mainstreaming into all 
areas of its work, in particular on macroeconomic questions, operational activities for 
development, poverty eradication, human rights, humanitarian assistance, budgeting, 
disarmament, peace and security, and legal and political matters.’181 As a policy, gender 
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mainstreaming, today, is omnipresent in the international arena with almost all U.N. bodies 
and agencies having formally endorsed it.182 This suggests that this policy is to become 
standard practice across all of its programmes.183  
 
While it is evident that gender mainstreaming has become an integral part of the fabric of U.N. 
institutions the same has not necessarily been the case across the U.N. system for the 
protection of human rights.184 One reason for the rather muted response of U.N. human rights 
bodies to gender mainstreaming is the low representation of women in the system, which has 
contributed to the minimal impact of the policy in the human rights sphere.185 Thus, while it 
might not have been difficult to encourage the adoption of the vocabulary of mainstreaming, 
there is little evidence of monitoring and follow-up. A consistent problem for all U.N. 
organisations that have adopted gender mainstreaming policies, moreover, is translating the 
verbal commitment into action. This is frequently caused by fatigue within the U.N. generated 
in turn by a lack of adequate support and training.186 But the problem with gender 
mainstreaming has not only been one of institutional invisibility. Rather, the way in which this 
concept has been deployed by U.N. agencies and treaty bodies carries problematic 
connotations, as critical feminist scholars argue.  Dianne Otto, for example, has pointed out in 
relation to General Comment 28 (on equality between men and women) adopted by the 
Human Rights Committee187in 2000 that it repeats the feminist inclusion strategies described 
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in part II of this chapter.188 Thus, General Comment 28 adopts a substantive approach to 
women’s equality and ensures that women’s specific rights are explicitly recognised as 
universal.  The Comment works its way through each of the ICCPR rights and aims to re-
imagine the subject as a woman, thus setting out to feminise civil and political rights, as is for 
example evident in relation to the right to life (Art. 6), which states: 
  
‘State parties should provide data on birth rates and on pregnancy-and childbirth-
related deaths of women. Gender-disaggregated data should be provided on infant 
mortality rates. State parties should give information on any measures taken by the 
State to help women prevent unwanted pregnancies, and to ensure that they do not 
have to undergo life-threatening, clandestine abortions. State parties should also 
report on measures to protect women from practices that violate the right to life, such 
as female infanticide, the burning of widows and dowry killings. The Committee also 
wishes to have information on the particular impact on women of poverty and 
deprivation that may pose a threat to their lives.’189 
 
The interpretation is certainly ground-breaking in so far as it includes the ‘sexed’ issues that 
the women’s rights-as human rights’ lobby has been concerned with such as backyard 
abortions, which have been identified as threats to the right of life. Perhaps even more 
significant, given international human rights law’s inferior treatment of socio-economic rights, 
is the recognition that ‘poverty and deprivation’ may also pose a threat to women’s right to 
life echoing the argument of this thesis. The woman-centric approach is moreover applied to 
each of the pertinent ICCPR articles, such as domestic violence (Art.7), which, significantly, is 
recognised as a form of torture.190However, the Comment’s focus on women’s difference from 
men means that the sexualisation of gender dualisms that is ingrained in the concept of formal 
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equality has not been adequately challenged. Indeed, all the dangers involved in including 
women by reference to their specificities remain, emphasising women’s helplessness, rather 
than their agency. The effect of this is that the masculinity of the universal subject is 
reaffirmed, as he does not need any special enumeration of his gender-specific injuries.191 
Thus, rather than dismantling gender hierarchies, some of the examples of women’s specific 
violations, such as infanticide, the burning of widows, or dowry murders serve to resurrect 
protective and imperialist subjectivities, which will be revisited in Chapter IV. As Otto has 
remarked rather insightfully:  
 
‘The unresolved feminist conundrum is well illustrated: in reflecting women’s present 
gendered experience of human rights violations, human rights law repeats the 
marginalizing gender tropes that entrench and naturalise women’s inequality.’192 
 
The irony of the situation, therefore, might be that both women’s gender disadvantage and 
women’s realisation of substantive equality might have been lost in the process of pressing for 
gender mainstreaming of women’s human rights. This has also been noted by Sari Kuovo, who 
has argued that while gender mainstreaming strategies can promote equality, they can also 
destroy equality and social justice politics. Thus, ‘the sudden and passionate concern’ for 
women’s advancement and gender equality sometimes has very little to do with a feminist or 
radical social justice agenda leading to the depoliticising effects of gender and the dispersing 
effects of mainstreaming.193 
 
 
ii) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 
Despite the feminist critique of gender mainstreaming strategies, U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1325, the first ever resolution to addresses the impact of war on women and 
promote their contribution to conflict resolution and sustainable peace, has pursued this 
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strategy.194  The Resolution builds on the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action in calling for the inclusion of women at all decision-making levels (national and 
international), especially in conflict resolution mechanisms.  This is in light of its concern, as 
stated in the Preamble, that civilians, made up predominantly of women and children, account 
for the vast majority of casualties during armed conflict.195  Acknowledging the absence of a 
female perspective in peace and reconciliation processes, Resolution 1325 identifies the need 
to increase female participation at all decision-making levels during the peace process, expand 
the role and contribution of women in U.N. field-based operations and incorporate a gender-
perspective into peacekeeping operations.196 It, therefore, conceptualises a gender 
mainstreaming perspective in relation to conflict prevention, peace negotiations, 
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration initiatives.197 It also reaffirms the need to fully 
implement international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect women and girls 
from human rights abuses, including gender-based violence.198  
 
Resolution 1325 is further significant because it marked the first time that the U.N. Security 
Council turned its full attention to the subject of women and armed conflict acknowledging 
the role of women as active agents in the negotiation and maintenance of peace agreements, 
thus, providing a clear legal basis for addressing the issue.199 On a symbolic level it marked the 
impact of war on women and provided high-level acknowledgment that the exclusion of 
women from conflict resolution is a threat to peace, while on a practical level, it triggered the 
immediate and ongoing attention of the U.N. to women, peace and security, by providing for 
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ongoing U.N. Secretary-General reporting on its implementation.200 Peace negotiations and 
agreements have become a focus of feminist intervention because they respond to the post-
Cold War proliferation of peace agreements and the use of negotiated settlements as the key 
mechanism by which to bring violent social conflict to an end and therefore correspond to the 
new liberal impulse earlier discussed in relation to human rights.201 Given that peace 
agreements serve to document agreement between warring parties in an attempt to end the 
conflict and establish politics as an alternative to military violence, the inclusion of women into 
such negotiations is an important starting point in achieving broader political, legal and social 
gains for women. The scale of the practice, today, is rather overwhelming with around as 
many states having peace processes and agreements as those that do not.202 
 
The gender mainstreaming perspective of Resolution 1325 is enshrined in paragraph 8, which 
talks of the need to adopt a ‘gender perspective’. Bell and O’Rourke have remarked that this 
concept goes well beyond whether the terms ‘gender’ or ‘women’ have entered an agreement 
to include, for instance, how civilians/combatant distinctions are dealt with, how provisions 
for socio-economic rights are made, what role customary law assumes, to assessing 
conceptualisations of equality underpinning any new constitutional order.203 Specific 
references to women, moreover, are a key indicator of whether a broader gender perspective 
has been used, or whether the agreement is constructed in terms of gender equality.204 The 
most startling finding produced by the study, (which also ties in with the earlier argument that 
gender mainstreaming policies might not have brought about substantive gender equality) is 
the finding that out of a total number of 585 agreements, only 92 agreements, or 16 percent 
mentioned women.205 However, post-Resolution 1325, quantitatively, references to women 
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have increased with the rise being more marked where the UN had a third-party role.206 Thus, 
in spite of the modest increase in specific references to women in peace agreements touching 
on the issues raised by Resolution 1325 this is a rather unsystematic pattern, which indicates 
that the impact of the Resolution on substantive equality for women has been modest. In spite 
of the lofty ambitions underlying gender mainstreaming policies, it is therefore far from 
certain that these normative standards have made a difference, whether they could make a 
difference in future, or what the negative trade off’s for women might be.  
 
iii) Post-U.N. Resolution 1325 
Eight years later, the U.N. Security Council reiterated its dedication to the eradication of 
wartime sexual violence in Resolution 1820 (2008) stressing that sexual violence is a tactic of 
war used to deliberately target civilians ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
civilian populations’, which can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and 
impede the restoration of maintenance and peace.207 It called on the parties to armed conflict 
to cease all acts of sexual violence against civilians and demanded, amongst other stipulations, 
that armies take appropriate disciplinary measures and uphold the principle of command 
responsibility, thus mandating that troops on the ground be trained on the categorical 
prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against women including the debunking of myths 
that fuel sexual violence. Further, the Resolution notes that rape and other forms of sexual 
violence could constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or could be a constitutive act 
of genocide, in a nod to the important legal precedents emerging out of the wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence produced by the ad-hoc tribunals.208 More recently, on September 30, 
2009 the Security Council extended these provisions in Resolution 1888 (2009), which calls for 
the specific protection of women and girls from sexual violence in armed conflict at the hands 
of peacekeeping missions. It also calls on already existing measures for the protection of 
women and children to be enhanced through the identification of women’s protection 
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advisers in human rights protection units.209 Its main focus is, thus, on the implementation 
measures dealing with sexual violence, as its Preamble notes ‘the underrepresentation of 
women in formal peace processes, the lack of mediators and ceasefire monitors with proper 
training in dealing with sexual violence, and the lack of women as chief or lead peace 
mediators in United Nations-sponsored peace talks’ as impediments to long-lasting peace.210 
Resolution 1888 was immediately followed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1889 (2009) 
aimed at increasing awareness and achieving implementation of Resolution 1325, while 
affirming earlier key peace process provisions. At present, it is difficult to gage the impact of 
these instruments on substantive gender equality in wartime, but as the previous discussion 
has shown, the feminist arguments overviewed need to form a critical part of the debate, as 
they show that while women might have achieved a sense of formal equality in international 




The chapter has sought to demonstrate that gender-based violence is today conceptualised as 
a universal violation of human rights law. In particular as a result of sustained feminist 
lobbying in the 1990s, it has turned into one of the most visible human rights causes animating 
feminist activists and scholars of varying persuasions and backgrounds. This has been evident, 
for example, in the contentious negotiations between feminist activists and state 
representatives around the deployment of a gender terminology in the Rome Statute, as seen 
in the cultural relativist approach adopted by states to deny the entrenched discrimination of 
women in everyday life. As the chapter has sought to show, the reluctance to incorporate 
gender into the Rome Statute is not only a reflection of the paternalist attitudes adopted by 
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 SC Resolution 1888, United Nations Security Council Adoption of Text Mandating Peacekeeping Missions to 
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 Meeting, 30 
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210
 Paragraph 17 urges that ‘the issues of sexual violence be included in all United Nations-sponsored peace 
negotiation agendas’, and also that ‘the inclusion of sexual violence issues from the outset of peace processes in 
such situations, in particular the areas of pre-ceasefires, humanitarian access and human rights agreements, 
ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring, DDR [demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration] and SSR [security 
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states, but is also a product of international law itself rooted in patriarchal notions, which have 
ensured a rigid public/private divide between officially sanctioned ‘male harms’, and violence 
in the private sphere, such as domestic violence, which predominantly affect women. 
 
Paradoxically, had it not been for the reports of mass rapes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which 
prompted international law to consider different forms of violence against women and to 
advance related definitions, international law might have remained silent on women’s human 
rights and might have failed to recognise gender-based violence as a serious violation of 
human rights law. The recognition of gender-based violence as a standalone issue of 
international law has, therefore, contributed to the broadening of traditional definitions of 
sexual violence against women based on women’s reproductive capacities and their specific 
female traits to take into account different forms of gendered violence, such as female 
poverty. The realisation that sexual violence is a pervasive phenomenon of armed conflict has, 
moreover, shifted the perception that such acts occur solely in the private realm, thus, 
prompting international law to acknowledge the public dimensions of gendered violence.211  
 
The chapter has also suggested that the enormity of these legal successes came at a cost to 
the feminist movement. Rather paradoxically, these normative developments have led to 
much feminist anxiety about any critique that could potentially destabilise female subjectivity, 
or jeopardise future rights claims for broader global recognition of women’s human rights, as 
is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. This has led to a persistent feminist anxiety 
about the fragmentation of subjectivity that could undermine certain ‘truth claims’ about 
women's lives. In short, feminists fear losing their new sense of power. But, as Kapur has 
argued, the exclusive reliance on the victim subject to make rights claims and slogans based on 
women's empowerment has some serious limitations, chief among them that the victim 
subject is based on gender essentialism, or overgeneralised claims about women.212 These 
generalisations in particular efface the problems, perspectives and political concerns of 
women who are marginalised because of their class, race, religion, ethnicity and/or sexual 
orientation, and socio-economic status in society and may therefore be counterproductive to 
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the feminist cause.213 The aim of the chapter has thus been to show that feminist ideas today 
permeate the institutions of international law. However, while these developments in 
principle ought to be welcome, questions around the turn of Western feminism to human 
rights and international criminal law as its preferred mode of deploying power in policy and 
law-making need to be sustained. Janet Halley has asked this question in the following way: 
 
'Is this new carceral feminism-intent on criminalising, indicting, convicting and 
punishing perpetrators of sexual violence in numerous domains of domestic law, as 
well as international humanitarian law and international criminal law going to 
contribute to new understandings of the relationship between sexual violence, sexual 
pleasure and war?’214   
 
 
In sum, this chapter has sought to stimulate debate and prepare the groundwork for the 
ensuing chapters which query whether the visibility of gender-based violence in contemporary 
human rights discourses has actually brought about any substantive change for women. The 
next chapter aims to add to this debate in its overview of the salient historical and legal 















                                            
213
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The Trajectory of Wartime Sexual Violence -from Marginalised Phenomenon of 
Wartime History to Highly Visible Offence in International Criminal Law 
 




The thesis is a critical feminist analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, as it is 
constructed in current feminist scholarship and the surrounding debate. As stated previously, 
sexual violence against women has been a greatly topical issue within recent years in both 
scholarship and the popular imagination. There have been important legal developments 
within international law, which have provoked much academic, and in particular, legal 
commentary. On one level, the thesis contributes to this commentary. At the same time, it 
aims to contribute to broader feminist theory, which engages with questions of human rights, 
identity, gender, armed conflict, culture and violence.  
 
This chapter provides the context for the analysis of key ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence, as it contains a historical overview of distinctive events of gendered violence in 
armed conflict and illuminates upon some of the reasons for its traditional marginalisation 
from international law. Moreover, it provides a sense of the gendered dimensions of 
contemporary international wartime sexual violence jurisprudence by focusing on the key 
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legal developments that have emerged from the international ad-hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. Given the limitations inherent in a project such as a doctoral thesis, the chapter 
does not conduct a comprehensive study of the historical roots of wartime sexual violence, 
but singles out for analysis a handful of ICTY and ICTR decisions adjudicated to date, as these 
have arguably dramatically altered the legal standing of wartime sexual violence in 
international law.  
 
The chapter is primarily intended to give a general sense of how sexual violence crimes have 
evolved in modern-day international criminal law, thus, preparing the ground for analysis 
carried out in subsequent chapters. The chapter limits itself to a summary of the main legal 
developments emerging from the two international ad-hoc tribunals, as they share similar 
legal characteristics, normative objectives, and are both considered international community 
projects. They stand in contrast to the more localised hybrid tribunals such as the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone215, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia216, the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon217 and the East Timor Tribunal218that were set up with the 
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 The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations. It was established for the purpose of trying those, who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone 
since 30 November 1996. For an overview see: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, established by an Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315 
(2000) of 14, August 2000. Agreement available at: http://www.sc-
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 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was set up at the request of the Lebanese government to establish an 
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former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and resulting in the death or injury to other persons. The Special 
Tribunal was thus established via Security Council Resolution 1664 in 2006 in agreement with the Lebanese 
Republic. For an overview of the activities of the court, see: http://www.stl-tsl.org/section/AbouttheSTL. (last 
accessed in June, 2011).  
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 Also known as the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) established by the United Nations acting as the 
transitional authority between the end of the Indonesian occupation in 1999 and the independence of East Timor 
in 2002, the Tribunal on May 20, 2005 completed more than four years of trials that had arisen out of the context 
of the 1999 violence following the referendum in which the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
independence from Indonesia.  On May 20, 2005, the Tribunal completed more than four years of trials that had 
arisen out of the context of the 1999 violence following the referendum in which the East Timorese voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of for independence from Indonesia. Although the work of the Tribunal was cut short 
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consent and complicity of the respective state affected. Moreover, the thesis does not engage 
in any substantive way with the International Criminal Court, as it is a creation of treaty law 
with substantially different scopes and aims than the ad-hoc tribunals. Most notably, the 
evolution of gender-based crimes is manifested through a discussion of the key legal 
developments shaping contemporary international criminal law in the area of wartime sexual 
violence.  A more critical analysis of the relevant case law is examined in greater depth in 
Chapters VI and VII. As will become apparent throughout the thesis, the feminist debate 
accompanying key wartime sexual violence advancements in international criminal law 
constitutes an integral part of the analysis. 
 
As outlined previously, wartime sexual violence is obviously a feminist issue, as it is a crime 
that disproportionately affects women. As a topic, it has received prominence primarily as a 
result of the prosecution of gender-related crimes in international criminal tribunals. Its 
relevance as a subject of interest has been sustained by a plethora of legal successes delivered 
by international criminal tribunals, which have (on numerous occasions) successfully 
reinterpreted, or expanded international humanitarian law to encapsulate the gender-specific 
harms perpetrated against women. In this way, the tribunals are said to have advanced the 
twin feminist aims of gender equality and justice into the normative framework of 
international human rights law, whose principal aim is the promotion of equality and anti-
discrimination in all areas of public life, regardless of sex.219 The chapter is intended to provide 
a snapshot of these developments, while also beginning to tighten its analytical noose in order 
to query what the prosecution of wartime sexual violence in international criminal law 
represents for women in the current political and legal moment. It aims to show how wartime 
sexual violence has been transformed from a perennially marginalised footnote of history to a 
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widely recognised and theorised phenomenon of armed conflict. Part II provides a brief 
historical overview of the Vietnamese and Bangladesh conflicts (both predating Yugoslavia) to 
suggest that historical heteronormative notions of rape as a natural, foreseeable, and 
unavoidable consequence of war-a measurement of success, a reward to the victor, or even a 
‘message between men’ provide only a piece of the puzzle in the history of wartime sexual 
violence against women.220 A constant theme of this thesis is to stress that socio-economic 
deprivation and institutional structures that naturalise women’s subordinate status in society 
are as central in accounting for the widespread sexual abuse of women in armed conflict, yet 
are often occluded from the legal narrative, thus, invisibilising the underlying conditions of 
inequality that characterise many women’s lives. Just as war has come to be accepted as an 
inevitable part of history, so too rape has come to be regarded as an unavoidable side product 
of war, a form of collateral damage, if not a ‘just reward’ for soldiers engaged in the 
battlefield. As radical feminist Susan Brownmiller has argued,  
 
‘War provides men with the perfect psychologic backdrop to give vent to their 
contempt for women. The very maleness of the military-the brute power of weaponry 
exclusive to their hands, the spiritual bonding of men at arms, the manly discipline of 
orders given and orders obeyed, the simple logic of the hierarchical command-confirms 
for men what they long suspect, that women are peripheral, irrelevant to the world 
that counts, passive spectators to the action in the center ring.’221 
 
In a deliberate move, this segment does not focus upon sexual violence incidences stemming 
from World War II and it does not analyse the war crimes prosecutions at Nuremberg and 
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 For a detailed overview of the historical treatment of gender-based war crimes see: J. Campanaro, ‘Women, 
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(2000-2001), at 2557-2592.  The historical treatment of rape has been theorised widely, and among some of the 
most forensic and detailed analyses are Catherine Niarcho’s contribution to the debate demonstrating that 
historically, rape was seen as a tactical function of war, an expression of the totality of the victory, as rape for the 
men of the conquered nation represented the ‘ultimate humiliation’ rendering starkly evident ‘masculine 
impotence’ ascribed to the conquered as a result of his failure to protect his own women. In C. Niarchos, 
‘Women, War and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 17 Human 
Rights Quarterly (1995), 660;  a non-feminist analysis of the historical treatment of wartime sexual violence is 
provided by Simon Chesterman, who  argues that notions of ‘Booty and Beauty’ were long associated with 
success in battle. They represented an opportunity for the victorious army to march through the defeated 
enemy’s territory, thus, clearly delineating the intimate relationship between rape and the ‘macho military 
project of conquest.’ In S. Chesterman., ‘Never Again…and Again: Law, Order, and the Gender of War Crimes in 
Bosnia and Beyond’, 22 Yale Journal of International Law (1997), 325. 
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Tokyo, as these have been theorised extensively elsewhere.222 The Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) are central in 
providing the current context underlying sexual violence prosecutions, as they ushered in the 
notion of individual responsibility and superior command responsibility for war crimes223, 
while at the same time highlighting the hidden, yet pervasive224 incidences of sexual violence 
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 For a discussion of the Laws and Customs of War on Sexual Violence after World War II, and the work of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also known as the Tokyo Tribunal, and the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) held in Nuremberg see K. D. Askin, & D. Koenig (eds.), Women and International Human 
Rights (Volume 1), (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999) 51-54.  As Askin describes, gender-based 
violence during World War II was commonplace, and women were murdered, tortured, enslaved and otherwise 
abused, as were men. Yet unlike the treatment of most men, but consistent with the treatment of women in 
previous and subsequent wars, hundreds of thousands of women and girls were also raped, forced into sexual 
slavery, forcibly sterilised, and subjected to other reproductive crimes, as well as subjected to sexual mutilation, 
sexual humiliation and forced to endure countless other forms of sexual violence and persecution. Nonetheless, 
when it came to hold the perpetrators and other responsible parties accountable for the gender-based crimes 
charges were conspicuously absent. In the post-war trials held at Nuremberg and Tokyo, although crimes against 
women were extensively reported and documented, these crimes were omitted from the jurisdiction of the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) Charter, they were not charged in the indictment and they were not 
prosecuted. Thus, captured German documents presented at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal in 1946 
corroborate the routine use of rape as a weapon of terror, and detail, for instance, the sexual humiliation that 
German SS unleashed upon the Jewish women in the Warsaw ghetto, despite the stern prohibition against ;’race’ 
defilement-the injunction against contaminating Aryan ‘blood’ contained in the Nuremberg race laws of 1935 
that extended under its own twisted logic to forcible intercourse, as well as to marriage or extramarital liaison. 
For a more detailed overview of sexual violence perpetrated against the female Jewish population at the hand of 
the Nazis during World War II see: Brownmiller, ‘War’ (1975), 31 at 49-56. For a historical account of the rape of 
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 The ‘Rape of Nanking’ after the nature of the atrocities was finally revealed to the world ten years after the 
event, soon passed into common usage as the world-wide metaphor for that city’s invasion. The events leading to 
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 ‘[a]n orgy of wholesale assault against the remaining civilian population,’ 
 
In a subsequent report compiled by the Nanking International Relief Committee, the missionary group that 
remained in the city, in June 1938, it found that among the injured females, 56 percent were between the ages of 
15 and 29, although the terms and methods of inquiry excluded rape per se. Subsequently, during the trial of 
General Iwane Matsui, the man in charge of the Nanking invasion, and one of the central defendants in the 
docket at Tokyo, it was established that ‘approximately 200,000 cases of rape occurred within the city during the 
first months of occupation.’ It was the considered opinion of the Tribunal at Tokyo that the invasion and 
wholesale destruction and looting of the city had been ‘either secretly ordered of wilfully committed’. Although 
command responsibility for sexual violence was not tried as an independent crime, but as a crime tried in 
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against women, such as the Rape of Nanking. Part III examines the genealogy of gender-
specific provisions of international humanitarian law using a feminist legal perspective. It 
surveys the principal international humanitarian law treaties that regulate contemporary 
armed conflict and recognise it as comprising international customary law to show that these 
have not necessarily had the desired effect of providing for enhanced safeguards for female 
civilians in armed conflict. Moreover, it argues that the laws regulating armed conflict continue 
to perpetuate portrayals of women along fixed binaries and dichotomies, which always situate 
them in relation to men and in this way emphasise their powerlessness. This part provides the 
critical legal context for the ensuing analysis, as it cautions against investing too much capital 
into a legal system that from its inception has reproduced hierarchical relations between men 
and women.225 Despite its inherent shortcomings, however, international humanitarian law 
has been progressive in its ability to reimagine wartime sexual violence as one of the gravest 
offences against mankind, as the current chapter goes on to show.  
 
Part IV focuses on the key ICTY and ICTR jurisdictional achievements accomplished in relation 
to wartime sexual violence by analysing the legal modalities through which these offences 
have been interpreted in international criminal law. It, thus, undertakes an analysis of recent 
developments to show how the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunals encompasses 
sexual violence under different categories of crimes. It also examines other legal significant 
developments, such as the creation of the Gender-based Advisor in the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) as another manifestation of the seriousness with which gender-specific 
concerns are treated in international criminal law, while Part V analyses how wartime sexual 
violence offences against women have been incorporated into the ICTY and reflects on the 
classification of sexual violence as a form of genocide in the ICTR Statute. Part VI reflects on 
the most significant legal developments accomplished by the tribunals examining in particular 
the development of the first-ever definition of rape in international law provided in the 
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Akayesu case. In this vein, it focuses on specific aspects of ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence, resulting, for instance, in the narrowing of the consent defence in wartime rape 
cases, which have been widely labelled as significant victories in the current feminist moment. 
In describing the cases that have helped shape these victories, the chapter prepares the 
groundwork for the subsequent feminist analysis, which focuses in detail upon their 
significance as manifestations of a particular brand of feminism, known as ‘governance 
feminism’. This chapter parts a warning shot in the direction of feminism, while subsequent 
chapters take the critique further by asking what these legal developments signify for women 




Rape as an Act Outside of Time- A Brief Historical Overview of Wartime Sexual Violence 
against Women committed during the Conflicts in Vietnam and Bangladesh 
 
In her seminal book Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape written three decades ago, 
Susan Brownmiller provides a feminist politico-historical analysis of wartime rape. She places 
the phenomenon of rape within the context of social and biological realities to unveil its 
political purposes, and to counter the persistent myths surrounding it.  Above all, she counters 
the perception that rape is a sexual act by showing that it is not inspired by sexual stimuli, but 
is often driven by political motivations that seek to dominate and degrade.226 In many ways, 
Brownmiller’s work can be considered the forerunner, if not the authoritative feminist text on 
wartime sexual violence. Considered part of the second wave of U.S. feminism, as a distinct 
strand of liberal thought, it is often perceived as the feminist perspective on rape and has been 
highly influential in the development of reforms concerning rape laws.   
 
It also furnishes contemporary feminism with the idea that wartime sexual violence against 
women is an extension of the everyday, a space so saturated with women’s objectification, 
(whether through pornography or prostitution as endemic social practices) that it constantly 
glorifies and naturalises violence against women in the private sphere.227 While the rise of 
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‘governance feminism’ is explored in detail in Chapter IV, there has been a notable turn in 
contemporary feminist scholarship towards the espousal of structuralist ideas in relation to 
the regulation of wartime sexual violence, which have located the root of the violence in 
‘oppressive’ cultural traditions.228 In the wake of the ‘ethnic conflicts’ of the 1990s and the 
ushering in of the era of ‘human rights globalisation’, this feminist trend has become more 
assertive, having assumed a prominent role in international treaty negotiations, diplomatic 
conferences, and in the drafting of international criminal statute law.  
 
Current feminist investments with international criminal law are heavily rooted in U.S.-centric, 
Western liberal notions of women’s role in society that locate sexual violence against women 
exclusively within the binary of female subjugation/ male dominance. The thesis believes that 
the feminist structuralist focus on women’s gendered injuries has had the effect of giving new 
                                                                                                                                           
 
‘The case against pornography and the case against toleration of prostitution are central to the fight 
against rape, and if it angers a large part of the liberal population to be so informed, then I would 
question in turn the political understanding of such liberals and their true concern for the rights of 
women. Or to put it more gently, a feminist analysis approaches all prior assumptions, including those of 
the great, unquestioned liberal tradition, with a certain open-minded suspicion, for all prior traditions 
have worked against the cause of women and no set of values, including that of tolerant liberals, is 
above review or challenge. After all, the  liberal politik has had less input from the feminist perspective 
than from any other modern source: it does not by its own considerable virtue embody a perfection of 
ideals, it has no special claim on goodness, rather, it is most receptive to those values to which it has 
been made sensitive by others.’  
 
In S. Brownmiller, ‘Women Fight Back’ (1975), at 390.  
228
 As Vasuki Nesiah has argued in her critique of American feminist scholarship in relation to their perception of  
Third World Women, the dominant U.S. feminist discourse about ‘universally shared oppression’ obfuscates 
global contradictions, and a discourse about the experience of oppression often participates in the imperially 
charged agenda of defining “Third World Women” as victims of oppression. In her contribution, Nesiah draws on 
Western feminist debates around Sri Lankan women who labour in transnational factories to argue that U.S. 
feminists remain complicit in masking global contradictions by insisting upon the notion of universalisation of 
oppression, a vision that privileges gender as the source of community and as a frame in which claims are 
articulated, thus preventing other critical issues pertinent to the Sri Lankan context, such as the disparity 
between the diverse ethnic composition of the country, which have been central to the Sri Lankan civil war, as 
well as complex class issues that cannot be negotiated along gendered registers, but are more strongly related to 
unequal power relations in society from emerging as a subject of debate. As Nesiah argues,  
 
‘By privileging gender as the source of community and the frame in which claims are articulated, they 
prevent other critical issues from being raised. The danger of basing feminist internationality on 
experiential discourse is that American feminists simply assume an international feminist community 
without interrogating their own investment in obscuring the structural conditions that separate women.’  
 
In V. Nesiah, ‘Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of U.S. Feminist Legal Scholarship’, 16 Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal (2003), 189 at 198-201.  
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life to imperial and protective subjectivities in international law. Dianne Otto has suggested 
that this might lead to undesirable consequence for the feminist movement, given that:  
 
‘[t]he extensive cataloguing of women’s injuries and disadvantages, while clearly 
necessary for making women’s human rights abuses legally cognizable, emphasizes 
women’s helplessness, rather than their agency’.229 
 
This leads to a significant, and yet unresolved feminist conundrum, namely of how to reconcile 
the danger of revitalising the ‘imperial victim subject’230 which has arguably been resurrected 
by contemporary human rights discourses with a strong feminist drive to prosecute gender-
based violence in armed conflict, so as to achieve gender justice and equality. Moreover, as 
noted previously, feminists have been anxious to preserve their hard-won victories in the 
international criminal arena at the expense of opening up a debate about the merits of 
criminalisation. This has left those who have queried the merits of the increasing 
juridicalisation of gender-based violence very little room for manoeuvre. The most pressing 
feminist anxiety, specifically, has been that critique of feminist accomplishments in the 
international legal arena will lead to a destabilisation of the subject detracting away from the 
normative aims of the feminist movement. The aim of this thesis is to show that the type of 
critique pursued here, which questions the construction and portrayal of the female subject in 
international law does not have to lead to a loss of female subjectivity, but instead might hold 
the potential for reimagining wartime identity as multiple, free-floating, varied and free of pre-
conceived gender stereotypes.  
 
i) A Brief Note on Male Rape 
Related to the idea of international law entrenching specific gendered subjectivities is a sense 
that sexual violence against men remains a relatively under-theorised aspect of wartime 
sexual violence jurisprudence, considering that attacks of a sexual nature against men were 
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rampant during the Yugoslav conflict.231 Yet patterns of sexual assault against men have not 
been similarly visibilised in ICTY decisions, even though over forty percent of the total number 
of cases prosecuted included charges in which men were the victims of sexual violence.232 The 
high proportion of counts of male sexual assault is, moreover, surprising, given the general 
consensus that women are the predominant victims of wartime sexual violence. In spite of 
these findings there have been significant differences in the patterns and scale of male and 
female sexual assault perpetrated during the Yugoslav conflict, which seem to reiterate 
dominant gender stereotypes of women in international law.  As Kirsten Campbell has found, 
women appear to have predominantly testified to sexual violence, whereas men seem to have 
testified mainly to conflict. This has created a pattern where:  
  
‘[m]en appear to testify to conflict and women testify to rape. If men primarily narrate 
war, then they appear to function as actors within the conflict. If women only narrate 
rape, then they appear as passive victims of sexual violence. Such narrative framing 
reproduces traditional models of active masculinity and passive femininity.’233 
 
The findings are even more startling considering that there has generally been an 
overrepresentation of counts of sexual violence against male victims compared to female 
victims, and a differential distribution of the categories of offences being charged between 
genders. Nonetheless, there has been an underrepresentation of instances in which sexual 
violence against male victims formed the sole basis of the charges.234 The invisibilisation of 
male sexual violence in relation to female sexual violence, thus, undergirds the thesis’ central 
contention that in spite of the ostensible successes international law continues to frame men 
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as active agents of conflict, while women remain victims of sexual violence.235 It, therefore, 
appears that the ICTY has adopted a strategy that avoids interpreting men as victims of 
wartime sexual violence, thus, potentially rendering grave injustice to men who have been 
raped and sexually assaulted. The patterns are most likely linked to heterosexual norms of 
sexuality and dominant ideas around the male body, which have allowed little room for the 
conceptualisation of homosexual violence and the ‘feminisation’ of one male body by another. 
 
As stated earlier, the thesis does not provide a comprehensive historical overview of sexual 
violence, including rape, as this has been done elsewhere. It does not, therefore, analyse 
events of sexual violence committed during World Wars I and II, other than to note that the 
view of rape as an inevitable bi-product of war has long held sway across a majority of the 
literature on the subject prompting more contemporary feminists to challenge the grain of 
dominant texts.236 Certainly, as feminist have aimed to show, part of the explanation for the 
high incidence of sexual violence is found in the preponderance of inter-ethnic conflict and a 
disproportionate targeting of civilians in the post-Geneva Conventions era.   
 
Moreover, institutional cultures have long considered violence perpetrated by armies against 
civilians as ‘heroic’ resulting in a lack of legal accountability for acts of sexual violence. It is 
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terror as the German Hun marched through Belgium in World War I. Rape was a weapon of revenge as 
the Russian Army marched through Berlin in World War II. Rape flourishes in warfare irrespective of 
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Brownmiller (1975), at 32.  
It is perhaps interesting to note in view of Brownmiller’s observation that if rape flourishes in wartime, regardless 
of nationality, or geographical origin, why it has become so central to the representation and framing of conflict 
in the post 1990s era particularly with respect to the Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts.  
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within this cultural context that stereotypical conceptions of female identity, which have 
variously portrayed women as property, chattel, or as battle-camp trophies and rendered 
access to their bodies rewards of war, have found fertile ground. The reasons for sexual 
violence against women during wartime can also be ascribed to the intoxicating effect that 
victorious armies experience in perpetrating rape as part of a pattern of national terror and 
subjugation, as well as to the maleness of military institutions and the institutional hierarchies 
that create a culture of permissiveness for acts of sexual violence, where male bonding often 
consists of a spiritual connection felt at having exclusive ownership and control over 
weaponry, paired with the manly discipline of giving and obeying orders.237 These factors all 
contribute to the production of war as a space offering the ‘perfect’ psychological backdrop 
for male contempt against women. 
 
It is apposite to note at this juncture that in the field of war crimes, ideas around the legal 
characteristics of rape in wartime have a long pedigree dating back to Grotius, who is often 
seen as the ‘father’ of the laws of war.238 Using rape as a crucial marker distinguishing 
‘civilised’ from ‘barbaric’ states, Grotius asserted that the more civilised nations disallowed 
rape, as for him the distinction turned as much on how states condemned rape as on which 
states engaged in it.239 Grotius, moreover, believed that rape of women indexed a hierarchy of 
states to the extent that rape and the official response to it became two means by which state 
behaviour was normatively ordered. Carrying distinctly Eurocentric undertones, this view 
perpetuated the idea that rape would not be committed by the more civilised Western armies, 
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which were deemed more sophisticated than their ‘barbarian counterparts.’240  It is, thus, 
interesting to note Brownmiller’s observations that a ‘simple rule of thumb’ as far as 
responsibility for rape is concerned was that ‘the winning side is the side that does the 
raping.’241 But given the colonial context, wherein the West did most of the winning, it is 
questionable whether this holds true. Certainly, this assumption would not apply to the 
Yugoslav context, given that the side deemed principally responsible for sexual violence crimes 
during the Yugoslav conflict were the Bosnian Serbs and by extension Serbia, the vanquished 
parties of the conflict.  
 
ii) Vietnam 
‘There is no precise moment in history when bells clanged and rape in war universally came to 
be considered a criminal act, outside the province of a proper warrior.’242 Sexual violence and 
most prominently rape have, thus, accompanied wars of religion as far back as the First 
Crusade, when knights and pilgrims took time off for sexual assault as they marched toward 
Constantinople.243 Rape has been used as a ‘weapon of terror’ as the German Huns marched 
through Belgium in World War I; it was a ‘weapon of revenge’ as the Russian Army marched to 
Berlin in World War II; it ‘got out of hand-‘regrettably ‘when the Pakistani Army battled 
Bangladesh, and it reared its head again as a way of ‘relieving boredom’ as American GIs 
searched and destroyed in the highlands of Vietnam.244  
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While undoubtedly present during the Vietnam conflict rape was, interestingly enough, not 
deployed as a tactic of war, as the general availability of sex (the brothel system established 
and controlled by the U.S. military forces having been rampant throughout Vietnamese 
society) gave the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) less cause to rape.245 Family relations served 
as a deterrent to rape, as the Vietnamese conflict was considered a war of brother against 
brother with injunctions against assaulting one’s sister or one’s brother forming part of the 
code of honour.246 The strong tradition of military brothels in Vietnam, which had been 
established long before the American presence247, might therefore account for the fact that 
sexual violence in a fratricidal war like Vietnam took on different contours to the sexual 
violence seen during the Yugoslav conflict (just as easily conceptualised as a war of brother 
against brother), which was widespread and often committed on a systematic and massive 
scale. 
 
In 1965, as the war in Vietnam was escalating the main idea was, thus, to keep the troops 
content and satisfied in what has been labelled as the ‘McNamara theory’ consisting of ‘ice 
cream, movies, swimming pools, pizza, hot dogs, laundry service and hooch maids.’248 The 
deployment of sexuality and positioning of women during the Vietnamese conflict as sex 
slaves, who had no other option but to pursue prostitution as a means of survival, thus, 
illustrates that female poverty paired with sexist military cultures, as well as state sanctioning 
of sexual attacks frequently lie at  the root of gender-based violence, whether perpetrated in 
the form of rape and sexual molestation inside detention camps, or through state legitimised 
establishments such as military brothels. Socio-economic deprivation and the civilian status of 
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women in conflict situations, thus, play a firm part in explaining the incidence of sexual 
violence against women in armed conflict.  The attention paid to sexual violence offences 
during the Vietnam conflict (although on a far smaller scale than during the Yugoslav war) was 
very much a reflection of its time, as it coincided with a burgeoning interest in gender-based 
violence on the part of second wave feminists in the United States in particular. The conflict in 
Vietnam, thus, raised awareness of the fact that rape was an ongoing phenomenon of wartime 
and that more modern typologies of armed conflict did not reduce the incidence of sexual 
violence. In this way, it paved the way for later feminist advocacy calling for the 





Much has been written about the Yugoslav war having first visibilised rape as a widespread 
phenomenon of wartime. However, a less well remembered event in history is the rape of 
more than 200,000 Bengali women at the hands of Pakistani soldiers during the nine-month 
conflict between West and East Pakistan starting in March 1971 when the Bangladeshi 
government declared its independence from West Pakistan.249 As in numerous subsequent 
conflicts, an ethnic component formed part of the rationale underlying sexual violence crimes, 
given that eighty percent of the women raped were Moslem, although Hindu and Christian 
women were not exempt.250 According to Brownmiller, the geography of East Pakistan and its 
lack of defence mechanisms were conducive to the brutalisation of women. Thus, the hit-and-
run rape of large numbers of Bengali women was made ‘brutally simple’251 in terms of 
logistics, as the Pakistani regulars swept through and occupied the tiny and over-populated 
land, an area only slightly larger than the state of New York.252  The aggressors were often 
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aided by the local Mukhti Bahini, so-called ‘freedom fighters’, who rather than acting as an 
effective counterforce did much of the raping themselves in a scenario reminiscent of World 
War II when Greek and Italian peasant women were assaulted by whatever soldiers happened 
to pass through their village.253 Surveys conducted with the raped women established that one 
of the most serious crises resulting from the widespread rape was pregnancy.254 The issue of 
rape as a strategy of forced impregnation also played a crucial part in the feminist debates 
surrounding the Yugoslav conflict with some feminists arguing that the use of rape-as-
genocide was ‘fundamentally hinged on the existence of forced impregnation.’255 Despite its 
absence from the annals of wartime, the rape of Bengali women during the struggle for 
Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 marked a crucial moment for feminist activism, as it was 
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‘We’ve been waiting for this for twenty years, for Muslim women, clean women to make chetnik 
children…you will give birth to a boy chetnik who will have a cross on his brow and who will kill Muslims 
when he grows up.’  
 
This anecdote and countless others of this kind lead MacKinnon to conclude that in the Yugoslav war, ethnic 
politics are ‘sexualised.’ In C. Mac Kinnon, ‘From Ausschwitz to Omarska, Nuremberg to The Hague’, Are Women 




possibly the first time in history the international community galvanised over wartime sexual 
violence.256 Significantly, it triggered an organised response from humanitarian and feminist 
groups in the West, in many ways being the forerunner of the type of organisational feminism 
dominating the 1990s. Thus, while the Yugoslav conflict is normally thought of as the event 
that brought rape as a weapon of war to international attention, this brief illustration of the 
incidences of sexual violence against women committed during the Vietnam and Bangladesh 
conflicts has served to show that while these episodes attracted attention at the time, they 
have been eclipsed by the events of the 1990s, which propelled the issue of wartime sexual 




The Role of Women in International Humanitarian Law- A Feminist Critique  
As outlined at the outset of the chapter, sexual violence has long been an integral part of 
armed conflict, and has, frequently, although not always been deployed in systematic fashion, 
or used as a ‘weapon of war’. In spite of the prohibition of sexual violence in humanitarian law 
for more than a century, customary international law has historically ignored and failed to 
punish gender crimes.257  Moreover, the various and principal international humanitarian law 
treaties that regulate contemporary armed conflict and make up international customary law-
the 1907 Hague Conventions and Regulations258, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions along with 
the annexes to these Conventions259, and the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
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Conventions-260have not necessarily had the desired effect of providing enhanced safeguards 
for female civilians in times of armed conflict. Neither The Hague Conventions, nor the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols contain definitions of rape. Yet, as Michelle Jarvis 
has pointed out, despite the absence of any express reference to sexual violence it has always 
been possible to interpret the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
Protocol I, so as to include sexual violence. Thus, the category of ‘inhumane treatment’ has, 
for example, been defined as a grave breach pursuant to Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. 261 
 
In the context of classical international criminal law262, rape was first explicitly formulated as a 
crime against humanity after World War II in Control Council Law No. 10, which was enacted 
by the Allied Control Council for Germany as the basis for the trial of non-major war criminals 
following World War II.263 Yet it took as late as the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
for rape to be first explicitly recognised as an issue particular to women in wartime.264 The 
Fourth Geneva Convention ‘unequivocally and without precedent’265 prohibits rape and forced 
prostitution’, despite the absence of rape from the enumerated grave breaches of the 
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Convention, which are subject to universal jurisdiction.266  This was of great significance from a 
women’s perspective, given that international law had been silent in relation to wartime 
sexual violence allegations at Nuremberg and Tokyo.  
 
The prohibitions of the Geneva Conventions were later supplemented and extended with the 
adoption of two protocols-Additional Protocols I and II.267 These primarily reiterate and 
cement the message that rape is prohibited in both international and internal armed 
conflicts.268 Moreover, and in a significant shift away from proprietary and protective notions 
of women, as per Article 27 of the Geneva Conventions Article 76 of Additional Protocol I, 
applicable to international armed conflicts, states that ‘women shall be the object of special 
respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other 
form of indecent assault.’269 The semantic move away from a language of honour to female 
dignity and respect manifested itself further in Article 4(2) (e) of Additional Protocol II, which 
prohibits ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, 
rape, enforced prostitution, and any other form of indecent assault.’270 Moreover, and as 
quoted by the Čelebići Trial Chamber, Article 4(1) of Additional Protocol II implicitly prohibits 
rape and sexual assault stating that all persons ‘are entitled to respect for their person and 
honour.’271 The two protocols also extend the protections of the Geneva Conventions to both 
international and internal armed conflicts, as well as to periods after a war ends, if the 
territory is still under foreign occupation.272  
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It, therefore, appears that in its more modern manifestations international humanitarian law 
has adopted a more progressive approach, by embracing ‘dignity’ instead of ‘honour’, 
although the former term is problematic from a feminist perspective, for it still fails to express 
the fact that sexual assault is a violent crime, or that it is not solely targeted at women 
because of their reproductive capacities.273  Moreover, it does not resolve feminist concerns 
about the overall portrayal of women within international humanitarian law.  
 
In spite of the conceptual shift in the perception of women's legal status in times of armed 
conflict, international humanitarian law as a discipline has been subject to feminist critique 
since the early 1990s following on from the branching out of feminist legal scholarship into 
different aspects of international law. Feminist legal scholars have argued that international 
humanitarian law fails to take into account the gendered experiences of women during times 
of armed conflict denying women any sense of female subjectivity by conceiving of female 
identity in wartime through a protectionist lens.274 The most widely framed criticism has been 
encapsulated by Judith Gardam, who argues that the gendered hierarchy of armed conflict is 
mirrored in the language of international humanitarian law, which is firmly rooted in 
protections based on women’s honour and in deeply essentialised sexual attributes, such as 
chastity and female modesty. Yet, women’s honour, a concept constructed by men for their 
own purposes, has very little to do with the reality of sexual violence experienced by women in 
armed conflict.275 Thus, despite having established an unequivocal prohibition of rape, the 
second paragraph of Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention has been a recurrent subject 
of feminist legal critique for its deployment of protective language, which aims to shield 
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women ‘against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or 
any other form of indecent assault.’276 
 
The criticism has been that the law provides for women’s protection from sexual crimes 
because of honour, not because of individual autonomy, thereby failing to grasp the gendered 
reality of war and the more intense, personalised and psychological sense of harm felt by 
women as result of the sexual violence.277 In a similar vein, Hillary Charlesworth has argued 
that Article 27 ‘assumes that women should be protected from sexual crimes because they 
implicate a woman’s honour, reinforcing the notion of women as men’s property, rather than 
because they constitute violence.’278 Catherine Niarchos has criticised the idea of linking rape 
and honour for compromising women’s ‘true’ injuries. As she has put it, ‘rape begins to look 
like seduction with “just a little persuading”, rather than a massive and brutal assault on the 
body and the psyche.’279 Thus, violations of honour and modesty are ‘wholly inadequate 
concepts to express the suffering of women raped during war.’280 This representation of 
women also has implications for the way in which sexual violence is later prosecuted, as rape 
as a mere injury to honour or reputation appears less worthy of prosecution than injuries to 
the person.  
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Nira Yuval-Davis has also contributed to this debate by suggesting that women have always 
been conceived of as the bearers of the ‘collectivity’s honour’.281 In wartime narratives the 
figure of the woman is often the symbolic bearer of the collectivity’s identity and honour, 
whether in the form of ‘Mother Russia’, ‘Mother Ireland’ or ‘Mother India’. 282 But while 
women symbolise the collectivity, unity, honour and the raison d’être of specific national and 
ethnic projects, such as going to war, they are frequently excluded from active policy and 
decision-making processes, and therefore from the collective ‘we’ of the body politic.283 
Women thus occupy an ambivalent position within the nation, by on the one hand being its 
symbol,284 while at the same time constituting the ‘Other’ within society by virtue of their 
exclusion from key political processes. In this way, women retain their object position in 
international law. International humanitarian law has, further, deployed highly essentialised 
interpretations of women informed by adopting rules that focus on the biological differences 
of women and on the consequences that flow from this rigid distinction.285 As Yuval-Davies has 
pointed out:  
 
‘Women’s positions in and their obligations to their ethnic and national collectives, as 
well as to the states they reside in as citizens affect and sometimes even override their 
reproductive rights making their ability to bear children the focal point for their very 
existence. Women like men are members of the national collective, but, unlike men, 
they are bound by certain rules and regulations that apply specifically to them. These 
rules assume special significance when considered against the fact that women are 
constructed as the ‘biological reproducers’ of the nation.’286 
                                            
281
 This is most clearly visible when considering the modalities by which international humanitarian law 
traditionally defining gender-specific crimes, such as rape a crime of honour rather than a form of torture. Strict 
cultural codes, which are even more prominent in situation of armed conflict, are often developed to keep 
women in this inferior position. See: N. Yuval-Davies, Gender and Nation, (London: Sage, 1997), at 39.  
282
 Ibid.  
283
 Ibid at 47. 
284
 In times of armed conflict women are associated in the collective imagination with women and children and it 
is supposedly for the sake of ‘womenandchildren’ that men go to war. Their association with children also ties 
them with collective, as well as with the familial future. Wars come to be justified on the basis that they are 
fought for women and children in the reassurance that those who fight on their behalf i.e. men will come home 
to a safe hearth where women eagerly await their return. Ibid at 45. 
285
 Gardam and Jarvis (2001), 94.  
286
 Yuval-Davis (1997) at Similarly, Gardam has argued that International humanitarian law in addressing the 




The feminist sentiment is, thus, that the language of protection is reinforcing proprietary 
images of women, rather than focusing on the prohibition of violence more generally. The 
regime of ‘special protection’ in particular reveals a picture of women based on their 
perceived weakness, both psychological and physical, and their sexual and reproductive 
functions. Aside from the specific provisions designated for their protection, women remain 
largely invisible.287 Moreover, a major shortcoming of international humanitarian law, from 
the perspective of this thesis is that it overemphasises sexual violence, while failing to take 
into account the socio-economic dimensions characterising women’s experiences of armed 
conflict, such as food insecurity and lack of medical and healthcare provisions, which are 
central to any comprehensive understanding of why women become vulnerable to begin with.  
The regime, thus, assumes that men and women have identical needs and that any potential 
problems that may arise can be dealt with according to the requirement of equal treatment 
inherent in the law.288 But, as feminists have argued, this system principally benefits the 
combatant, who is traditionally the central figure in armed conflict around which a majority of 
the legal provisions revolve. International humanitarian law still expressly assumes ‘[a] well-
armed, well-dressed professional, from an organised group- a combatant predominantly 
engaged in an international armed conflict’.289 
 
What emerges from this brief feminist critique of international humanitarian law is not only a 
system with an inherent gender-bias that has failed to take into account ‘women’s experience’ 
(itself a contingent and charged term), but also a regime that has been unable to 
conceptualise the more modern manifestations of conflict that have become far more 
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complex to grasp. The following section, thus, examines the key legal developments of the 




Key Developments in ICTY and ICTR Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence 
Janet Halley has noted that ‘the specific criminalization of sexual violence in war has made an 
immense stride in recent years.’290 The 1990s, thus, saw an explosion of lawmaking intended 
to govern armed conflict and witnessed a rapid development of international sexual violence 
prosecutions prompted primarily by the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which 
had gained notoriety for widely publicised incidents of rape, sexual mutilation, and sexual 
humiliation of women. Both conflicts thrust into the open the stark reality of gender-based 
violence during armed conflict ensuring that the international community would no longer 
ignore this issue.291 Wartime sexual violence, thus, soon became a site for ‘feminist 
lawmaking’, as consistent and strongly organised feminist advocacy in the 1990s mobilised 
activists to engage with international humanitarian law as a means of addressing gendered 
harms.292 It also influenced contemporary debates on transitional justice prompting the 
discipline to recognise the importance of addressing gender issues in conflict situations and in 
their aftermath.293  
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The Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals became pioneering institutions for wartime sexual 
violence adjudication due to their ‘successful’ prosecution of various forms of sexual violence 
as instruments of genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, persecution and enslavement, 
as this chapter goes on to discuss.294 The ICTY, in particular, has pioneered the idea of 
accountability for wartime sexual violence against women through its extensive 
jurisprudence.295 Moreover, the creation of both tribunals embodied the feminist aspiration 
that wartime sexual violence would finally be visibilised by the law.  Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald 
has, thus, noted that the establishment of the ICTY ‘signalled the beginning of the end of the 
cycle of impunity’.296 Both tribunals also appeared to provide the opportunity of moving away 
from the notion that the rape was a crime against a man’s property to acknowledging it as an 
attack upon female autonomy.297 In particular, it was anticipated that the history of wartime 
sexual violence, which as previously shown, had been replete with reports of women being 
raped, sexually enslaved, impregnated, sexually mutilated, and subjected to multiple other 
forms of sexual violence, or mass violence, would finally be taken seriously and that violence 
against women would be criminalised.298  
 
The ICTY and the ICTR statutes were adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 
and 1994, respectively, with the aim of defining their subject-matter jurisdiction, procedures, 
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institutional roles and rules.299 The tribunals are primarily driven by their statutes, which 
outline in detail the scope of their jurisdiction.300 The statutes authorise prosecution and 
conviction in accordance with already existing forms of international criminal liability, but at 
the same time they modify these bodies of law both formally and substantively, as they do not 
only select from the tradition on which they rely, but also authoritatively reinstate it. The 
statutes can therefore be likened to ‘codes with crisp boundaries’.301 Moreover, the tribunals 
promulgate their own rules of evidence and procedure, which were heavily driven by feminist 
efforts.302  
 
The jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal has been particularly substantive in defining, 
delineating and developing substantive crimes. The ICTY has, thus, rendered decisions 
concerning the nature of modern-day armed conflict, such as the application and scope of 
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while also ‘breathing life’ into the grave 
breaches regime by being the first institution to systematically apply it to sexual violence 
offences.303 It has added significant definitional value to the Geneva Conventions through 
identifying comprised acts, such as rape and other sexual violence crimes, as well as 
distinguishing these acts from those comprised under the Torture Convention.304The 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, thus, firmly reflects the reconceptualisation of sexual violence as 
torture, which had begun within the context of international and regional human rights law.305 
 
In addition, it has clarified when grave breaches may be applicable through an elucidation of 
the ‘overall control test’, which it used as a method for legally characterising the Yugoslav 
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conflict. It, thus, found that the regime could apply in practice through the operation of the 
nexus requirement. In parallel strokes, it reinterpreted the ‘protected person’ category in 
order to crystallise which persons may benefit from its provisions. Moreover, it broadened the 
criteria serving to establish whether a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population had occurred and it defined the prerequisite requirements necessary for proving 
the core crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.  In this way, it has also delineated what 
acts constitute forms of enslavement, as well as ruling on the constituent elements required to 
prove torture under international humanitarian law.306  Significantly, it has also provided 
detailed insight into when a superior can be held criminally liable for crimes committed by the 
subordinate by extensively developing the joint criminal enterprise theory of responsibility.  
According to Article 8 of the ICTY Statute, territorial jurisdiction is limited to the former 
Yugoslavia, but temporal jurisdiction is open-ended as to the events occurring in the territory 
after 1 January 1991.307 Security Council Resolutions 1503 and 1534 provide that the ICTY and 
ICTR are to complete their proceedings by the end of 2010, although at present both tribunals 
are still fully operational.308 
 
At this point, it is relevant to note (albeit in brief contours) the circumstances that led to the 
creation of the Rwandan Tribunal. During the months of April to July 1994, between 500,000 
and one million Rwandan men, women and children were slaughtered, as part of a genocidal 
campaign against the Tutsi minority (typically accompanied by widespread massacres of 
moderate Hutus who were willing to work with Tutsi). A circle of political leaders, threatened 
with the loss of political power, organised the killings with the help of Hutu militiamen and 
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civilians.309 One of the central patterns underlying the Rwandan genocide was the sexualised 
targeting of Tutsi women and girls, as part of a targeted and well-organised Hutu ethnic 
campaign against the Tutsi.310 As a result of the events which took place in Rwanda during the 
spring of 1994, the ICTR was established by way of Security Council Resolution 955 of 
November 8, 1994.311 Under the Statute, the ICTR has the power to prosecute Rwandan 
citizens responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as genocide 
and other such violations, committed in the territory of Rwanda and in neighbouring states 
between January 1 and December 31, 1994.312 According to Articles 2 through 4, the tribunal 
has subject-matter jurisdiction over persons who committed genocide as defined in Article 2 
of the Statute, persons responsible for crimes against humanity as defined in Article 3 of the 
Statute and persons responsible for serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
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Conventions of August 12, 1949, and for violations of Additional Protocol II, as well as the 
crimes defined in Article 4 of the Statute.313  
From a gender-based perspective, the most significant substantive accomplishment of the 
ICTR has been its definition of rape in The Prosecutor v. Akayesu314 (as discussed in Part VI of 
this chapter) and the recognition that consent is irrelevant for acts of a sexual nature with a 
nexus to genocide, armed conflict, and crimes against humanity315 This judicial insight, as 
pioneered in Akayesu is becoming increasingly accepted in international criminal law, as 
related  provisions in the Rome Statute similarly do not contain consent, thus reflecting that 




i) The Gender-based Mandate of the ICTY 
The ICTY consists of sixteen permanent independent judges and a maximum at any one time 
of twelve ad litem judges, while the ICTR is made up of eleven permanent judges. The 
procedure of electing tribunal judges is by way of a vote in the United Nations General 
Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council. The ad litem judges are drawn from a 
pool of 27 judges and are also elected by the General Assembly for a term of four years, upon 
which they may be re-elected.317 Although no reference to sex or gender had been made in 
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definition of rape and enforced prostitution as crimes against humanity. International Criminal Court, Elements of 
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the criteria, the first bench of the ICTY in 1993 included two female judges out of eleven 
judges.318 Thus, the 1993 election of female judges to serve on the ICTY marked the first time 
women entered the international judicial arena, despite the forty-eight year existence of the 
International Court of Justice.319 Women also figured prominently in other high-profile 
positions at the tribunal, as the second Chief Prosecutor to be appointed to the post was 
Louise Arbour, a former judge from Canada, while the third Chief Prosecutor to the ICTY was 
also a woman, the Swiss former Attorney-General Carla del Ponte who held the position until 
the end of 2008.320   
 
ii) Gender Integration through the Position of the Gender Advisor in the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) 
Much has been written about the creation and the appointment of Patricia Seller’s to the 
position of Gender Advisor in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) by former Chief Prosecutor 
                                                                                                                                           
drawn from a pool of between twenty-two and thirty-three. They are also elected by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations for a term of four years and can be re-elected. The Appeals Chamber consists of seven permanent 
judges: five from the permanent judges of the ICTY and two from the 11 permanent judges of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). These seven judges also form the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR. The unique 
aspect to the composition of the judges is that they all represent the main legal systems of the world, and bring 
to the Tribunal a variety of legal experiences. Their duties include hearing testimony and legal arguments, 
deciding on the innocence or guilt of the accused and passing sentence. The permanent judges have a further 
important regulatory function consisting of drafting and adopting legal instruments regulating the functioning of 
the ICTY, such as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See: ICTY Composition and Mandate. Available at: 
www.icty.org. (last accessed in July, 2011). 
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Richard Goldstone.321 Charged with developing the law through formulating the approach of 
the OTP to the investigation and indictment of gender crimes, the post of the Gender Advisor 
is a prominent example of the mainstreaming approach espoused by the United Nations.322 
According to commentators, the creation of this role has led to an increase in awareness 
amongst ICTY staff of how to address gender issues more thoroughly and effectively by 
fostering gender expertise and integrating gender awareness throughout the organisation. 
Thus, in 1995, for instance, in response to staffing issues and in recognition of the need to hold 
perpetrators of gender-based crimes accountable, the tribunal established a ‘sexual 
investigation team’ composed exclusively of women with extensive experience of gender 
crimes.323 After a few intense years of focusing on sexual violence the team was eventually 
dissolved, but only after the ICTY had gained sufficient gender awareness and expertise 
without having to rely upon this mechanism. The Gender Focal Point approach, moreover, 
enhanced the ability of prosecutors to bring successful charges against perpetrators of sexual 
violence, as ICTY staff members with gender expertise helped identify witnesses, analyse 
evidence, elicit testimony, and support those who testified.324 Feminist activists also noted a 
correlation between participation rates of women and the existence of serious investigations 
into sexual violence, observing that this resulted in a ‘gradual shift toward taking rape and 
other sexual violence crimes seriously and investigating them zealously.’325 In fact Goldstone 
went as far as to argue that if a woman had not been on the tribunal in its early years, there 
may not have been any indictments for gender-based crimes at all.326 It is at the same time an 
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example of the kind of ‘governance feminism’ that proved so influential to the adjudication of 
key ICTY wartime sexual violence cases. Another significant innovation of the tribunal in 
relation to the prosecution of wartime sexual violence was the drafting of Rule 34 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, which provided for the creation of a Victims and Witnesses Unit 
within the Registry, the tribunal’s administrative organ that recommends protective measures 
for the victims and witnesses.327 The purpose of this unit is to: ‘provide counselling and 
support for [victims and witnesses], in particular in cases of rape and sexual assault.’328 
Moreover, it is supposed to give ‘[d]ue consideration….in the appointment of staff, to the 
employment of qualified women, ‘thus reflecting the gender mainstreaming policies driving 
the contemporary legal institutions of the United Nations.329 An important innovation from a 
gender-based perspective has been Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, governing 
evidentiary matters in cases of sexual assault. These rules prescribe a system of protection for 
victims or witnesses to be balanced against the rights of the accused thus respecting 
universally accepted human rights standards.330   
 
Part V  
The Classification of Wartime Sexual Violence as a Prosecutable Offence in International 
Criminal Law  
 
The ICTY’s subject matter jurisdiction is set forth in four articles, giving it jurisdiction over 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 2), violations of the laws and 
customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and crimes against humanity (Article 5). 
Women’s advocates were particularly successful in having their demands that rape be 
explicitly listed as a crime against humanity met, as Article 5 defines crimes against humanity 
in armed conflict as ‘(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) 
                                            
327 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
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Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, Evidence in Cases of Sexual Assault, IT32/Rev. 21, 12 July 2001, at Art. 20.  
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imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; 
[and] (i) other inhumane acts’.331 Yet rape was omitted from both Articles 2 and 3, the 
provisions relating to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other war crimes.332 As 
alluded to previously, this was problematic from a feminist perspective, as rape could only be 
prosecuted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
This criticism is engaged with in greater detail in Chapter VI.  
 
i) Sexual Violence as a Crime against Humanity 
The ICTY Statute is the first legal provision since Control Council No. 10 to expressly reference 
rape in the context of crimes against humanity. Article 5(g) confers on the tribunal the power 
to prosecute persons responsible for, inter alia, rape as a crime against humanity ‘when 
committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed 
against any civilian population.’333 According to the ICTY jurisprudence, as established in the 
Kunarac case, the following elements are required to establish a crime against humanity 
pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute:  
 
(i) There must be an attack 
(ii) The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack 
(iii) The attack must be ‘directed against any civilian population’ 
(iv) The attack must be ‘widespread or systematic’ 
(v) The perpetrator must know of the wider context in which his acts occur and 
know that his acts are part of the attack 
(vi) The crime must have been committed during an armed conflict.334 
 
Indictments charging rape as a crime against humanity were issued in a number of other 
sexual violence cases arising from the context of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
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  See ICTY Statute, Art. 5.  
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 The Prosecutor v. Kunarac, (IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T) Trial Chamber Judgement (22 Feb. 2001), at para. 410. 
[hereinafter Kunarac Trial Chamber Judgement]. 
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accordance with the ICTY classification.335 Moreover, the ICTY entered convictions for sexual 
violence as a crime against humanity constituting other expressly enumerated crimes under 
Article 5 of the ICTY, such as torture as a crime against humanity under Article 5(f).336 Article 
5(c) refers to ‘enslavement’ as a crime against humanity, which during times of armed conflict 
is often experienced in different forms and frequently encompasses detention and rape over 
prolonged periods of time, forceful marriage; or forced prostitution.’337 As has been noted 
previously, the international community has been historically slow to act upon the connection 
between sexual violence and enslavement.338 Chapter V, thus, discusses the significance of the 
Kunarac case, where two defendants were found guilty of enslavement as a crime against 
humanity due to their treatment of women and girls as their personal property.339 The tribunal 
in this case recognised both the physical, as well as psychological elements of detention and 
the extreme sense of duress experienced by the women in this situation, which prevented any 
meaningful escape, as the women had nowhere to go and no means of survival in the 
prevailing wartime conditions.340 In this way, it will be argued that the tribunal indirectly 
foreclosed the possibility of female agency and resistance in wartime, as Chapter VI illustrates. 
The court, moreover, held that control of sexuality is a relevant factor in determining whether 
the crime of enslavement has been committed.341 In addition, Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute 
recognises that persecution can be a constituent act of a crime against humanity, and 
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individuals have been convicted of sexual violence offences committed on political, racial, 
and/or religious grounds.342 Persecution has been defined in the jurisprudence of the tribunal 
as ‘the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in 
international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as other acts 
prohibited in Article 5’. 343 Moreover, other acts of sexual violence excluding rape have been 
charged before the ICTY as inhumane acts, also a form of crime against humanity.344 This was 
confirmed in the Furundžija decision.345 
 
 
ii) Sexual Violence as War Crimes  
War crimes have been broadly defined as ‘violations of the laws and customs of war’, although 
not all breaches of international humanitarian law result in criminal responsibility.346 Recent 
developments in the prosecution of war crimes have confirmed the existence of two main 
categories of these crimes: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol I, applying to international armed conflict; and other violations of the laws and 
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customs of war, which apply to both internal and international armed conflicts. In the ICTY, 
indictments have been issued by the Prosecutor on the basis of sexual violence as a grave 
breach by way of torture and/or inhuman treatment;347 and wilfully causing great suffering348 
In practice, however, the OTP has increasingly avoided charging defendants with grave 
breaches to avoid the considerable time and expense involved in proving the existence of an 
international armed conflict.349  
 
The ICTY, moreover, has jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war under 
Article 3. Although the latter provides a non- exhaustive list, it does not make any reference to 
sexual violence. Nonetheless, the Prosecutor has issued indictments in which sexual violence is 
treated as a violation of the laws or customs of war applicable to international and internal 
armed conflict.350  The extent to which sexual violence can be prosecuted as a violation of the 
laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute was, specifically, considered in the 
Furundžija case.351 The Trial Chamber here confirmed that Article 3 is an ‘umbrella’ rule that 
covers ‘any serious violation of a rule of customary international humanitarian law entailing, 
under international customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the 
person breaching the rule’.352 The tribunal also found that ‘rape and other serious sexual 
assaults’ fall within the definition.353 Furundžija was, thus, found guilty of violations of the laws 
and customs of war through committing outrages upon personal dignity, including rape.354 
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This development was, moreover, confirmed in the Kunarac case, where the Trial Chamber 
convicted each of the three defendants of rape as a violation of the laws or customs of war.355 
 
iii) Sexual Violence as Genocide 
Genocide and genocidal acts are defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide.356 It was the first major human rights instrument of its kind adopted 
by the U.N.357 Genocide is defined in Article II of the Genocide Convention as: ‘any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a `national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group, as such:  
 
a) Killing members of the group 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about the 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
Genocide is a specific example of the broader category of crimes against humanity, but it 
differs from other crimes against humanity by the presence of a specific intent to destroy the 
specified group in whole or in part, thus making it difficult to prove the mens rea of the crime. 
Moreover, according to Article I of the Genocide Convention, genocide is a crime under 
international law whether or not it occurs during wartime or in peace.358  
 
Before engaging with the monumental Akayesu decision in more detail another important 
ruling on sexual violence as a form of genocide merits attention, as it raises some interesting 
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questions about women’s agency in wartime, The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko 
case.359 On May 26, 1997, the prosecutor of the Rwandan Tribunal filed an indictment accusing 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko of genocide, crime against humanity, and serious violations of 
common Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions committed during the Rwandan 
genocide. Nyiramasuhuko was the former Minister of Family and Women’s Development360 in 
both the government of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana that collapsed after his 
death on April 6, 1994 and the interim government that succeeded it.361  Two years after the 
initial indictment, the prosecution was granted leave to amend it and to include charges of 
conspiracy to commit genocide, complicity in genocide and direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide.362 The additional crimes against humanity included a rape charge. 
Nyiramasuhuko was the first woman to have been indicted by an international criminal 
tribunal, charged with rape as a war crime and crime against humanity, and the first woman 
indicted for genocide.363 Specifically, she stood accused of having ordered male soldiers to 
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actively rape and then burn Tutsi women.364 According to Sherrie Russel-Brown, the 
Nyiramasuhuko case ‘concretises’ the precedent established in the Akayesu judgement by 
illustrating the intersectional nature of genocidal rape, which detaches it from the notion that 
it is a violation against a woman’s honour, or a ‘reward’ for soldiers during war.365  
 
Certainly, in showcasing that women are indeed capable of committing rape as a form of 
genocide, this case opens up the possibility for seeing ‘genocidal rape’ solely as a gender-
specific crime, or something that male soldiers generally commit against women during 
wartime. The fact that a Hutu woman, who might have been a Tutsi herself366 (but thereafter 
possibly re-categorised herself as a Hutu in order to maintain her political power and prestige) 
could commit genocide raises not only important questions around notions of victimhood and 
agency that have informed the portrayal of women during armed conflict, but also around the 
conceptualisation of wartime sexual violence as an ethnically-driven act. Thus, rather than 
showing that women can indeed commit the same crimes as men-that they can rape, or order 
rape and target women of a different ethnicity,  this case ought to give pause for reflection in 
relation to the thesis’ question. Specifically, what does the prosecution of Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko mean to women in the current legal and political moment? In convicting her 
of genocidal rape, do international criminal tribunals thereby view women as agents of war, or 
are the judgement and prosecution of this high-profile female figure to be understood as 
aberrations that only resulted in prosecution because of the high number of civilians raped 
and killed? Based upon subsequent case law emerging from both tribunals, it is certain that 
the Nyiramasuhuko case is the only one to date that has seen a prominent female convicted of 






The Definition of Rape in International Criminal Law- Expanding Rape and Narrowing 
Consent as a Defence  
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Given that there was no definition of rape in either statute, both ad-hoc tribunals made it their 
primary goal to elaborate the objective and subjective elements of rape.  Moreover, to date, 
the most notable developments concerning the prosecution of sexual violence as genocide 
have occurred in ICTR wartime sexual violence jurisprudence367, most visibly and significantly, 
in the landmark Akayesu decision.368  The accused, Jean-Paul Akayesu, served as the mayor of 
the Taba commune from April 1993 until June 1994. He was in charge of performing executive 
functions and maintaining public order, while maintaining exclusive control over the 
communal police and the gendarmes at the disposition of the commune.369  Between April 7 
and the end of June, 1994, at least 2,000 Tutsis were killed in Taba, while he was in power. 
Hundreds of displaced civilians, the majority of them Tutsi, sought refuge in the town hall, 
whereupon the female civilians were taken out and subjected to sexual violence by armed 
local militia and the communal police. These acts of sexual violence were generally 
accompanied by explicit threats of death or bodily harm and sustained beatings, leading the 
displaced female civilians to live in constant fear of sexual violence as a result of which their 
physical and psychological health deteriorated.370 With respect to the rape charges, the 
Akayesu Trial Chamber held that rape had to be first defined, as there had been no commonly 
accepted definition of this term in international law.’371The first definition of rape in 
international law was, thus, formulated by the Akayesu Trial Chamber in September 1998 
as:372  
 
                                            
367
 There has been some limited consideration of the issue in Furundžija with the Trial Chamber noting that under 
the ICTY Statute rape could constitute genocide. The ICTY’s prosecution of sexual violence charges as genocide 
might have also been hampered by the International Court of Justice ruling in the Bosnia v. Serbia Genocide case! 
368
 This was a historic judgement, as the ICTR became the first international criminal tribunal to define rape as an 
act of genocide and to find an individual guilty of genocide on the basis, inter alia, of acts of rape and sexual 
violence. For a discussion see: S. L. Russell-Brown, (2003), 350 at 351.  
369
 Indictment, (ICTR-96-4-T), Jean-Paul Akayesu, at paras. 3-4.  
370
 Ibid.  
371 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T) Trial Chamber Judgement, 2 September 1998 (hereinafter 
Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment), at para. For a discussion see also: K. L. Fabian, K. L., Fabian, Proof and 
Consequences: An Analysis of the Tadic & Akayesu Trials’, 49 De Paul Law Review (1999-2000), 981. 
372
 Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment, at para. 496.  
105 
 
'a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances, 
which are coercive. Sexual violence, which includes rape, is considered to be any act of 
a sexual nature which is committed under circumstances which are coercive.'373 
 
The court, thus, acknowledged that rape was a form of aggression whose central elements 
could not be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts. It also 
acknowledged the conceptual approach to state sanctioned violence adopted by the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment as a more useful approach in international law.374 Moreover, Akayesu signalled a 
breakthrough for holding that consent is irrelevant to sexual violence offences with a nexus to 
genocide, armed conflict, and crimes against humanity. The insight proffered was that:  
 
‘lack of consent as  an element of the crime of rape (or any other sexual violence crime 
for that matter) is immaterial within the supranational criminal law context, especially 
in light of the violent and oppressive context in which rape takes place during 
genocide, crimes against humanity or armed conflict, and should therefore be 
rejected.’375 
 
In this way, it departed from a majority of national jurisdictions, which have traditionally 
defined rape as 'non-consensual intercourse'. 
 
Navanathem Pillay, who as the only female judge in the case critically intervened to include 
wartime sexual violence charges into the Indictment, has justified this in the following way: 
 
‘I framed my decision in this manner because it was evident that, in the circumstances 
that were being described, there was no place whatsoever for the consideration of 
consent. I hoped that this ruling would remove the age-old practice of focusing on the 
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conduct of the woman victim in order to establish the guilt of the perpetrator.  That 
decision was not appealed. I was glad at the time. No one likes to be appealed!’376 
 
In embracing legal regulation as the way forward, Pillay’s words capture much the feminist 
sentiment currently underlying wartime sexual violence prosecutions. While undoubtedly a 
welcome intervention from a feminist perspective, these words illustrate the rather uncritical 
approach espoused by feminist activists regarding consent. That lack of consent is not only 
immaterial to the offence, but next to impossible in circumstances that are inherently coercive 
regardless of their context has therefore been firmly embraced. From the perspective of this 
thesis, this legal construction is problematic, for it precludes the idea that consent could have 
been given in a meaningful way. This critique is not meant to diminish in any way the profound 
conditions of duress and precariousness experienced by women during wartime, or to 
trivialise the great difficulties in successfully prosecuting rape cases in national courts, which 
almost always reflect a battle between the defence strategy and its evidentiary presumptions 
that consent was present and the prosecution’s struggle in proving that the woman was the 
actual victim of rape.377   
 
Trials thus often tell the same story reproducing what is known about women from a male 
perspective. As Carol Smart has described it, ‘women’s sexual subjectivity has already been 
framed by the language of rape. Women “know” they are to blame for rape.’378 This is because 
considerable deference is usually given to the claims of the defendant that he subjectively 
believed consent was present, thus, rendering the experience of the rape trial an often 
traumatic experience for women.379 In this way, the rape trial also confirms what is already 
known about heterosexual sex, namely, that men have uncontrollable urges and natural 
desires to which women exercise passive consent. The rape trial, thus, becomes another 
manifestation of the law’s power. In silencing all but one account of rape, the rapable, the 
biological and the sexed woman of legal discourse is produced. It is precisely because of these 
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misgivings resulting from the law’s perpetuation of deeply offensive gendered stereotypes 
that feminist investments with the law need to be questioned. Feminists need to be reminded 
not to fall into a similar trap of reproducing these gendered dichotomies in their spirited 
embrace of the law as the path leading to the promised land of gender justice and equality.   
 
From an intersectional perspective, the Akayesu judgement highlighted genocidal rape by 
emphasising that it happened to women because of their ethnicity-in this case, specifically 
Tutsi women or Hutu women married to Tutsi men. The tribunal also recognised that these 
women were targeted both because of their ethnicity and because of the beliefs and opinions 
held by Hutus about Tutsi women.380 Aside from emphasising the ethno-nationalist 
dimensions underlying the sexual violence-as-genocide attacks against women, the tribunal 
also visibilised the significance of gender amidst the genocide by recognising the subjectivity of 
the victims of genocidal rape. This has been singled out as a positive development by 
feminists, who have stressed that although the intent of genocidal rape might have been to 
destroy a particular individual (the Tutsi woman), the effect achieved, namely the destruction 
of the entire Tutsi group was more significant.381 Thus, a key passage states:  
 
‘In light of all the evidence before it, the Chamber is satisfied that the acts of rape and 
sexual violence…were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were 
subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated and raped several times, often in 
public, in the bureau communal premises or in other public places, and often by more 
than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of 
Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part 
of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically 
contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a 
whole….Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group-
destruction of the spirit, the will to love, and to life itself…..’382 
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Such lines of legal reasoning have been rather symptomatic of the way in which much of the 
feminist debate on wartime sexual violence has been conducted. As stated earlier, structural 
feminists advocated the view that sexual violence attacks against women could not be 
divorced from their cultural context or their identity as members of a group. This, in turn, 
informed not only female legal subjectivity, but became the representational frame through 
which gender was constructed in wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. Moreover, it is 
evident from the passage above that the perpetrator’s intent and the actual effect of the harm 
became closely intertwined in the court’s legal reasoning. A significant element of the Akayesu 
judgement, certainly from a feminist viewpoint, was, thus, the ICTR’s construction of rape as 
an act not so much directed against female autonomy but rather deployed as a tool of war, a 
violent act perpetrated against a member of a group with the intent of destroying that 
group.383  A similar reasoning has also been adopted in the subsequent The Prosecutor v. 
Musema judgement384, where the tribunal inferred specific intent to destroy the Tutsi group 
by finding that acts of serious bodily and mental harm, including rape and other forms of 
sexual violence, were often accompanied by humiliating utterances signalling a clear intent to 
destroy the Tutsi group as a whole.385  As the Trial Chamber put it, 
 
‘In this context, the acts of rape and sexual violence were an integral part of the plan 
conceived to destroy the Tutsi group. Such acts targeted Tutsi women, in particular, 
and specifically contributed to their destruction and therefore that of the Tutsi group 
as such.’386 
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But these interpretations raise an interesting point, namely, if rape is no longer defined as a 
violation of individual sexual autonomy, but rather an act targeting an ethnic group, does this 
reading not inherently depoliticise sexual violence as an act of war divorcing it further from its 
socio—political context and the historical powers that helped shape it? Although it could be 
argued that treating rape as part of the ethnic targeting of a group makes it a less 
individualised and more contextualised offence, given that it could be conceived of as an 
attack on the socio-economic structures of society, the thesis believes the opposite to be the 
case. In defining rape as an attack on an ethnic group, the act of rape becomes a culturalised 
event-it it is, thus, no longer an attack against individual autonomy and agency and the woman 
herself, but a violation of the group as the proprietor of the female body. Concerns such as 
these provide the impulse for this thesis, and they are intended as mild warning shots to 
feminists, who amidst the sense of overall triumph might have celebrated the law’s ability to 
absorb a gendered wartime experience in unbiased fashion too prematurely.   
 
 
ii)  Furundžija 
Given the progressive nature of the Akayesu judgement, it initially appeared as if the ICTY 
would adopt the same definition.387 However, after having followed the holding of the 
Akayesu judgement in the Čelebići Trial Judgement, the ICTY Trial Chamber came up with its 
own definition of rape in the Furundžija case finding it necessary to further particularise the 
elements of rape along more traditional, if not mechanical lines. After surveying trends in 
national laws and other jurisprudence, it held that the ‘objective elements’ of rape, or the 
actus reus of rape in international law consist of the following: 
 
i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
a)        of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other  
       object used by the perpetrator; or 
b)        of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object  
           used by the perpetrator; 
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ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.388 
 
As transpires from this wording, the Furundžija definition did not allow adequately for 





The Trial Chamber in Kunarac subsequently corrected this definition by finding that the 
Furundžija criteria, although appropriate to the circumstances of the case, were in one respect 
more narrowly stated than is required by international law.  While agreeing with the actus 
reus elements of rape articulated earlier, the court found that paragraph (ii) of the Furundžija 
classification of the element needed to be interpreted to include consent.390 It emphasised 
that while force, threat of force or coercion are relevant, these factors are not exhaustive, and 
focus needed to be placed on violations of sexual autonomy as a wider principle for penalising 
violations of this kind.391 The tribunal held that ‘sexual autonomy is violated wherever the 
person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary 
participant.’392 Factors such as force, threat, or taking advantage of a vulnerable person 
provided evidence as to whether consent was voluntary.393 Guided by common law 
jurisdictions, which typically define rape by the absence of the victim’s free will or genuine 
consent, the Trial Chamber identified three broad categories of factors to determine when 
sexual activity should be classified as rape:  
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i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to the victim or a third 
party; 
ii) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other specified 
circumstances which made the victim particularly vulnerable or negated her ability 
to make an informed refusal; or 
iii) the sexual activity occurs without the consent of the victim.394 
 
The decision emphasised the importance of recognising a victim’s vulnerability or deception 
when in situations where he or she is unable to refuse sex due to such things as ‘an incapacity 
of an enduring or qualitative nature’ (such as a mental or physical illness, or the age of 
minority) or of a ‘temporary or circumstantial nature’ (such as being subjected to psychological 
pressure or otherwise being in a state of inability to resist’).395 The other key factors negating 
consent were held to comprise ‘surprise, fraud or misrepresentation’ leading to the victim’s 
inability to offer an ‘informed or reasoned’ refusal. As the tribunal pointed out, ‘In all of these 
different circumstances, the victim’s will was overcome, or her ability to freely refuse the 
sexual acts was temporarily or more permanently neglected.’396  
 
It was, thus, determined that sexual autonomy ought to be the standard for determining when 
sexual activity constitutes rape leading the Trial Chamber to expand upon the parameters of 
rape under international law by proffering the following definition of its actus reus: 
 
Rape is ‘constituted by: the sexual penetration, however slight:  
a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object 
used by the perpetrator; or  
b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual 
penetration occurs without the consent of the victim.’397  
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In this context, it was held that consent had to be given voluntarily as a result of ‘the victim’s 
free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances’.398 The means rea of the 
offence was held to have been satisfied by demonstrating the ‘intention to effectuate the 
sexual penetration and knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim’.399  The 
definition of rape as a violation of sexual autonomy in the Kunarac decision, thus, came close 
to the holding of the Akayesu Trial Chamber that rape is a physical invasion under 
‘circumstances which are coercive.’400 In principle, this definition was also upheld on appeal. 
The Kunarac Appeals Chamber noted that ‘the Trial Chamber had [appeared] to depart from 
the tribunal’s prior definitions of rape,’ but that by emphasising the ‘absence of consent as the 
condition sina qua non of rape,’ it had not divorced itself from the ICTY’s prior jurisprudence; 
rather it had been concerned to elucidate the relationship between force and consent.401 The 
Appeals Chamber thus clarified the court’s holding in the following way:  
 
‘[F]orce or threat of force provides clear evidence of non-consent, but force is not an 
element per se of rape. In particular, the Trial Chamber wished to explain that there are 
“factors [other than force] which would render an act of sexual penetration non-
consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim.” A narrow focus on force or 
threat of force could permit perpetrators to evade liability for sexual activity to which 
the other party had not consented by taking advantage of coercive circumstances 
without relying on physical force.’402 
  
However, the Kunarac Appeals Chamber added one significant observation:  
 
‘While it is true that a focus on one aspect gives a different shading to the offence, it is 
worth observing that the circumstances giving rise to the instant appeal and that 
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prevail in most cases charged as either war crimes or crimes against humanity will be 
almost universally coercive. That is to say, true consent will not be possible.’403  
 
Given that the proven allegations against the appellants specifically concerned the rape of 
women held in de facto military headquarters, detention centres, and apartments maintained 
as soldiers’ residences, the Kunarac Appeals Chamber had to limit its findings accordingly. In 
this regard, it found that the circumstances had been so coercive as to negate any possibility 
of consent.404 The Kunarac definition of rape was subsequently also adopted by the Trial 
Chamber in the Kvočka case.405 By expanding the definition of rape in this way, the Kunarac 
Trial Chamber precluded the notion of consent as relevant in circumstances of extreme duress 
in notable contrast to domestic criminal systems, which render the issue of consent central to 
rape trials.  The potential for such problems to arise in proceedings before the ICTY has further 
been lessened by the existence of Rule 96, governing evidence in cases of sexual assault,406  
which states that a ‘defence’ of consent cannot be introduced in situations of threats, or fears 
of violence, duress, detention, or psychological oppression, therefore, recognising the 
inherently coercive nature of armed conflict for women, which renders it difficult, if almost 
impossible to enact any form of resistance. 407 The Kunarac Trial Chamber, thus, stated that 
this provision was consistent with a common sense understanding of the meaning of ‘genuine 
consent’. In situations where the victim:  
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i) No corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be required; 
ii) Consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim 
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‘[i]s subjected to or threatened with or has reason to fear violence, duress, detention 
or psychological oppression’, or ‘reasonably believed that if [he or she] did not submit, 
another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear, any apparent consent which 
might be expressed by the victim cannot have been freely given.’408 
 
The paragraph thus served to reinforce the requirements of consent in rape cases as ‘absent 
until freely given’ and satisfied the second limb of the Trial Chamber’s definition. These 
gender-sensitive provisions, moreover, allowed it to deal promptly with the claims of two of 
the accused that some of the women and girls had, in fact, consented to sexual intercourse 
with them. On the basis of the evidence presented, the judges strongly rejected the argument 
made by the defendant that one of the victims had been his actual girlfriend, and that their 
relationship was consensual, an aspect of the decision elaborated upon in more critical fashion 
in Chapter VI. 409 To sum up, the Kunarac decision has provided significant clarification and 
elaboration of the appropriate elements of rape under international law, while emphasising 
wartime sexual violence as a violation of female autonomy in a nod to the spirit of Akayesu.  
 
iv) Muhimana and Gacumbitsi 
More recent ICTR jurisprudence suggests that this definitional divide has been successfully 
overcome. Thus, in The Prosecutor v. Muhimana410, the Trial Chamber found that:   
 
‘[t]he Akayesu definition and the Kunarac elements are not incompatible or 
substantially different in their application. Whereas Akayesu referred broadly to a 
‘physical invasion of a sexual nature’, Kunarac went on to articulate the parameters of 
what would constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature amounting to rape.’411  
 
In addition, in its appeal against the Gacumbitsi judgement412, the OTP requested that the 
Appeals Chamber find that non-consent and the perpetrator’s knowledge thereof are not 
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elements of rape as a crime against humanity or an act of genocide; instead consent was 
considered as an affirmative defence that could be raised by the accused subject to the 
limitations of Rule 96 of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence.413   
 
The case concerned Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, who as mayor of the Rusumo commune had been 
accused of having publicly instigated the rape of Tutsi women and girls.414 The Trial Chamber 
had convicted Gacumbitsi, inter alia, of instigating eight rapes (including that of one victim, 
who died after her genitals had been impaled with a stick) as a crime against humanity 
pursuant to Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute.415 Moreover, the appeals decision in this case 
effectively sustained the core insight of Akayesu in holding that the surrounding circumstances 
were so coercive as to negate any possibility of consent. Thus, it held that under coercive 
circumstances ‘[n]on-consent is not a separate element to be proven, but could be inferred 
from the context’.416  The Appeals Chamber, moreover, further clarified the law by holding 
that the circumstances that prevail in most cases that encompass charges of either war crimes 
or crimes against humanity will almost universally be coercive rendering true consent 
impossible.’417 
 
The Gacumbitisi Appeal Judgement has, thus, clarified that the prosecution may establish non-
consent by proving coercive circumstances without having to introduce evidence of the 
victim’s non-consent. This has widely been seen as a landmark improvement in comparison to 
the conduct of earlier proceedings in which victims were sometimes additionally humiliated by 
being asked whether they had consented even though they had only moments earlier testified 
about horrific incidences of sexual assault.418 
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v) Sexual Assault  
Aside from the substantive progress made in defining and crystallising rape in international 
law, the two ad-hoc tribunals have made important advancements in relation to finding that 
sexual assaults fall within the scope of other crimes, punishable under international criminal 
law.  The Akayesu Trial Chamber, thus, held that:  
 
‘[s]exual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may 
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.’419 
 
Moreover, it held that sexual violence including rape could be considered to be ‘any act of a 
sexual nature which is committed on a person in circumstances which are coercive.’420 Sexual 
violence was held to fall within the scope of ‘other inhumane acts’, set forth in Article 3(i) of 
the ICTR Statute as ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ set forth in Article 4(e) of the ICTR 
Statute, and ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ set forth in Articles 2(2) (b) of the ICTR Statute.421 
The Akayesu Trial Chamber, consequently, found Akayesu guilty of ‘other inhumane acts’ for 
the forced undressing of a woman outside the bureau communal after making her sit in the 
mud; for the forced undressing and public marching of another naked woman; for the forced 
undressing of a third woman and her two nieces and for forcing the women to perform 
exercises naked in public near the bureau communal.422 The Furundžija and the Kunarac Trial 
Chambers, moreover, held that sexual assault and sexual harassment falling short of actual 




 Part VI 
Conclusion 
In overviewing key ICTY and ICTR developments, this chapter has sought to show that violence 
against women is today strongly articulated in international law and its effects mediated in the 
judgements of international criminal tribunals. This is of significance for feminist legal theory 
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and wider international legal scholarship, as it showcases the juridicalisation of gender-based 
violence as a manifestation of the legitimatising function which international law has assumed 
in late modernity.423 In addition, this chapter has demonstrated that wartime sexual violence 
as a previous footnote of history has travelled far, given its recognition today as one of the 
most serious violations of international humanitarian law. The legal advancements made in 
international criminal tribunals have given way to a more confident, if not more assertive 
institutional framework for the prosecution of wartime sexual violence against women. 
Despite significant obstacles along the way, they have made significant progress in crafting an 
international legal definition of rape that more closely corresponds to women’ experiences of 
wartime, while taking into account the inherently coercive nature of wartime, which often 
precludes the exercise of any choice, or resistance.   
 
Moreover, the tribunals have expanded the parameters of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, the grave breaches provision of the Geneva Conventions and genocide in order to 
render sexual violence a justiciable offence in international criminal law, while at the same 
time elaborating the elements making up the rules and procedures in sexual violence cases. 
The analysis has shown that both tribunals have addressed crimes of sexual violence 
effectively and with special attention to the protection of victims, while balancing this against 
the rights of the accused to a fair trial. Gender issues have, therefore, become closely 
associated with notions of success in the popular discourse. However, considering that this 
thesis is a feminist critical analysis of current international wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence, this chapter has served as a platform for preparing the ensuing critical analysis, 
which aims to fire a warning shot in the way of feminist celebrations of the law by reiterating 
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     Chapter IV 
 
Feminist Approaches to Human Rights, Gender, Ethnicity, Culture and Conflict 
 




As explained in the introductory chapter, the thesis is a critical feminist analysis of wartime 
sexual violence jurisprudence and the surrounding feminist debate. The previous two chapters 
provided an overview of the salient themes and concepts underlying the thesis and detailed 
how gender-based violence has become a subject of interest for international law, while 
wartime sexual violence is today no longer a footnote of history but a fully recognised 
international crime. These chapters have sought to provide ground for the critical feminist 
analysis that this thesis ultimately pursues. They have provided a bridge between a discussion 
of the key legal developments in the areas of gender-based violence and wartime sexual 
violence and their ensuing analysis. The present chapter constitutes the first of the two limbs 
in the transition from an analysis of the existing law and the theory surrounding violence 
against women to the original thesis put forward in Chapters V and VI, which provide the 
second limb in this transition, where the actual ‘critical feminist’ approach of the thesis is fully 
crystallised.  
 
As is evident from the previous chapters, the wartime sexual violence debate is a fusion of 
issues cutting across human rights, gender, ethnicity and culture. The present chapter thus 
overviews various feminist approaches to these intersecting discourses, highlighting their 
respective advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of pursuing an analysis of an 
issue such as wartime sexual violence. These will consist of four principal approaches that have 
been salient in recent feminist debates: first, liberal and universalist feminism; second, radical 
and structural feminism, or governance feminism as its more modern manifestation, third, 
poststructural and postcolonial feminism and, fourth, intersectionality approaches, which have 
significantly influenced the development of the feminist critique underlying this thesis. These 
approaches provide the focus of Parts II, III, IV and VI respectively. Part VII concludes and 
summarises the chapter. Inevitably, the analysis in this chapter implies a considerable degree 
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of generalisation and selectiveness. This is defensible in so far as the chapter’s objective is to 
trace the most salient feminist approaches to the analysis of human rights, gender, culture and 
armed conflict, as they have been manifested in feminist scholarship and activism in recent 
years. Where appropriate, references will be made in this chapter to the ways in which the 




Liberal/ Universalist feminists 
Although the ‘liberal’ and ‘universalist’ orientations in feminism are not, strictly speaking, 
identical, there is a significant degree of conflation and overlap between them as liberalism 
usually rests on strong universalist presumptions.425 There is a long tradition of liberal 
feminism: indeed, ‘first wave’ feminists explicitly adhered to liberal, universalist ideology in 
their pursuit of equal rights for women. However, more recently liberal feminists began to pay 
attention to the ‘endless variety’, as well as the ‘monotonous similarity’ of gender 
oppression.426 It is fair to say that such attention within liberal feminism has tended to 
concentrate on ‘culture’ or ‘culture and religion’ as the factors perpetuating the ‘endless 
variety’ of gender oppression.427 Liberal feminists generally perceive culture and gender to be 
in antagonism.  
 
The idea that cultural contexts play a key role in producing gender roles and expectations 
based on sexuality is exemplified by the approach adopted by Susan Moller Okin in her 
controversial essay ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?428 Okin’s central point is that the 
ascent of multiculturalism and celebration of cultural difference is profoundly anti-ethical to 
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women’s rights.429 The crucial connection between gender and culture is manifested in the 
sphere of personal, sexual and reproductive life as the central focus of most cultures with 
certain ‘cultural practices’ having a much greater impact on women since far more of women’s 
time and energy goes into preserving and maintaining the personal, familial and reproductive 
side of life. The more a culture requires or expects of women in the domestic sphere, the less 
opportunity they have of achieving equality with men in either sphere.430 On Okin’s view, 
many societies appear to accept violence as appropriate discipline for certain kinds of 
behaviour and women who do not conform to traditional sexual expectation often become 
subject to violence from within their own communities. Most controversial, however, is Okin’s 
premise that minority cultures are more hostile to women than the majority (i.e. liberal 
western) culture. She writes:  
  
‘While virtually all of the world’s cultures have distinctly patriarchal pasts, some-
mostly, though by no means exclusively, Western liberal cultures-have departed far 
further from them than others. Western cultures, of course, still practice many forms 
of sex discrimination….But women in liberal cultures are, at the same time, legally 
guaranteed many of the same opportunities and freedoms as men. In addition, most 
families in such cultures, with the exception of some religious fundamentalists, do not 
communicate to their daughters that they are of less value than boys, that their lives 
are to be confined to domesticity and service to men and children, and that their 
sexuality is of value only in marriage, in the service of men, and for reproductive ends. 
The situation, as we have seen is quite different from that of women in many of the 
world’s other cultures, including many of those from which immigrants to Europe and 
North America come.’431 
 
Inevitably, Okin’s argument has attracted much criticism from feminists and non-feminists 
alike. In a truly classical liberal vein, she understands ‘culture’ as the opposite of liberalism. 
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This is a rather unhelpful, strongly essentialised approach that simultaneously casts culture as 
the hierarchialised opposite of modernity, the West and human rights. This understanding of 
culture is central to both contemporary liberalism and (neo)colonialism. Okin creates a 
monolithic picture of ‘culture’, which comprises all non-Western cultures, and which 
acknowledges no ‘local traditions of protest, no indigenous feminist movements, no sources of 
political and cultural contestation.’432  
 
Furthermore, her argument reflects the broader liberal presumption that the opposition 
between culture (as saturating and defining non-Western people) and moral autonomy (as 
signifying the rational subject of liberalism) is total, and requires that the former must be 
subdued by the latter. Wendy Brown has argued that the fiction of autonomy’s triumph in 
liberalism is made possible thanks to the strong Kantianism underlying liberalism’s ideology, in 
which liberalism figures as uniquely capable of being ‘culturally neutral and culturally 
tolerant.’433 She explains that, within liberalism, the possibility of an ‘optional relationship’ 
with culture is secured by the conceit that ‘the individual chooses what he or she thinks,’434 
which posits culture as extrinsic to the subject.  Thus, for liberal individuals in the West, 
culture is a mere ‘background’, a house one can enter and exit. In contrast, for non-liberal 
people, including ethnic and religious minorities within liberal societies, culture is not only 
fixed and static, but ‘saturating and authoritative.’435 This is exactly the dichotomised view 
employed by Okin, who believes that the perpetuation of discrimination against women in the 
rest of the world is so uniquely serious because it is formally inscribed in (non-liberal law), 
which ‘openly avows its religious and cultural character.’436 Thus, Okin’s writing exemplifies 
liberalism’s denial of its own entanglement with cultural norms, themselves deeply imbued 
with hidden but pervasive signs of male superiority, while advocating a specific western mode 
of culture.   
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It is relevant to recall at this point that mainstream human rights discourses share, by and 
large, the classical liberal vision of culture as exemplified by Okin. In international human 
rights law, the term ‘culture’ is synonymous and/or interchangeable with ‘tradition’. Thus, UN 
instruments dealing with violations of human rights, such as those produced by the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, use the formula of ‘harmful traditional practices’, 
notably when confronting such issues as female genital cutting and early marriage.437 As Sally 
Engle Merry has noted: 
 
‘Labelling a culture as tradition evokes an evolutionary vision of change from a 
primitive form to something like civilization. In the evolutionary model, all cultures are 
positioned on a continuum from the private to the modern. Variations are exclusively 
temporal. So-called traditional societies are at an earlier evolutionary stage than 
modern ones, which are more evolved and more civilized. Culture in this sense is not 
used to describe the affluent countries of the global North but the poor countries of 
the global South, particularly in isolated and rural areas. When it does appear in 
discussions of European or North American countries, it refers to the ways of life of 
immigrant communities and/or racial minorities.’438 
 
Indeed, Brown has argued that the discourse of civilisation, although distinct from and much 
older than liberalism, is an additional dimension in the project of modernity and as such 
complements liberalism.439 A civilisational discourse is, thus, used across the political 
spectrum in order to define what is tolerable. In this way, the anxieties of neo-conservatives 
and right-wing Christians about the decline of western civilisation coincide with those of 
liberal, human rights activists and feminists (such as Okin), who advocate zero tolerance 
towards cultural practices such as female genital cutting or veiling. The question of ‘What 
should be the attitude of the tolerant toward the intolerant?’ is, thus, deeply ingrained in 
civilisational discourse.440 In this model, tolerance operates as a principle of demarcation, 
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defining intolerable ‘cultural’ practices with the limits of tolerance as the limit of civilisation 
itself.  
 
There are, however, liberal feminists, who are not as extreme as Okin in their opposition to 
culture. Martha Nussbaum’s ‘friendly amendment to liberalism’441 is a prominent example of a 
more sensitive, ‘new-wave’ liberal feminism. Nussbaum’s main concern is that feminists have 
been increasingly distancing themselves from liberalism and she is therefore keen to highlight 
its advantages for feminism. She proposes a ‘human capabilities approach’-grounded in 
‘international, humanist ‘liberal’ feminism and ‘concerned with sympathetic 
understanding’.442 The ‘combined capabilities’ concept is meant to stress a combination of 
‘internal’ capabilities of a human person set against external, material conditions.443  She is 
particularly interested in the application of ‘feminist methods’ to the ‘real lives of women’ 
worldwide in order to prove that human rights are not an exclusively Western discourse.  
International human rights discourse is, thus, central to her project, although she does not 
dismiss cultural diversity and the arguments of anti-universalist feminists out of hand. One of 
the problems with this approach, however, is that it is unlikely to challenge material 
inequality, as Nussbaum concentrates on autonomy, rather than equality in her analysis of 
female poverty.444 While providing a benchmark for poverty, the ‘human capabilities’ laundry 
list is thus nonetheless an inadequate measure of equality.445  
 
Nussbaum has also been criticised by post-colonial feminist scholars such as Ratna Kapur for 
adopting a ‘simple theory’ that converges with the ‘victimisation rhetoric’ described in Chapter 
II, as a problematic  trope, which has origins in colonial feminism and has flourished in 
international human rights discourses over the past two decades.446 Like Okin, Nussbaum’s 
work appears informed by a presumption that culture is to blame for violations of non-
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western women’s human rights. Thus, these women need protection from their dangerous, 
non-liberal men, and it is the western, liberal feminist who is to protect them. Simple theory 
then has been criticised as endorsing ‘[a] child’s view of history and politics: idealist, personal 
and replete with heroes and villains, good values and bad.’447 
 
A related trope in feminism, which is of great significance to this thesis, and can be most 
relevantly located under the heading of liberal/universal feminism, is the distinct prioritisation 
on the part of many such feminists of practically-orientated activism and advocacy. Many 
scholars, who advocate a ‘practical feminism’-that is a feminism that is orientated towards 
finding real-life solutions to ‘real problems’ and improving the lives of ‘real women’-reject 
theory and theorising practices as at best irrelevant to their work and at worst dangerous and 
corrupting. Indeed, as Brown has argued, this crisis of feminist theory appears to reflect the 
broader contemporaneous ‘pressure on theory…-to apply, to be true, or to solve immediately 
real-world problems.’448  
  
This is demonstrated in striking fashion in recent feminist mobilisations around international 
criminal tribunals, which have entailed significant recourse to practically-orientated feminist 
work. In these instantiations, there has been a notable preponderance of ‘simple theory 
preferences’, which generally signifies some straightforward version of liberal or radical 
feminist theory, to the almost certain exclusion of postmodern and poststructuralist varieties. 
In the context of international(ist) liberal feminism especially, much of late twentieth century 
feminist scholarship has been strikingly anti-theoretical.449 The next part of the chapter 
dedicates itself to exploring the anti-theoretical turn in feminism in greater detail.  
 
To sum up, the discussion in this part of the chapter argued that calls to return to a universalist 
and/or liberal agenda usually rest on a commitment to some refashioned version of liberal 
concepts such as autonomy or freedom.450 The main critique of such perspectives is that they 
often rely on assumptions of a clear, unified concept of the subject, which is deemed 
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necessary for a meaningful pursuit of a feminist project. As explained in the introductory 
chapter, the thesis is a critical feminist analysis of the way in which gender, ethnicity and 
culture are constructed in contemporary ICTY wartime sexual violence decisions and the 
surrounding debate. In the next segment, two other broad varieties of feminist engagement 
with human rights, gender, culture and ethnicity are considered: namely radical, or 
structuralist feminists.  
 
Part III 
Radical Feminists and Governmentality Feminists  
This school of thought is of particular interest to the thesis for its domination of feminist 
discourse over the past two decades. As a theory, radical legal feminism first assumed 
prominence during the 1980s and it is rooted in the idea that society entrenches female 
subordination, which is contingent upon male domination.451 In broad strokes, radical feminist 
theorists consider the law to be a reflection of historical evolution, which excluded women 
from the public world. Laws, thus, inscribe gender oppression, as they are directly reflective of 
society’s patriarchal values and relationships of power. Since men have power over women, 
the laws reflect and reinforce these power relations particularly in the area of sexuality and 
sexual relations, as laws are constructed in such a way as to project the male view of the 
world. The law is thus never impartial, objective and rational.452  
 
Catherine Mac Kinnon, more than any other radical feminist scholar, has shaped this field by 
producing a plethora of foundational texts that have notably contributed to the visibility of 
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this rich strand of feminist legal scholarship.453 By foregrounding the ‘[c]oncrete conditions of 
all women as a sex,’454 she has, for example, in typical radical fashion defined sexuality as:  
 
‘[t]hat social process, which creates, organizes, expresses, and directs desire, creating 
the social beings we know as women and men, as their relations create society.’455    
 
On this strongly structuralist view, the social relations between the sexes are organised so that 
men dominate and women submit. This relation is sexual-in fact it is sex. Sexuality is, thus, 
inherently gendered and gender is sexualised. Male and female are created alongside the axis 
of the eroticisation of dominance and submission-the man/woman difference and the 
dominance/submission dynamic, which in turn define each other. Inequality is always political 
and sexual in nature and is principally constructed on sexual difference within society. The 
state itself is male and is the instrument which hands the law the power to institutionalise 
male power. Thus, ‘if male power is systemic, it is the regime.’456 The law, moreover, is the 
central mechanism that perpetuates the inferior position of women within society by 
preserving a hierarchical system based on gender and sex. As she has put it, ‘The law sees and 
treats women as men see and treat women.’457  The concept of gender difference, moreover, 
is an ideology, which masks the fact that genders are socially constructed, coercively enforced 
and not freely consented to. Hence, the idea of gender difference helps keep the reality of 
male dominance in place.  Further, gender as elaborated and sustained by behavioural 
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patterns of application and administration is maintained as [a] division of power.’458 These are 
considered to be the focal areas for understanding the space that gender occupies both in 
legal and non-legal contexts. At its crux, Mac Kinnon’s theory is thus a theory of power. As a 
form of power, gender entrenches sex hierarchy as what men and women are- it is thus 
productive rather than reflective of sex. As Janet Halley has argued, this is one of the most 
radical elements of Mac Kinnon’s theory. She interprets from these writings that:  
 
‘The reality of sex -the very idea that men and women exist and are bodily dimorphically 
different-and the consciousness in which that reality seems real, natural and inevitable 
are effects of power.’459 
 
In this articulation every single important term of sexuality, such as gender, or sexual 
orientation is a manifestation of the domination of f by m as what sexuality is. This set of ideas 
denotes ‘power feminism’, a neat and tight system, despite its constructedness and 
contingency. 460 Moreover, Mac Kinnon’s theory can be described as a consciousness theory in 
that power produces consciousness by recruiting ‘all its subjects to the production and 
domination across the whole expanse of human life’.461 But as Halley has argued, radical 
theories like this one pose a deep challenge to anyone seeking emancipation, as the very 
consciousness with which women perceive their being is based on ‘the very wellspring of their 
desire’, which is male domination.’462 Thus, only a transformation of consciousness propelled 
forward by women on behalf of women and working ‘utterly without the leverage of any 
emancipatory “outside”-can possibly give any hope of release from m>f’.463  
 
Moreover, radical feminism has been subject to equally impassioned critique from feminist 
historians, who have argued that theories of patriarchy fail to show how gender inequalities, 
or, indeed, how gender affects these areas of life that do not seem to be connected to it.464  
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Nicola Lacey has argued that radical feminism replays and reconfirms the very stereotypes of 
active and aggressive masculinity and passive and victimised femininity, which she regards as 
counterproductive to the feminist cause, as it reinforces rather than contributes to ending 
women’s marginalisation in the legal sphere.465 In spite of the extensive criticism, Mac 
Kinnon’s ideas were still distinctly radical in the early days in sharp contrast to the notably 
dogmatic undertones they assumed in her later texts466, which constitute the focus of the 
subsequent part of this chapter.  
 
i) The Ascendancy of Governance Feminism through Structural Feminist Interpretations 
of the Yugoslav Conflict  
 
Radical feminism became highly influential in the early and mid-1990s as the conflict in 
Yugoslavia unfolded. MacKinnon’s voice- strongly re-emerged in this context assuming central 
prominence in feminist legal interventions around the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.467 Her 
highly evocative description of the atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslim women 
provided the central thrust to her argument that the Yugoslav war was ‘genocidal’ in nature, a 
war targeting women because of their ethnicity.468  Most notably, Mac Kinnon saw a 
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129 
 
convergence between ways of thinking about women and ways of thinking about international 
law and politics. Thus, the more a conflict could be framed as a civil war, as domestic, as 
private-the less effective the human rights system was. As she has put it:  
 
‘The closer the fight comes to home, the more “feminized” the victims become, no matter 
what their gender, and the less likely is it that international human rights will be found 
violated, no matter what was done.’469  
 
In this vein, Mac Kinnon attributed the violence committed during the Yugoslav war to the 
Serbs, whereas ‘feminine’ Croatia and Bosnia were to be treated like ‘[w]omen-women gang-
raped on a mass scale.’470 The discourses generated by Mac Kinnon about ethnic responsibility 
seen through a cultural lens were significant because they produced an interesting trend in 
feminist legal scholarship, namely the entanglement of gender and ethnicity as a central 
technique for making sense of the sexual violence committed against (specifically Bosnian 
Muslim) women during the Yugoslav conflict.  The interlocking of gender and ethnicity and (by 
extension) their depolitcisation became complete in one of her most frequently cited remarks 
on the intersectional nature of rape, gender and ethnicity during the Bosnian conflict: 
‘The systematic and instrumental nature of these rapes marks them. Progroms were 
one thing, designing and fielding the gas chambers was another. Rape as most women 
generally know it and these rapes have a similar difference. Auschwitz was industrial 
murder. Omarska has “industrial rape: intended planned, mass-produced, serially 
                                                                                                                                           
Yugoslav context. Her other extensive interpretations of the Yugoslav conflict include: C. Mac Kinnon, Are Women 
Human? Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1999), which includes several chapters on the sexual violence committed during the Yugoslav conflict. For 
example: C. Mac Kinnon, ’Human Rights and Global Violence Against Women’ in Are Women Human? Reflections 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1999), 34; C. Mac Kinnon, ‘Rape as Nationbuilding’; in Are Women 
Human? Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (, 1999), 169; C. MacKinnon, ‘From Ausschwitz 
to Omarska, Nuremberg to The Hague’, Are Women Human? Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1999) at 174.  
469
 Ibid at 139.  
470
 Mac Kinnon, C., ‘Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights’, in Stiglmayer, A., Mass Rape: The War Against 
Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 193. 
130 
 
executed, instrumentalized”. It comes close to the experiences of prostituted women, 
serially raped in what is called peacetime.’471 
Given that the Omarska camp was Bosnian Serb-run472 MacKinnon concluded that sexual 
violence against women had not only been committed on an industrialised scale, but was 
entirely ethnically motivated, in fact coming close to a finding that it was genocidal in nature. 
By comparing the rapes at Omarska to the World War II progroms against the Jewish 
populations of Europe, this tactic of historic reduction allowed MacKinnon, (a Western, US-
based legal scholar with little practical experience of the former Yugoslavia), to introduce her 
audience to the idea that the Yugoslav war was driven by ethnic motivations (particularly Serb 
aggression directed against non-Serbs) based on ancient rivalries that sought to exterminate 
the ‘ethnic Other.’473 MacKinnon, thus, raised the possibility that the specific character of 
Yugoslavia (and of the Balkans), as embodied in the persona of the Serb was the root cause of 
conflict. Whether it was the propensity of the Serb for pornography, or the patterns of 
patriarchal, pastoral and communal life with its own mythical views of heroism and a specific 
code of shame the blame for the high incidence of sexual violence against women during the 
conflict could always be located in culture.474   
Aside from its reproduction of the problematic tendencies undergirding liberal universalist 
visions of culture, as critiqued earlier in Okin’s writings, radical feminism played a crucial role 
in influencing feminists on all sides to take up positions on wartime sexual violence leading 
many to unproblematically adopt specific terminology such as  rape as ‘a weapon of war’ into 
mainstream discourses. Moreover, the term ‘death camps’, used to denote the detention 
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facilities where women had been raped by soldiers during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
slipped into mainstream feminist jargon without obvious protest.475 
 
ii) Governance Feminism and its Impact on the Interpretation of Gender and Ethnicity in 
ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence  
 
One of the most notable consequences of the radical feminist perspective on the Yugoslav 
conflict and its centre stage status in much of the surrounding literature was the ascendance 
of ‘governance feminism.’ As Janet Halley has described it, this is not just a benign form of 
feminism, but rather ‘a feminism grown up, professionalized and adept at wielding power for 
the good of women globally and locally. In short, it is a feminism that ‘rules’ and ‘wants to 
rule.’476 A form of organised feminism, ‘governance feminism’ assumed particular prominence 
in the formation of new international criminal tribunals over the course of the 1990s. It 
produced an interesting, if not unexpected trend in feminist legal scholarship of creating an 
overwhelmingly coalitional, if not consensual style of agreement, which was not a ‘median 
liberal view’ that split the difference between the conservative and leftist feminist ideologies, 
but instead a version of ‘updated radical feminism’ strongly committed to a structuralist 
understanding of male domination and female subordination.477 It has, certainly, been of 
critical importance in propelling feminism from a discipline at the margins to its current 
institutional status-firmly considered part of the ‘academic and bureaucratic life of 
international law in the twenty-first century’.478 
 
The term ‘governance feminism’ was initially coined by four US-based legal feminists, Chantal 
Thomas, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir and Janet Halley in part because it captured the 
strong resemblance of the ‘new, muscular’ NGO formations adopted by feminists in their 
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political engagement with the law. 479These feminists were particularly struck by the paradox 
that feminists working on male and sexual wrongs against women in the NGO mode that 
typically views the international and national legal orders as heavy, consolidated, top-down 
sovereign powers nevertheless ambitiously jumped on the bandwagon of this sovereign power 
in order to produce absolute results.480 According to Halley, such feminists: 
 
‘[S]eek to wield the sovereign’s sceptre and especially his sword. Criminal law is their 
preferred vehicle for reform and enforcement; and their idea of what to do with 
criminal law is not to manage populations, not to warn and deter, but to end impunity 
and abolish.’481  
 
Halley has produced two key findings about the sovereign power wielded by feminists in the 
formation of contemporary international criminal tribunals:  
 
1) Almost without exception, the ‘consensus’ feminist stance that dominates the law 
review literature and pervades the activist literature is ‘structural-feminist,’ and it also 
overwhelmingly animates both argumentation and rule preference.482 
 
2) The substance of this structural feminism vision evolved over the course of the 1990s 
without producing a literature of internal dissent. While the legal agenda initially 
started out as a fairly simple commitment to assure that international humanitarian 
law and international criminal law expressly and implicitly prohibit rape in war and that 
the international criminal tribunals prosecute it vigorously, (as seen in Chapters II and 
III), over the course of the decade feminists who were active in this field discovered 
ways of implementing their ‘structuralist’ view of rape not merely as a tool of 
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belligerent forces (Croat vs. Serb, Serb v. Muslim, Hutu v. Tutsi), but as part of a global 
war against women.483 
 
The result of the second feminist imprint in particular was not only a much stronger 
representational practice, but also a much bolder reform agenda, which involved ‘annexing’ 
human rights law to international humanitarian law and international criminal law and vice 
versa, and extending the explicit prohibitions. The key terminology evolved from rape to 
sexual violence (as shown previously in the Akayesu discussion), to sexual slavery to gender 
violence-‘beyond wartime rape’ to ‘everyday rape’, beyond ‘war as men define it’ to ‘war as 
women experience it.’484 In this way, war became conceived of not as an event, but as a 
situation, the life of everyday. According to this feminist strand of thought, it, thus, made 
increasing sense to look at ethno-nationalist dimensions underlying the Yugoslav conflict, and 
to portray it as ‘a war against women.’485  
 
iii) Ethno-nationalist Interpretations of Gender in ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence 
Jurisprudence  
 
As is further discussed in Chapters V and VI, one of the consequences of the structuralist turn 
in international legal feminist scholarship is that ethnic and gender stereotypes heavily inform 
identity representations in international wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. This process is 
symptomatic of a wider trend in late modern governmentality to depoliticise structural 
problems such as inequality, subordination and social conflict as personal and individual, on 
the one hand, and as neutral, religious, cultural on the other.486 In the Yugoslav context in 
particular it has led to a view of the Serbs being particularly heinous rapists, or originators of a 
rationally conceived and systematically executed policy as a tool of war. The use of rape in the 
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former Yugoslavia was thus attributed to cultural values unique to the region.487  But as 
feminist anthropologist Dubravka Žarkov has put it, when armed conflict is framed in ethnic 
terms, and is referred to as a war based upon ‘ethnic hatred’ and ‘ancient ethnic rivalries’, the 
danger is that such terminology will be merged with an Orientalist discourse of the 
'Balkans'.488 On her view,  
 
‘[I]n such discourses the former Yugoslavia is represented as divided into two 
irreconcilable and incompatible parts: West and East. According to this argument, the 
western, Catholic modern part of the country strives for democracy and civil society, 
while the eastern, Orthodox, Muslim, traditional and even tribal, part is still satisfied 
with a communist totalitarian system.’489  
 
It is therefore conceivable that the representation of conflict as ethno-nationalist in ICTY 
wartime sexual violence jurisprudence (strongly informed by structural feminist ideas) has 
removed violence against women as a political and social phenomenon from comprehension 
of its historical emergence and from recognition of the powers that produced it. In casting 
‘group conflict’ as rooted in ontologically natural hostility towards essential, religious, ethnic 
and cultural difference, such ideas have marginalised the significance of power and history in 
the Yugoslav context, as Chapter VI illustrates.  
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Moreover, through their conceptualisation of the conflict as a space where competing 
identities vie for sovereignty based on identity claims, structural feminists have personalised 
conflict as an event along the lines of artificially constructed boundaries (such as ethnicity and 
territoriality) while removing factors such as economic violence and material conditions from 
the analysis.490 The imputation of ethno-nationalist dimensions has, moreover, led feminist 
activists and scholars to label the Yugoslav conflict as a ‘war on women,’491 which is an 
arguably distortive trope that renders the resulting jurisprudence a reductive narrative of 
‘ethnic war’.492  
  
To sum up, radical feminism’s key shortcoming, as most vividly encapsulated in Mac Kinnon’s 
early writings, is its totalitarian approach to male domination as constitutive of female 
subordination. In other words, to borrow Halley’s method, everything about the relationship 
of m and f manifests domination and subordination.493 On this account, every woman suffers, 
however differently, the same fate. Moreover, every woman’s viewpoint is rooted in her own 
conscience and experience, which feminism ‘unmodified’ (supposedly) articulates. It, thus, 
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suggests that any woman can transfer truth from feminism to law, if only she succeeds in 
obtaining redress for sexual injury she does so on behalf of all women everywhere.  
  
Feminists critical of MacKinnon’s theory of gender and of her prescription for using law to 
undo gender have objected to this reification of all women as spoken for through the body and 
speech of the one who happens to file the claim. They have contested the totalism of this 
model, alongside with the idea that women have a single point of view, and the idea that by 
attaching these to the institutional system of rights adjudication and enforcement it will 
liberate women from male power. Thus, it is relevant to evoke at this juncture Wendy Brown’s 
question with reference to Mac Kinnon’s discourse, namely:  
  
‘[W]hat does it mean to write historically and culturally circumscribed experience into an 
ahistorical discourse, the universalist discourse of the law? What happens when 
“experience” becomes ontology when “perspective” becomes truth, and when both 
become unified in the Subject of Woman and encoded in law as women’s rights?’494 
   
As discussed in Chapter VI, this is the theoretical framework within which the thesis operates 
to ultimately query whether it might not be apposite at this moment in time to ‘Take a Break' 
from feminism. Janet Halley’s work is thus of great importance to this project as, firstly, it 
criticises the dominant modalities of feminism, and, secondly, introduces the idea of taking 
decisions in the splits between theories. This is a form of contrapuntal analysis that is useful 
for the objectives pursued by this thesis, as it is believed that attention to this type of 
argument may promote a more complex and insightful feminist analysis as well as make room 
for other discourses, which may provide refreshingly new insights pertaining to the questions 
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Poststructuralist Feminism -Judith Butler on Gender 
Given the difficulty of doing justice to a theory as complex as postmodernism, this part of the 
chapter restricts itself to a brief analysis of some salient aspects of Judith Butler’s 
contributions to feminist thought. In this way it seeks to push the earlier critique further by 
distancing itself from the rigid models of gender, sex, subordination and culture embodied in 
liberal and radical modes of feminism. The term 'postmodern' has been described as an active 
verb from which to ‘denounce some parts of the modern and to point out that other parts are 
lost or missing.’495  
 
This approach stresses fragmentation, individuation and uncertainty and denies that the 
interests of women are all the same. On this view, there is no essential woman imbued with 
the characteristics and needs of every woman, regardless of age, race or class. Postmodern 
thinking has been vital to feminist attempts to trouble the limits of gender as a category of 
analysis and to make feminist expectations of gender into uncomfortable nodes for internal 
questioning. Post-structural feminism, as captured in the writings of Judith Butler, is of 
particular interest as it opposes the fixed nature of categorisations and adopts a fluid 
approach to gender and its location within certain extraordinary situations, such as armed 
conflict. It also represents a marked departure from radical feminism and liberal feminism in 
its rejection of universalising tropes surrounding female identity.  
 
In contrast to the Anglo-American feminist schools of thought described so far in this chapter, 
Judith Butler’s writings have been influenced by continental theories, such as Lacanian 
theory.496 Butler has been responsible for injecting feminism with new debates on gender 
meanings by allowing for a reconceptualisation of the category through the creation of new 
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spaces for thinking about its relation to the law. Her writings probably offer the most distinctly 
alternative view of gender in current feminist literature. Butler’s seminal text is Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity497, wherein she illuminates the idea of 
gender identity as a free-floating concept, not connected to an essence, but rather to a 
performance. Butler believes that identities are constructed through gender performances and 
the question is not whether to do a gender performance, but what form the performance will 
take. By choosing to be different about it, gender norms and the binary understanding 
between masculinity/femininity might be disrupted. Therefore, what is required is a 
deconstruction of the categories of sex, gender and sexuality and a move towards alternative 
approaches to identity.498   
 
Butler particularly contests the notion of gender as culturally constructed, and sex as 
biologically pre-determined. If gender is the cultural meaning that the sexed body assumes, 
then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way.  In spite, or precisely 
because of this binary understanding of the sex/gender distinction as ‘a radical discontinuity’, 
Butler does not believe that men will interpret their identities only through male bodies, or 
that women will view their identities only through the female body for: 
 
‘[W]hen the constructed status of gender is theorised as radically independent of sex, 
gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that the man and 
masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and 
feminine a male body as easily as a female one.’499  
 
It follows that gender is not to culture as sex is to nature. Rather, gender is the cultural means 
by which a ‘natural sex’ is produced and established as a precursor to nature, it is ‘a politically 
neutral surface on which culture acts.’500 An essential part in radically rethinking the categories 
of identity lies in challenging the universal conception of the person as understood in social 
theory, and replacing it with historical and anthropological positions that understand gender 
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as ‘[a] relation among socially constituted subjects in specifiable contexts.’501 The question 
becomes not so much one of what one is, or what gender is, but of what one does or performs 
at a particular time. Gender does not denote a substantive being, but a ‘relative point of 
convergence among culturally and historically specific set of relations.’502 
 
Gender, framed in postmodern terms, thus, offers a site from which to problematise the 
identity categories that modernism produces. Implicit in the approach of post-feminism 
towards gender is a focus on subjects as the outcome rather than the source of historical 
processes and power relations. As illustrated above, this is reflected in Butler's arguments for 
performitivity, seeing gender as something one does, rather than something one is. This 
approach thus deconstructs gender and removes it as the sole focus of identity politics by 
tying it to other social categories, such as race, class, age, sexuality, disability. There is general 
agreement within postmodern feminist circles that gender does not stand alone as an 
analytical category and must be considered in relation to other salient practices of power. The 
goal of postmodern thinking therefore is to incorporate gender practices with the aim of 
disrupting them altogether rather than recreating a better set.503 Rather than expecting 
closure on the question of gender, postmodernism sees feminist scholarship as best equipped 
for analysis when it understands gender as always already intertwined with other analytical 
and political energies. It is, thus, opportune to examine the relation of gender with other axis 
of subordination such as race, class, age, sexuality and disability, as best captured in another 
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Intersectionality Feminists  
Intersectionality has been defined as ‘signifying the complex, irreducible, varied, and variable 
effects which ensue when multiple axis of differentiation-economic, political, cultural, psychic, 
subjective and experiential-intersect in historically specific contexts’.504 Within the last couple 
of decades, intersectionality has pervaded much of feminist theory and activism. It has even 
been argued that it is the most important contribution that women’s studies in conjunction 
with related fields have made so far.505  
 
From a methodological perspective, it has raised awareness of the intersection between 
power relations, cultural practices and gender roles drawing attention to their intertwined 
nature. It is primarily concerned with subjectivity referring to a particular paradigm based in 
individual categories506, and with the interplay of different power relations and/or systems of 
oppression in society. Furthermore, it has made a significant impact beyond feminism, notably 
in the international human rights arena. This part traces the origins of intersectionality, its 
international success, its relevance to a postcolonial feminist perspective and its drawbacks.  
 
In its earlier stages, intersectionality was associated with mostly black and Latina feminist 
critique of mainstream feminist theory and law, which were seen as imposing the essentialist 
standard of the white (middle-class) heterosexual woman.507 Kimberley Crenshaw’s seminal 
contributions finally introduced intersectionality into feminist legal scholarship in the early 
1990s. She argued that the focus on traditional categories (such as race and gender) in anti-
discrimination law and doctrine works to exclude those who are at the categories 
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intersections, especially black women.508 According to Crenshaw, the aim of intersectionality 
was to ‘bring together the different aspects of an otherwise divided sensibility.’ She argued 
that:  
  
‘[r]acial and sexual subordination are mutually reinforcing, black women are commonly 
marginalized by a politics of race alone or a politics of gender alone, and a political 
response to each form of subordination must at the same time be a political response  
to both.’509 
 
Crenshaw’s work has been of great influence in legal doctrine, practice, and feminist legal 
activism across the globe. It now features prominently in international human rights and 
activism, at least since the start of the 21st century. Due to sustained feminist activism, as 
discussed previously, gender has, for example, made its way into the United Nations law and 
practice dealing with racial discrimination.510  
 
It also featured prominently at the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, which was held in Durban, South Africa thanks to the feminist NGOs that 
had consistently advanced this agenda in the international legal arena. 511 The final text of the 
Declaration, adopted at Durban, thus refers to the ‘differentiated manner’ in which ‘racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance reveal themselves…for women and 
girls.’512 At present, UN Human Rights Committees and Special Rapporteurs explicitly use 
intersectionality as a framework when dealing with gender issues. The concept was 
particularly salient in the work of former U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Professor Yakin Ertürk and has been continued in the work of the current U.N. Special 
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Rapporteur, Rashida Manjoo.513 In this way, intersectionality, which originally emerged as a 
theory at the margins of academic feminism, has now been widely accepted into international 
feminist activism and human rights discourse.  
 
In its theoretical manifestations, intersectionality has tended to rely on terms frequently 
associated with geography such as vectors and crossings as metaphors for the description of 
the cumulative discrimination faced by minority women in society. As Crenshaw has put it:  
  
‘Intersectionality occurs when a woman from a minority group….tries to navigate the 
main crossing in the city…The main highway is “racism road.” One cross street can be 
Colonialism, then Patriarchy Street…She has to deal not only with one form of 
oppression, but with all forms, those named as road signs, which link together to make 
a double, triple, multiple, a many layered blanket of oppression.’514 
 
 
On this view, an individual is treated as a composition of interlocking identity elements, such 
as gender, race, sexuality, religion and class. Governance feminism is in many ways an 
extension of intersectionality theory in that it explores the ways in which late modern subjects 
are constituted through discourses of power, class and race albeit without ever using the term 
intersectionality. Of particular interest to the thesis is the impact of intersectionality theory on 
postcolonial feminist scholarship, which in turn is vital to this project’s examination of the 
representational practices of the ICTY in its interpretation of wartime identities.  
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i) Structural Bias Critique and the Opening Up of the Postcolonial Feminist Discourse 
As noted previously, international feminist legal scholars such as Christine Chinkin, Hillary 
Charlesworth, Rhonda Copelon, Charlotte Bunch and Catherine MacKinnon (albeit in distinctly 
different registers) have contributed notably to international feminist legal scholarship with 
their ideas underpinning many feminist reform projects of the law. In many ways their writings 
also represent the leading strand in feminist legal theory from the early 1990s onwards. While 
Chapters II and III have already mapped out their salient ideas, it is useful to briefly resort back 
to them, as their ‘structural bias’ critique of international human rights law has in many ways 
served as a springboard for many of the most distinct arguments in recent postcolonial 
feminist scholarship.515  
 
Implicit in these critiques of international law is the idea that international law is male, and 
therefore inherently or ‘structurally biased’ against women, not only preventing their inclusion 
but even requiring their subordination. These feminists, each in their own registers, have thus 
advocated for an integration of women’s human rights through a complete regime change.  
While universally applauded during the 1990s, ‘structural bias’ critique has subsequently come 
under sustained critique from other feminist scholars for its failure to explore the intersecting 
dimensions of female discrimination, which according to postcolonial feminist scholars, for 
instance, cannot be divorced from the historical context in which they took shape. Moreover, 
their almost exclusive focus on the binary divisions of the law and the family as the main site 
of oppression is seen as misplaced for not taking into account government inaction as a force 
that frequently further perpetuates this oppression.516  
 
In particular, the structural feminist embrace of cultural factors and practices as a way of 
accounting for gender-specific issues such as domestic violence, female genital mutilation or 
malnutrition is often deemed biased against Third World women in the sense that it does not 
conceive of their agency.517 Most crucially, structural feminism has failed to conceptualise the 
multiplicity of women’s voices within that group, which has become a renewed subject of 
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interest in feminist legal scholarship not least because of the influence of postcolonial feminist 
scholarship on current human rights discourses around gender-based violence.  It is, thus, 
apposite to turn to some of the most notable contributions in postcolonial feminist 
scholarship, which further reinforce the idea earlier expressed by Crenshaw that 
discrimination is always multiple, yet also historically contingent and culturally constructed. In 
this way, postcolonial feminist scholars have pointed out some interesting modalities, which 
also distinctly shape contemporary wartime sexual violence jurisprudence.  
 
In one of the foundational postcolonial feminist texts, Under Western Eyes: Feminist 
Scholarship and Colonial Discourses518, Chandra Mohanty points to the absence of the histories 
of Third World women’s engagement with feminism.519 ‘Feminist historiography’ is her central 
method for understanding the connection between women as historical subjects and the re-
presentation of women produced by hegemonistic discourses.  Mohanty is particularly critical 
of Western feminist assertions that have reinforced the homogeneity of women based on 
their shared ground of oppression inevitably binding women together in a sociological notion 
of ‘sameness’ of oppression.  Her most stringent critique of Western feminist discourse, 
however, is its conceptualisation of the Third World woman as a unitary subject with 
homogenous interests and goals. A majority of feminist texts are seen as having ‘discursively 
colonised the material and historical heterogeneities’ of the lives of women in the Third 
World, which reproduce a ‘singular Third World Women’-an arbitrarily constructed, yet 
weighty trope in dominant Western humanist discourses.520  Mohanty, thus, calls for women 
to form ‘strategic coalitions across class, race and national boundaries’, as the most useful way 
of exploring the links among the histories and struggles of Third World women against racism, 
sexism, colonialism, imperialism and monopoly capital.521 This is because Western feminist 
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political practice has foreclosed on the possibility of coalitions among Western feminists, 
working-class feminists and women of colour, for in its prioritisation of certain issues-most 
notably gender-based violence-it has not accounted for those who might have entirely 
different concerns. In some ways, Mohanty’s engagement with ‘feminist historiography’ is a 
rejection not only of the essentialised Third World woman frequently found in colonialist 
discourses, it is also a call for an intersectional understanding of the historical and political 
powers that constitute the varying vectors and crossroads of oppression that differently 
situated women experience around the world.  
 
ii) New Intersectional Understandings: Postcolonial feminism and the rejection of the 
woman as victim-paradigm 
 
Whereas earlier writings on the intersectional dimensions of oppression against women from 
the ‘Global South’ were primarily focused on their historical exclusion from the texts of 
international law, later postcolonial feminists sought to explore the more concrete threats to 
women shaped by very modern forms of violence, namely by way of economic globalisation 
and military intervention.  
 
Feminist legal scholars writing in this vein include Karen Engle, Diane Otto, Anne Orford and 
Ratna Kapur (amongst many others).  Their common critique of contemporary feminist legal 
theory is that it has succumbed to the idea of women as unitary, monolithic subjects of 
international law, without acknowledging that gender is always shaped by intersecting vectors 
such as race, class and ethnicity and economic exploitation. Feminist legal theory has thus 
produced a limited and incomplete understanding of women’s subjectivity having denied 
women their agency as independently constituted subjects in international law. The 
universality and essentialism of the earlier feminist movements are, thus, seen as having 
contributed to the production of women as victims in much of contemporary feminist 
scholarship. While postcolonial feminists do not deny that the women’s human rights 
movements were instrumental in raising awareness and setting international standards, they 
strongly reject the universal assumptions made about women and the lack of 
acknowledgement of the multiple dimensions of violence they face in everyday life. These 
writers, thus, pose a direct challenge to modern international feminism’s very foundation. 
Third World feminist critique has ‘unconsciously affected’ much of the feminist critique of 
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international law through its introduction of the ‘Exotic Other Female’ to the international 
stage’.522 Postcolonial feminists in particular have challenged the systems of knowledge that 
continue to inform feminist understandings of women and the subaltern subject in the 
postcolonial world523. Postcolonial feminism, thus, exposes the imperial and essentialist 
assumptions about Third World women and culture that often characterise the debates on 
women’s rights. Moreover, it challenges attempts to universalise women’s experiences, 
primarily along the lines of gender, as these serve to exclude through cultural, religious or 
sexual ‘Othering’ the situation of women in the postcolonial world and their struggles for 
rights. Western feminist strategies espousing ‘global sisterhood’ in their search for universal 
solutions to women’s concerns continue to ignore the colonial contexts on which these 
assumptions are founded.524  
 
Ratna Kapur’s writings reflect most strongly the contemporary postcolonial feminist critique of 
the international women’s rights movement.525 To Kapur, the depiction of Third World woman 
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as perpetually marginalised and underprivileged object of international law is reflected in the 
strategies adopted to remedy the harms that women experience, which in reality reinforce 
stereotyped and racist representations of ‘Third World culture’ and in doing so privilege the 
culture of the West.526 The perception of the Third World woman in international legal 
scholarship is further reminiscent of colonialist representations, which regarded them as 
infantile, civilisationally backward and incapable of autonomy or self-determination.527 
Moreover, the international women’s human rights movement has reinforced the image of 
women as ‘victim subjects’, primarily through its focus on violence against women, which has 
had little to do with the actual promotion of women’s rights. The focus on the ‘victim subject’ 
has strengthened gender and cultural essentialism and erased the problems, perspectives and 
concerns of women, who are marginalised on account of their race, class, ethnicity, religion or 
sexual orientation.  Moreover, it has posited the Third World woman as the ‘authentic victim’ 
given that ‘the look of starvation, helplessness and victimisation is remarkably familiar to our 
imaginations, irrespective of the reality’.528  
 
As stated in Chapter II, the Violence against Women (VAW) campaign is one manifestation of 
cultural essentialism marking contemporary women’s human rights discourse that has failed 
to encapsulate the lives and experiences of women as not only shaped by gender, but also by 
race, religion and class, therefore, never translating into a complex understanding of women’s 
experiences.529 Moreover, the campaign has reinforced a gratuitous connection between 
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culture and violence in relation to the Third World, which is not invoked in a similar fashion 
when discussing violence against women in the West. This is reflected in the way certain 
crimes associated with the Third World, such as dowry murders and veiling have been 
deployed by the VAW movement to reproduce a totalising view of culture in its treatment of 
women offering an overly simplistic image, if not total misrepresentation of the practice. As 
Kapur has remarked in relation to current feminist debates around veiling practices, 
    
 ‘The veil may not be a modern practice, yet the multiple meanings of the veil,  
 through different cultural and historical contexts, get subsumed in rhetoric that  
focuses almost exclusively on veiling as an oppressive and subordinating practice. 
It is read in a uniform, linear manner as an oppressive practice because it erases women’s 
physical and sexual identity and is symbolic of the subjugation of women in Islam. Yet, 
there is no universal opinion as to its function amongst those who wear the veil.’530 
 
Another prominent practice invoked by Western feminists-in relation to postcolonialist India-is 
the image of the female body in flames, or the practice of sati, which is often collapsed with 
dowry murders as an entirely distinct phenomenon.531 But what is frequently lost in such 
culturally essentialised discourses is how the subject in different cultural contexts comes to be 
constituted through oppositions between culturally totalising discourses and liberal rights 
discourses, which end up erasing the very subjectivity of the woman, whose rights are 
implicated or have been denied. In spite of its constant assertions that it is dealing with the 
‘real lives’ of women, the VAW campaign has furnished accounts of the lives of these victims 
from the perspectives of outsiders. As Kapur argues, merely giving priority to the victim’s voice 
as a response to this critique risks equating it with the ‘truth’ and produces an experiential 
politics that is too closely tied to identity politics, which has ‘surrendered’ any commitment to 
a transformative vision of the world and women’s lives in that world.532  
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The effort to integrate cultural diversity into a gender analysis has, thus, been a mixed bag for 
the women’s human rights movement. The focus on violence against women has not only 
reinforced images of the Third World woman as ‘thoroughly disempowered, brutalized and 
victimized; a representation that is far from liberating for women’, but has foreclosed the 
possibility of imagining human rights discourses as reflecting a multitude of women’s voices 
that draw strength from the fragmentation and multitude of experiences and thinking. 
Moreover, it has failed to analyse how the mechanisms of discursive engagement produce the 
victim subject and the forms of violence to which she may be subjected. According to Kapur, 
‘an account of the reality of women’s lives, though important, cannot adequately explain the 
social construction of violence and resistance to such violence.’533 Postcolonial feminists have 
inevitably been highly critical of radical feminism’s essentialising tendencies, which have 
focused on the commonality of women’s experiences, while failing to interrogate the extent to 
which the multiplicity of women’s experiences displaces gender as the central category of 
analysis.534  Moreover, Kapur’s analysis has fleshed out the modalities by which contemporary 
women’s human rights discourses continue to perpetuate unhelpful images of women by 
advocating for ways in which they ought to be, rather than reflecting on the ways in which 
they are.  
 
The main theoretical contribution of postcolonial legal feminism lies in its interrogation of how 
colonial histories continue to discriminate in the postcolonial present. Moreover, it exposes 
how scholars from ‘the metropolis’ including liberal feminists operate under hegemonistic 
historical narratives disguised by the idea of objectivity. Postcolonial theory, thus, also poses a 
challenge to those feminists, who speak in the name of postcolonial feminism by constantly 
trying to produce an ‘authentic’ identity, or a ‘culturally distinctive position’, as reinforcing 
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binary divides between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, which homogenise the location and politics of 
Western feminism and play into the hands of right-wing agendas, who use the image of the 
‘woman victim’ for their own political purpose.535 It concludes that international law can only 
reinvent women’s spaces through a radically reformed legal discourse that integrates an 
understanding of how women’s subjectivities and experiences of violence are partly 
constituted and constructed in the arena of women’s human rights in and through the 
discourse of the VAW campaign and the foregrounding of the ‘victim subject’. This suggests 
that while solutions must be found outside of the law, it is still the most powerful tool for 
reinventing and re-politicising current women’s rights discourses.  
 
In various registers, contemporary legal feminist scholarship has been inspired by postcolonial 
feminist theory in its intersectional analysis of the representational practices deployed by 
international criminal tribunals with respect to wartime identities in the age of ‘ethnic’ 
conflict.536 Intersectional readings of ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence are examined 
in close detail in Chapter VI, but it is nonetheless useful to outline some of the central ideas 
undergirding the work of Doris Buss, as she is one of the most prolific scholars to have 
engaged with ICTY and ICTR wartime sexual violence jurisprudence.537  She has questioned 
whether there are limits to the strategy of seeing women and the human rights abuses they 
suffer within the work of international crimes tribunals. Her key argument is that wartime 
sexual violence against women has become visible in the emerging international criminal 
justice system largely through the attention placed on ethnicity as a key meta-narrative within 
which sexual violence against women materialises.538  While the ICTY's analysis of gender-
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based violence produced an increased visibility of wartime violence against women, this has 
occurred against the backdrop of conflicts defined as ‘ethnic’, which were interwoven into the 
tribunal's jurisprudence.539 The intersections of gender and ethnicity in the tribunal's 
jurisprudence reveal some of the mechanisms through which sexual violence and gender 
inequality are highly visible but only superficially so.  As she has put it,  
 
‘In the Tribunal's reasoning, the focus on gender in the context of an overdetermined 
assessment of ethnic conflict becomes a means for occluding, rather than opening up 
the complex dimensions of violence against women’.540  
 
Buss illuminates that this tendency in much of international scholarship of understanding 
modern conflicts as ‘ethnic’, in particular when viewed in light of the complexity of the 
Yugoslav situation, can produce reductive and distorting effects.541 In overplaying the ethnic 
dimensions of conflict, the complex effect of political, economic and geo-political change that 
created the conditions for the wars in the region are simultaneously minimised. This raises 
concerns about what is lost and unseen when ethnicity becomes unquestionably the 
explanatory framework within which these conflicts are understood. Buss pauses to reflect on 
the fact that while wartime sexual violence against women has become both part of the public 
image of war, or the symbol of suffering, it has simultaneously been erased as an international 
concern. As she sees it: 
 
‘[M]issing from the various constructions of wartime rape is any sense of rape as an 
act of violence against women.’542  
 
Chapter VI further engages with this aspect of Buss’ work analysing in more detail her 
argument that ethnicity and race function as the dominant, arguably distorting lens through 
which gender crimes are seen and unseen in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence.543 
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Buss’ analysis also ties in closely with the work of cultural feminist anthropologist Dubravka 
Žarkov, who has analysed the centrality of victim representations in media narratives around 
rapes and sexual assaults which in turn have shaped intersectional feminist legal 
interpretations of gender, ethnicity, the body and the nation in the breakup of Yugoslavia. As 
Žarkov has put it:  
  
‘Media representations of rapes and sexual assaults against women treated the female 
body as the map on which the new, sexual, geographies of ethnicity were drawn, this 
time in discursive terms.’544 
 
Žarkov has argued that victimisation accompanied both the violence against women and its 
legal remedies, as much as it accompanied the media representations and collective narratives 
during the breakup of Yugoslavia.545 The victimised female body has been a particularly 
powerful tool in the deployment of media images, a potent metaphor in the violent 
production of collective identities that have made women in the Yugoslav war visible.  A 
prominent example she has provided to illustrate this point is the way in which Croatian 
newspapers developed three distinctive stories about wartime rape.546 The stories revolved 
around three central themes: the victims of rape, forced impregnation and about the rapists 
themselves. About half of the stories were about the victims of rape, and a majority of them 
were about the national and international activities around the issue, such as United Nations 
or European Union resolutions, international attempts to prosecute the perpetrators, or assist 
the victims, and actions within Croatia, mostly by medical experts on treating trauma,547 thus, 
indicating the international dimensions that helped visibilise rape in the popular discourse. 
Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the articles (largely supplied to the Croatian media 
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through foreign sources)548 were about raped Muslim women. Only a handful of the articles 
about rape surveyed mentioned that Croatian women had been raped at all, and only one or 
two went into describing the circumstances of the rape. By way of example Žarkov cites the 
following passage in the weekly daily Danas: 
 
‘With regard to the severity of the violence, Croatian women were no better off than 
Muslim women, but the scope of the violence against Muslim women surpasses 
everything ever seen in the history of wars.’549 
 
Aside from positing the ‘unique’ nature of the sexual violence against Bosnian Muslim women 
as a culturally loaded signifier of the Yugoslav conflict, the newspapers emerging in the 
Croatian media at the time usually mentioned the rape of Croatian women without providing 
any concrete details, while the rape of Serbian women, was hardly ever mentioned, and if so, 
mostly to deny it. The underlying reason for these different representational practices might 
have been motivated by a desire to establish the difference between all Croats and Muslims, 
for: 
 
‘The visibility of the Muslim woman only as the rape victim produced her as having 
nothing in common with a Croat man or a woman. According to the Croatian press, 
Muslims and Croats belong to different levels of civilization, which simply do not touch 
each other.’550 
   
In this representation, rape becomes a question of ‘humanity’-meaning that the raped Croat 
woman, if visible, would be a link to those ‘dehumanized Others’-both the Serb rapist and the 
raped Muslim woman. Thus, when rape becomes a question of humanity to link the Croatian 
woman with ‘those dehumanized Others’-with the Serb rapist, and the raped Muslim woman-
would equal questioning her humanity. The dehumanisation of the Croatian woman, thus, 
needs to be prevented in order to preserve the humanity of the ‘ethnic Self’, which is a crucial 
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strategy whereby the victim is equated with the perpetrator, as the representation of Serb 
women in the Croatian press suggests. 551 
 
The danger of presenting violence against women as a ubiquitous practice along strictly 
ethnicised lines is that these practices produce certain women as victims only, denying them 
both subjectivity and agency while at the same time excluding women, who are deemed 
undesirable from the protective realm and, also, foreclosing male vulnerability. The act of 
sexual violence is, thus, given the power to produce dominant notions of both femininity and 
masculinity, creating the former through violence endured and the latter through violence 
perpetrated. That the Serbian press was similarly complicit in the production of women as 
victims viewed through highly essentialised readings of the woman’s body has also been 
demonstrated by Žarkov and indicates that this was not a particularised representational 
practice, but rather ubiquitous regardless of ethnic context.  
 
The ethnicised issue of forced impregnation became a particularly prominent theme in the 
Serbian press, as the children conceived of rape-whether born or unborn were defined as the 
source of ‘ultimate torment’ for the impregnated women.552 These representations were on 
the one hand concerned with defining the Serbhood of the women, while at the same time 
seeking to define the Serbhood of the men.  Both these directions speak about shifts at the 
intersections of gender and ethnicity-the practice of rape, specifically, defines women as both 
the female and the ethnic ‘Other’ at the same time, with gender and ethnicity appearing 
equally important.553 But the practice of forced impregnation, wherein the child’s ethnicity is 
defined through the father speaks of the gendered hierarchy of ethnicity and the primacy of 
gendered difference in ‘ethnic conflict.’ Thus, while gender and ethnicity, are mutually 
productive they at the same time produce each other in competing and conflicting ways.  This 
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is most strongly captured by the discourse of ethnic purity, which assumes that the child’s 
ethnicity is produced by the man. The woman in such discourses is swept aside, as the right to 
determine the ethnicity of the child is deemed as the male preserve. According to Žarkov, this 
is what points away from the impregnated Serb woman, toward the Serb man, making him the 
ultimate victim of these impregnations: ‘wronged’ by seeing his ethnic stock contaminated and 
his lineage disrupted by Muslim men, he is the embodiment of Serbhood.554 
 
Žarkov’s is a powerful intersectional reading of the way in which female identity, bodily injury 
and culture emerge in the media discourses around the Yugoslav conflict with often regressive 
results for women. In order to have any emancipatory purchase, feminist theorising on 
wartime sexual violence against both women and men needs to deconstruct the ‘fatal 
linkages’ between male identity, male violence and male and female pleasure, as they produce 
highly  problematic intersectional readings of gender, ethnicity, violence and the nation in the 
context of armed conflict. Žarkov thus cautions against the overwhelming visibility and 
presence of women as rape victims in public discourse along ‘very specific, ethnicized 
identities of victims and villains’, which are perpetuated through the use of universalised 
gendered and sexual identities that preclude the emergence of alternative notions of 
femininity and masculinity.555 Her writings serve as vivid reminder of the centrality of popular 
narratives in the production of disenfranchised victim subjects, which are produced not only 
through the general sense of female subordination in armed conflict but are also shaped by 
conflicting forces of masculinity, which themselves are deeply contingent and hierarchical.  
 
Yet, while intersectionality theories have undoubtedly provided highly useful insights into the 
multiple dimensions of identity underlying women’s experiences whether in their everyday 
lives, or in times of armed conflict, they have been criticised for their insufficient emphasis on 
the broader and structural dimensions underlying female inequality, thus fragmenting both 
subjectivity and the forces that shape it.  Prominent critical and feminist theorists, such as 
Judith Butler and Wendy Brown have argued that it is misleading to think of gender in isolation 
                                            
554
 Ibid at 123. (Origninal emphasis).  
555
 Ibid at 182.  
156 
 
from race, or of race as free of all inflection of gender or sexuality.556 Various strands of 
literature have, moreover, highlighted the pointlessness of constructing the individual as an 
atomistic, detached, ‘relentlessly self-interested’557 entity. Thus, Wendy Brown has, for 
example, argued that structural influences are always subsumed and internalised in the 
individual before individual identity components can be meaningfully articulated.558 In 
addition, Brown has emphasised that the social powers constituting identity are not simply 
different powers, but different kinds of power, as gender, sexuality, race, religion and so on 
are not equivalent problematics.559 
 
The concept of intersectionality, thus, appears flawed, as it more often than not tends to 
presuppose that ‘intersections’ exist prior to the subject and are more or less equal in weight. 
More recent feminist theorising has asserted that ‘intersectionality has reached the limits of 
its potential for the feminist project in law’, with its value being confined to simply highlighting 
complex experiences before the law.560 Joanne Conaghan has, thus, argued that 
intersectionality is: 
  
‘[R]ather limited in its theory-producing power. In particular, while it acts as an aid to the 
excavation of inequality experiences at local level, it tells us little about the wider 
context in which such experiences are produced, mediated and expressed.’561 
 
Furthermore, to focus on the intersections between the categories simply leads to the 
production of ‘more categories, thereby supporting the law’s propensity to classify’562, 
according to Emily Grabham, whose analysis draws on Wendy Brown’s critique of identity.563 
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In her chapter, Grabham tells of her experience as a lawyer of representing a trans lesbian 
woman in a discrimination claim against her employers for her harassment sustained at work. 
The petition required her to squeeze the case into ‘one or more of the following grounds: sex, 
sexual orientation and/or gender reassignment.’564 But as she points out, the request for 
‘further particulars’ in the forms reified rather than challenged these categories. Furthermore, 
the inherently fragmented, yet disciplinary nature of discrimination law meant that it was 
impossible to accurately capture what the individual had actually experienced or how she felt 
about it in legally intelligible terms.565 Thus, intersectional claims might not be able to capture 
the complex identity and experiences of individuals, whose claims might not fit into neatly pre-
arranged boxes. They might not even perform what Conaghan has called their 
‘representational function.’566 As Grabham puts it,  
  
‘Intersectionality is now arguably the product of the regime in which it operates and 
which it was conceived to contest. It supports law’s classifying impulse to the extent 
that focusing on the ‘intersections’ has merely resulted in the disciplinary production of 
more identities. And in many ways it is an archetypal government discourse, 
presuming, as it does, an all-seeing optics of detail in which the vicissitudes, of 
experience and identity can be set out and examined.’567 
 
To sum up, intersectionality has been successful at drawing attention to the problem of the 
marginalisation of certain identities and experiences in feminist politics, law and wider human 
rights discourses. However, intersectionality as an approach for feminist analysis has tended to 
concentrate on difference, while overlooking the persistent importance of gender structures 
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across the intersections.  It is, thus, questionable whether intersectionality has been able to 
capture the complexities inherent in experiences that do not conform to everyday norms, such 
as gendered experiences of wartime. Moreover, it appears that the concept’s usefulness 
beyond its function of ‘representing’ experiences has been exhausted, as it appears to 
enhance, rather than destabilise the regulatory and identity-producing function of the law. It is 
conceivable that intersectionality might have reached its utility for feminism, and would 
benefit from giving way to other forms of engagement to which the next part of the chapter 
turns.  
 
Part VI  
 
Exploring Gender’s Limits: the Impact of Economic Globalisation, Military Intervention and 
Structural Violence  
 
Although intersectional to the extent that it examines the confluence of power, gender, race 
and economic exploitation Anne Orford’s critical reading of recent intervention narratives is 
useful for the critical feminist analysis pursued by this thesis, as it reinstates critical legal 
theory in the face of dominant representations of power in current international legal texts. 
Orford analyses globalisation and economic injustice as central drivers of new liberal impulses, 
which are frequently interventionist in nature and directed at those with limited resistance, 
such as the people of the ‘Global South.’568 In this way, she is able to draw attention to 
economic injustice as the key driver of violence, if not the root cause of the disproportionate 
targeting of women for sexual violence offences in armed conflict.  
 
Moreover, she queries feminist conceptions of the law as operating through the creation of 
subjectivity and identity, or the constitution of sovereign states and international institutions 
and suggests instead that it might be more helpful to understand power as operating beyond a 
‘juridical’ or prohibitive model in order to think about the power relations involved in, and 
enabled by, the performance of humanitarian intervention.569 Drawing on postcolonial theory, 
Orford argues that in the era of decolonisation imperialism today manifests itself largely 
through its economic grip on power, rather than through territorial expansion. As she puts it:  
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‘It is true that we do not today see reprised that form of imperialism premised upon 
the sovereignty of claiming of sovereignty over invaded or occupied territory by a an 
foreign, colonial power. Yet, ‘a largely economic’ enterprise of imperialism continues in 
the form of exploitation of the colonised, their land and resources. Intervention has 
been preceded in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, and accompanied in 
Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor by the facilitation of this imperial enterprise. One of the 
overt aims of pre-conflict ‘aid’ programmes, and post-conflict reconstruction, has been 
the establishment of the necessary conditions to make foreign investment secure and 
profitable.’570 
 
Thus, rather than reading international law and humanitarian intervention as a form of 
progress from a world of ‘irrational tribal, premodern, failed states to one of free, democratic, 
developing states’571, intervention and the power relations that sustain it need to be 
understood as part of the global history of global imperialism.  Orford’s approach is valuable to 
this thesis, as it reinstates critique as an important methodological tool for any feminist inquiry 
that counters against the tendencies earlier described of analysing complex, structural 
problems through a ‘simple theory’ approach, which eschews critique as irrelevant to the facts 
on the ground, a luxury, or the stuff of recreation amidst the problems facing ‘real people in 
the real world.’572 Taking aim at the pragmatic, goal-orientated, linear focus of international 
legal scholarship, which requires that all critique be directed towards policy and programmatic 
change, she argues that:  
 
‘The self-representation of international law as a discipline concerned with peace and 
security, decolonisation and humanitarianism reassures lawyers that there is no time 
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to waste on dealing with theoretical irrelevancies, when our profession is engaged in 
more important life and death matters.’573 
 
On this view, theory and critique are seen as vacuous and narcissistic projects for their 
reflection of textual practices of the law without the provision of a corresponding plan for 
action. This is part of a broader pattern of negative reactions towards the use of cultural and 
critical theory to study issues of capitalism, globalisation, neo-imperialism and militarism both 
within the law and the social sciences more generally.574 The trend is, moreover, reflective of 
current trends in feminist scholarship and activism, which increasingly seeks ‘real life’ solutions 
to complex problems for which it might not have unique epistemic purchase.575 
 
Orford thus proposes an approach that does not separate ‘representation from reality’, an 
abandonment of the disciplinary or generic rules of law (certainly in the context of 
humanitarianism) that work to make stories of brutality appear legitimate and useful. Instead, 
cultural criticism is a necessary approach from which to understand ‘the apparent naturalness 
and inevitability of both militarism and economic globalisation.’576 In a similar vein to 
postcolonial feminist theorists, such as Spivak and Kapur, Orford is therefore highly critical of a 
feminist theory that threatens to facilitate and enable colonialism, if it stages the key struggle 
in the  globalised world as between ‘male and female sparring partners.’577 Indeed, as she puts 
it:  
  
‘A feminist analysis of intervention that focuses on gender alone, without analysing the 
exploitation of women in the economic ‘South’, would operate to reinforce the 
depoliticised notion of ‘difference’ that founds the privileged position of the imperialist 
feminist.’578 
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Her analysis is highly useful for this project, as it pays careful attention to the context of 
increasing economic integration in which humanitarian intervention takes place. Intervention, 
in particular, takes different forms in the contemporary context, and can denote the 
involvement in the international community in, say, the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia by 
means of prohibitive economic measures taken against the country starting in the 1980s, or it 
can even take shape in the creation of international ad-hoc tribunals, such as the ICTY, which 
has been viewed as an interventionist measure taken by the international community to 
remedy past wrongs.579 Moreover, Orford’s approach is insightful because it serves as a 
reminder that the ending of the Cold War has enabled the process of economic globalisation, 
which was in turn facilitated by the increasingly effective and rapidly shifting economic 
operations of international economic institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).580  
 
This process has been very powerfully demonstrated by Balkans scholar Susan Woodward, 
who has shown that the engagement of the international community in the political and social 
life of Yugoslavia was extensive.581  This external involvement gained in strength following the 
death of the former President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito in 1980, who until then had 
managed to keep a tight grip on the central levers of power.582 Yet with the death of Tito, the 
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demise of the state became only a question of time, as in the 1980s all three of its key 
functions-its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, its authority in the conferral and 
enforcement of rights and its central function in the provision of protection to the population- 
began to break down.  Moreover, a fiscal crisis and budget-cutting austerity programme of 
debt repayment signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the early 1980s 
undermined the government's ability to provide protections and guarantee minimum 
welfare.583 The authority of the federal government was thus severely challenged by 
liberalising economic and political reforms and by republican politicians who opposed any loss 
of economic rights they had obtained during the decentralising reforms in the 1970s.584  These 
developments resulted in a serious decline in the federal government's capacity to enforce 
rights and the weakness in authority was further undermined by parallel developments in two 
republics of Yugoslavia-Slovenia and Croatia-which by that stage had begun to secretly build 
separate armies.585 As Woodward points out,  
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preservation of the Yugoslav federation leading to a division, as Slovenia and Croatia supported provincial party 
leaderships against Serbian demands of decentralisation. This confrontational atmosphere led to a deep rift 
between the republic elites and more generally the republics. It is also seen as having precipitated the 
declarations of independence of first Slovenia and then Croatia in 1991. In S. Sofos & B. Jenkins (eds.), Nation and 
Identity in Contemporary Europe, (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 1996), 257 at 261-26.  
585
 These separatist moves on the part of the two republics together with the growth of paramilitary groups 
aligned with emerging, right-wing political parties in many parts of the country clearly ended the state's hitherto 
existing monopoly on the legitimate use of violence by early 1991. In Woodward (2000) at 12.  
163 
 
‘There is no need for any historic of ethnic animosity or civil war to predict growing 
uncertainty, social chaos and potential violence under such circumstances.’586  
 
In this atmosphere of intense frustration with the political status quo, pseudo-nationalist 
sentiments, or ‘a childlike yearning to be heard’ found fertile ground to manifest themselves in 
tandem in the two largest republics, Serbia and Croatia.587 Neither advocates of a free market, 
nor supporters of redistribution and equality were likely to be as popular under conditions of 
austerity and rising inequality as were states' right advocates who claimed that individuals had 
rights-national rights-to their earnings and employment.588 Once political, cultural, and 
economic elites called on Yugoslavs to think in terms of their ethnic identity and as members 
of a national (instead of a Yugoslav) community and claimed that their survival was threatened 
by other Yugoslav nations and that protection in insecure times lay with their own nation and 
its leaders, the gravity of the loss of an overarching Yugoslav state became ‘crystal clear’.589 In 
this situation of loss or renouncement of a Yugoslav identity paired with a debilitating 
economic crisis (reinforced to a large degree by external players), the language of exploitation 
and victimisation based on ‘ethnic belonging’ found fertile ground.590 
 
Yet the consequences of economic restructuring, and the central role played by international 
institutions in furthering that project have not been examined by international lawyers, who 
have often entirely ignored the historical context within which security and humanitarian 
crises emerge and military intervention takes place. Thus, while ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’, 
ethnic tensions, postmodern tribalism or emerging nationalisms are regularly treated as the 
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 Ibid at 12.  
587
 In Serbia nationalism first manifested itself in the rhetoric used by President Slobodan Milosević, who used the 
‘Albanian question’ in Kosovo as a rallying cry with which to play on the fears of Serbs who saw their presence in 
Kosovo threatened largely due to demographic shifts in the region, which had produced a 90 percent majority of 
Albanians. In the latter case nationalism found its strongest advocate under the leadership of former Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) general and historian Franjo Tuđman, whose lifelong passion had been to deliver Croatian 
statehood. During the 1970’s and under Tito's regime Tuđman had twice been jailed for nationalism. In A. Silber 
& L. Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 51- 89.  
588
 In Woodward (2004) at 27.  
589
 All national groups in Yugoslavia were numerical minorities. Ibid at 29.   
590
 Historian Joel Malcolm has similarly argued that the Yugoslav economic system was only able to flourish and 
boom on borrowed money leading to a total foreign debt of $33 billion by the end of 1988. But while, it was 
certain that internally there was a climate of profound political and economic malaise among the population 
added by strong apathy and distrust in the political institutions, it is nonetheless more than questionable whether 
Yugoslavia would have descended into violence had it not been for the involvement of the international 




causes of intervention most international legal analyses do not ask whether such crises could 
be better understood as a consequence of ever more ruthlessly efficient divisions of labour 
and resources in the post-Soviet era.591 
 
Thus, the hypothesis of this thesis, that ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence has 
marginalised from its analysis the nature of the economic order that was put in place in 
Yugoslavia as one of the key causes underlying the conflict, does not seem far-fetched when 
considering the previous analysis. Moreover, the argument that identity categories such as 
gender and ethnicity exist in a vacuum that can be entirely divorced from the political, social 
and economic circumstances and the structural conditions characterising Yugoslavia in the 
pre-war era, not only depoliticises the meaning of power and history in the constitution of 
these subjects, but also misrepresents the nature of the conflict, which-as previously shown-
cannot be defined as solely ‘ethnic’ in nature.  
 
Orford’s approach is thus in so far useful as it has successfully delineated the limits of gender 
as a category of analysis for the complex power relations that inevitably undergird 
interventionist strategies-whether military, economic, or ‘humanitarian’ in the present day.  
Her analysis, while distinctly feminist in its outlook, is at the same time sceptical of feminism’s 
capacity to provide the necessary framework for understanding the complex range of 
gendered experiences in extraordinary situations such as armed conflict. In moving away from 
subjectivity as a framework for understanding armed conflict by drawing attention to the 
material forces that determine discourses of power, Orford has thus raised pressing questions 
perhaps inadvertently suggesting that it might be opportune for feminism to take a step back 
and reconsider its own investment with institutional power. In this way, her approach perhaps 
come closest to the thesis’s ultimate suggestion that now might be the time for feminism to 
‘Take a Break’ from itself in order to allow for new and fresh insights unperturbed by identity 
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As explained in the introductory chapter, the thesis is a critical feminist analysis of how 
gender, ethnicity and culture are constructed in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence 
and the surrounding debate. This chapter has been concerned with providing an overview and 
analysis of the most salient contemporary feminist approaches to human rights, gender, 
ethnicity and culture. It has highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of these 
approaches, from the point of view of pursuing an analysis such as gender-based violence 
against women. The feminist approaches overviewed in this chapter comprised 
liberal/universalist feminists, radical and ‘governance’ feminists, poststructuralist feminists, 
postcolonial feminists and intersectionality feminists. As was stated in the introduction to the 
chapter, this selection has implied a considerable degree of generalisation, which is justifiable 
to the extent that the approaches overviewed are considered to be the most salient/or 
expressive points in contemporary feminist scholarship and activism, dealing with human 
rights, gender, ethnicity, culture and armed conflict.  
  
Although each of these approaches have undoubted merits, each also has some significant 
limitations for a project such as the present one. To sum up, the liberal/universalist feminist 
approach is problematic because of its decoupling of gender and culture and its preference for 
‘simple theory’, including a unified conception of the subject. Radical feminism, while 
undoubtedly instrumental in highlighting women’s subordination and oppression as deeply 
embedded in the legal and power structures of the state, has overplayed the dominance of 
men over women and the struggle between men and women as the central mechanism for 
understanding the gendered dynamics of armed conflict. In so doing, it has reinforced the 
trend towards the culturalisation of identities in international law, which in turn has produced 
highly essentialised and reified stereotypes of women in ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence. In its more contemporary manifestations radical feminism has been 
conceptualised as a form of ‘governance feminism’, which has largely produced consensus 
among feminist scholars and activists as to the legal reforms necessary to regulate sexual 
violence against women while often stifling critique from those, who have queried these 
advances for women in the current and political and legal moment and have called into 




The intersectionality approach, arguably the most influential in the human rights arena, is 
useful for highlighting that gender alone does not account for the complexities that women 
find themselves in. This has been taken further by postcolonial feminist analysis, which has 
highlighted the intersection of gender, race and poverty in its analysis of the representational 
practices of international texts about ‘Third World Women’. It has, moreover, firmly located 
these practices in the postcolonial context, thus, reinforcing the significance of history and the 
material dimensions of women’s lives as essential for an understanding of how identities are 
produced in Western scholarship. However, intersectionality has been accused of further 
fragmenting subjectivity and, thus, colluding with the classificatory impulse of the law. 
Furthermore, its theory producing and practical resolution are to some extent limited, as 
postcolonial feminists in particular have tended to focus on the condition of the ‘Third World 
Woman’, while not paying much attention to women located in ‘the in between’, such as 
Yugoslav women, who are neither seen as Western European, nor as ‘Third World’ women, 
due to their geographical location in South-East Europe. While intersectionality has 
undoubtedly been deployed effectively to analyse the legal modalities used by the ICTY in its 
interpretation of wartime identities (as the next chapter demonstrates), it is not able to 
entirely account for the complex interplay of gender, ethnicity, the nation and armed conflict 
in relation to wartime sexual violence, as it focuses too closely on liberal notions of subjectivity 
and autonomy, which in themselves are contingent and limiting concepts. Thus, as suggested 
through the analysis of Orford’s ‘gender limits’ approach, the question of the thesis will be 
more suitably pursued by a different set of methods to which the thesis turns in Chapters V 
and VI.  
 
 










   
 
Chapter V 
The Dynamics of ‘Ethno-Nationalist Conflict’- The Interface of Gender and 
Ethnicity in ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence 
Part I 
Introduction  
As explained previously, the thesis is a critical feminist analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence and the surrounding debate. This chapter forms the second strand in the 
transition from a discussion of the legal developments surrounding gender-based violence and 
wartime sexual violence in international law presented in Chapters II and III to a reflection on 
these developments adopted in Chapters IV, V and VI, where the actual approach of the thesis 
is fully crystallised. The previous chapters, each in their own register have sought to 
demonstrate the long road travelled by feminists in gaining legal recognition for women’s 
human rights and for gender-based violence as a serious violation of human rights and 
international humanitarian law.  
 
Chapters I and II, thus, provided an overview of the evolution of gender-based violence and 
wartime sexual violence in international law and clarified why gender-based violence is a 
feminist issue of currency in the contemporary legal moment. Chapter III constituted the first 
limb in the transition from the discussion of violence against women to their theoretical 
analysis by mapping out the salient feminist approaches that have shaped the theoretical 
understanding of this thesis. In highlighting their respective advantages and disadvantages, 
the thesis has clarified its position on the feminist spectrum by suggesting a more critical 
approach towards the study of armed conflict and wartime identity. It has shown that 
international law continues to perpetuate deeply entrenched images of women based on 
essentialised notions of female identity, which are dressed up as legal successes. This has 
prompted much debate in feminist circles about how to incorporate a more feminist 
perspective into the law. But, as argued previously, this has not necessarily been 
emancipatory for women, as feminist activism today is strongly informed by structuralist 
perspectives of women’s subordination. The present chapter, thus, aims to further analyse 
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how wartime identities come into being in the jurisprudence. It provides the core context for 
the analysis of wartime sexual violence, as it scrutinises the key legal achievements 
accomplished by the ICTY in this area of the law. Primarily, the chapter examines the key 
dynamics of the Yugoslav war in order to convey a stronger sense of the nature of gender-
based violence endured by women and the circumstances of extreme precariousness within 
which the sexual violence took place. The chapter, thus, proceeds with an overview of 
respective case-law, interjected with some brief historical background of the events and 
patterns of wartime sexual violence that have defined the Yugoslav conflict in the popular 
imagination. The chapter draws on feminist observations, which constitute an integral part of 




As mentioned previously, the ICTY has adjudicated a host of cases in the area of wartime 
sexual violence that proved influential for future international criminal jurisprudence. Of the 
161 individuals indicted to date, 78 had charges of sexual violence included in their 
indictments. Twenty-eight (more than one third) were convicted of individual criminal 
responsibility for wartime sexual violence charges under Article 7(1) of the Statute, and four of 
them for added superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute. Moreover, 13 
indictments have been either withdrawn, or were terminated due to death, while 11 
individuals have been acquitted of wartime sexual violence charges. There are 19 ongoing 
proceedings currently at pre-trial and trial stage of which six have been referred to national 
jurisdictions, while one suspect still remains at large.592The chapter proceeds by presenting an 
overview of such developments. It does not, however, aim to cover them all.593 Rather, the 
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 Key Figures of ICTY Cases 3/06/2011, at http://www.icty.org/x/file/cases/keyfigures/key-figures_110328-
en.pdf (accessed June, 2011). Three of the seven cases currently at trial, and three of those awaiting trial 
(including that of the recently captured former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić) involve sexual violence 
allegations and charges. Moreover, four of six trial judgements subject to actual or potential appeal also involve 
sexual violence findings. For an overview, see: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: ‘Review 
of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgements of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Light of 
Security Council Resolution 1820’.  (pdf file, copy with author). 
593
 ICTY sexual violence cases as of June 2011 include: Tadić (IT-94-1); Nikolić (IT-94-2); Došen, Kolundžija and 
Sikirica (IT-95-8); Todorović (IT-95-9/1); Blagoje Simić (IT-95-9/9-T); Milan Simić  (IT-95/9/2); Česić (IT-95-10/1); 
Rajić (IT-95-12); Čerkez and Kordić (IT-95-14/2); Bralo (IT-9517); Furundžija (IT-95-17/11); Meakić et al.(IT-95-4); 
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objective is to give a sense of the evolving ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence and its 
achievements to date, as seen from a feminist perspective. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a platform for further reflection and analysis. The cases that constitute the central 
focus of the thesis are as follows: Prosecutor v. Tadić594; Prosecutor v. Delalić595 (commonly 
referred to as Čelebići after the name of the camp where the offences occurred); Prosecutor v. 
Furundžija596; Prosecutor v. Kunarac597 and Prosecutor v. Kvočka598. These are considered to be 
the most significant cases to date in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, as all bear the 
hallmarks of feminist advocacy and set precedents for the future prosecution of gender-based 
violence in international law.599  
 
The common element underlying the judgements is that they address the particular 
phenomena that have characterised the Yugoslav conflict in its treatment of women: 
‘genocidal rape’, systematic rape campaigns, forced pregnancy and mass detention of civilians 
in Serb-run 'rape/death camps' following ethnic cleansing campaigns against local civilian 
populations, which have been widely portrayed as motivated by a targeting of specific 'ethnic' 
identities. Moreover, the judgements have developed the jurisprudence on wartime sexual 
violence individually and as a whole contributing to the ‘remarkable presence and lifespan of 
the topic’ in feminist discourses and beyond.600 Part II thus addresses, in brief, the case 
selection criteria underlying this thesis. By way of contextual analysis Part III provides a 
                                                                                                                                           
Blaškić (IT-95-14);Kupreškić et. al (IT-95-16) Česić (IT-95-10/1); Delalić, Delić, Mučić and Landžo (Čelebići case) (IT-
96-23); Kovač, Kunarac and Vuković (IT-96-23, IT-96-23-1); Zelenović, “Foča” (IT-96-23/2); Stakić (IT-97-24); 
Krnojelac (IT-97-25)Kos, Kvočka, Prčac, Radić and Žigić (IT-98-30/1); Krstić (IT-98-33); Vasiljević (IT-98-32); Brđanin 
(IT-99-36); Plavšić (IT-00-39 &40/1); Krajišnik (IT-00-39); Halilović (IT-01-48); Banović (IT-02-65/1); Rasim Delić (IT-
04-83); Milutinović et al. (IT-05-87); Mladić (IT-(IT-09-92). 
594
 Prosecutor v. Tadić (Trial Chamber) Case No IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) (Judgement); Prosecutor v. Tadić (Appeals 
Chamber) Case No IT-96-21-A (15 July, 1999) (Judgement) (collectively ‘Tadić’’).  
595
 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mučić, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo (IT-96-21-T), (16 November, 1998) 
(Judgement); Prosecutor v. Delalić et al Appeals Chamber) Case No IT-96-21-A (20 February, 2001) (Judgement) 
(collectively ‘Čelebići’).  
596
 Prosecutor v. Furundžija (Trial Chamber) Case No IT-96-23-T/1-T (10 December 1998) (Judgement); Prosecutor 
v. Furundžija (Appeals Chamber) Case No IT-95-17/I-T (21 July 2000) (Judgement) (collectively ‘Furundžija’).  
597
 Prosecutor v. Kunarac(Trial Chamber) Case No IT-96-23-T/1-T (22 February, 2001) (Judgement); Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac (Appeals Chamber) Case No. IT-96-23-T/1-A (12 June, 2002) (Judgement) (collectively, ‘Kunarac’).  
598
 Prosecutor v. Kvočka (Trial Chamber) Case No IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) (Judgement); Prosecutor v. 
Kvočka (Appeals Chamber) Case No IT-98-30/1-A (25 February, 2005) (Judgement) (collectively, ‘Kvočka’).  
599
 For a discussion see, 82. See also Askin (2003) at 88 and Askin (2002-2003) at 910.  
600
 This phrase is borrowed from Jelena Batinić’s discussion of both local, as well as international feminist debates 
on rape accompanying the Yugoslav conflict, which later significantly influenced the legal regulation and 
interpretation of these acts in the jurisprudence. In J. Batinić, ‘Feminism, Nationalism and the War: The Yugoslav 
Case’ in Feminist Texts’, 3(1) Journal of International Women’s Studies, (Nov. 2001),1.  
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structural account of the internal and external forces of power that contributed to the collapse 
of the Yugoslav state. It also adopts a contrapuntal perspective in countering the common 
assertion transmitted in much of the contemporary scholarship on the Yugoslav conflict as 
originating in ‘ancient ethnic rivalries’. Part IV assesses the role of language, as reflected in the 
use of terminology such as ‘ethnic cleansing’, which helped frame the idea of the conflict as 
ethnic in nature while defining sexual violence crimes in ICTY decisions through an ethnic lens. 
Part V analyses the structure of the camp as a political space in which the law is suspended 
and looks to the significance of the findings of the Commission of Experts as an instrumental 
element in visiblising sexual violence in ICTY decisions. Part VI turns to the salient ICTY case 
law by providing a legal analysis of the Tadić decision and it elaborates on the significance of 
this judgement for international criminal jurisprudence more generally. Part VII analyses the 
Čelebići judgement, considered one of the landmark decisions in international wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence for its acknowledgment of the serious and widespread nature of sexual 
violence, while Parts VIII and IX chart the key developments arising out of the Furundžija and 
Kunarac cases, which together with the Čelebići judgement are seen as having provided 
groundbreaking space for gender justice, due to their adjudication of sexual violence as a war 
crime and crime against humanity. They constitute part of a trilogy of cases emerging from the 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia.601 Part X overviews the Kvočka case and its significance 
concerning the development of international criminal law with respect to its findings of 
individual responsibility for rape as part of persecution against the civilian population and 
torture for threats of sexual violence. Part XI summarises and concludes the chapter.   
 
Part II 
i) Case Selection Criteria 
Given the limitations inherent in a project such as a doctoral thesis, it would not be feasible to 
detail every wartime sexual violence case adjudicated upon in the ICTY. The case study, thus, 
focuses, exclusively, on sexual violence cases arising from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The common elements underlying the incidences of sexual violence are, most notably, the 
circumstances of mass detention of civilians in camps or camp-like facilities, where sexual 
                                            
601
 See for example K.D. Askin, ‘Reflections on Some of the Most Significant Achievements of the ICTY’, 37 New 
England Law Review (2002-2003), 910 
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violence against women was commonplace leading feminists to label them, variously, as 
‘death camps’ and rape camps’.602 The analysis of the camp as the space in which much of the 
conflict took place is, moreover, important for defying the commonly constructed portrayal of 
the conflict as 'ethnic' in nature, as is shown in the relevant section. The focus on the conflict 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, moreover, is linked to the project’s interest of exploring the 
portrayal of the Yugoslav war as synonymous with rape, and the raped woman as the 
metaphor for female identity.  In this way, the cases selected provide a poignant insight into 
gendered experiences of wartime.   
  
The common pattern underlying the cases selected for analysis is explored through a critical 
reading of the Final Report produced by the Commission of Experts. In a predominant number 
of cases, not all of which feature in this chapter, the detainees were civilians, whose towns 
and communities had been initially rounded up by enemy forces. In most instances, they were 
later detained against their will and transported to detention-like facilities (mostly civilian in 
nature), such as sports halls, or private residences and hotels, which was a commonly 
occurring phenomenon in the case of female detainees. Detainees would routinely be 
subjected to questioning and interrogation in adjacent hangars which functioned as makeshift 
interrogation facilities, where much of the violence, whether of a sexual or non-sexual nature 
was perpetrated, as is discussed in detail in the case law review.  
 
Moreover, the cases featuring in this analysis share in common a disproportionate targeting of 
women and girls for crimes of a sexual nature across a wide range of age groups. They 
showcase the systematic and widespread nature of sexual violence, which has prompted many 
feminists to label the rapes committed against women as ‘mass rapes’, if not ‘genocidal rapes’-
certainly, rape committed on an industrial scale.603 As indicated previously, this view was 
                                            
602 As Catherine MacKinnon has put it, ‘[S]erbian forces have exterminated over 200,000 Croatians and Muslims 
thus far in an operation they’ve coined “ethnic cleansing”. In this genocide, in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, over 
30,000 Muslim and Croatian girls and women are pregnant from mass rape. Of the hundred ‘Serbian-run 
concentration camps, about twenty are solely rape/death camps for Muslim and Croatian women and children.’ 
In C. MacKinnon, ‘Human Rights and Global Violence Against Women’ in Are Women Human? Reflections on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), at 36.  
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 Going as far as to equivocate the ‘death camps’ run by Serbs with the systematic extermination of Jews during 




almost universally espoused by feminists, regardless of whether they believed that rapes by 
Croats and Muslims ought to be distinguished from those committed by Serbs, or whether 
they believed that rape had been committed on all sides. The thesis argues that these debates, 
far from aiding in the project of gender justice, have invoked problematic notions of gendered 
identity in armed conflict doing little to dispel recurring gendered stereotypes in international 
law. 
 
A further commonality of the cases discussed is their extensive elaboration of the various 
elements constituting sexual offences. The Furundžija case, for instance, has provided its own 
definitions of rape after finding that the elements of the crime were not sufficiently defined 
under existing international humanitarian law.604 The cases also discuss superior command 
responsibility enshrined in Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, which is commonly regarded as a 
mechanism for ensuring individual responsibility on the basis of the position of the accused as 
superiors to the perpetrators of the crimes alleged.605 A number of decisions, moreover, 
analyse the theory of joint criminal enterprise and individual liability for sexual offences. The 
prosecution of crimes under this legal heading has had significant implications for the 
conceptualisation of gender roles and women's agency in times of armed conflict. As stated 
                                                                                                                                           
‘[T]he systematic and instrumental nature of these rapes marks them. Progroms were one thing, 
designing and fielding the gas chambers was another. Rape as most women generally know it and these 
rapes have a similar difference. Auschwitz was industrial murder. Omarska has ‘industrial rape: intended 
planned, mass-produced, serially executed, instrumentalized. It comes close to the experiences of 
prostituted women, serially raped in what is called peacetime.’  
 
In C. MacKinnon, ‘Rape as Nationbuilding’ in C. MacKinnon (1999) 176. This quote has also been reproduced in 
the author’s recent article. This point has also been made in D. Nadj, ‘The Culturalisation of Identity in an Age of 
‘Ethnic Conflict’-Depoliticised Gender in ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence’, 15(5) International Journal 
of Human Rights, (June, 2011), 647. 
604
The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mučić  (IT-96-21-T)-(hereafter referred to as Celebići case), Trial 
Chamber Judgement, 16 November 1998, at para. 478. The Trial Chamber draws guidance on this question from 
the ICTR case of which has considered the definition of rape in the context of crimes against humanity. The 
Celebići Trial Chamber fully concurred with the Akayesu definition adopting the 'rape as a physical invasion of a 
sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances, which are coercive' as its working definition in the 
present judgment.  
605
 Three of the accused-Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mučić and Hazim Delić were charged with responsibility as 
superiors for all the criminal acts alleged in the Indictment, with the exception of count 49 on plunder of private 
property where the charge of responsibility was limited to Zdravko Mučić and Hazim Delić. At para. 330. The 
governing principles of 'command responsibility' have been incorporated into Article 7(3) of the Statute, which 
provides that: [t]he fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by 
a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.' See ‘Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (Adopted 25 May, 1993 by Resolution 827), Article 7(3).  
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previously, the thesis conceives of gender violence as perpetually at the centre of feminist 
debate, therefore, inevitably rendering it a subject of feminist critique.  
 
The case law analysed has been considered as pivotal to the development of international 
criminal law and many commentators regard it as a monumental advance for women’s human 
rights. Most importantly, the tribunal's work has been noted for its expansion of various 
definitions of sexual violence enabling these acts to be brought within the remit of the Statute, 
while its wartime sexual violence jurisprudence is deemed as having reflected women's 
participation, thus showcasing the potential for legal change through concerted feminist 
advocacy, as has already been indicated in Chapters II and III. Due to the wealth of material 
available on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the analysis excludes the focus on sexual 
crimes committed in other parts of the Former Yugoslavia.  The conflicts in Croatia, Kosovo, 
and to some extent in Macedonia are, consequently, not subject of the analysis.606  
 
  
Part III   
The Yugoslav Ideal, its Structural Collapse and the Role of External Power 
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most protracted of the conflicts that took place 
during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.  This segment aims to trace how popular legal 
and political discourses contributed to the idea of the conflict as ethno-nationalist tied to the 
idea that the various Yugoslav peoples could not live together and that their common state 
consequently had to be divided.607 This has prompted legal anthropologist Robert Hayden to 
argue that the disintegration of Yugoslavia into its warring components marked the failure of 
the imagination of the Yugoslav community.608  Without wanting to provide a revision of 
history, the thesis asserts that this is in so far a misconception, as Yugoslavia was founded on 
the notion of self-determination first espoused by former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson.609 
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 For a summary of the conflict in Kosovo, see: The Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Ďorđević (IT-05/87/1-PT), Fourth 
Amended Indictment, 9 July, 2008 at paras. 23-33. For a summary of attacks on ethnic Albanians within the 
Republic of Macedonia, see: The Prosecutor v. Boškoski & Tarčuloski (IT-04-82). 
607
 R. Hayden, ‘Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia’, 
23 American Ethnologist (Nov, 1996), 788.  
608
 Ibid at 788.  
609
 According to Jeffrey Dunoff, Steve Ratner and David Wippman, Yugoslavia represented an experiment for the 
victorious allies of World War I and a variant on President Woodrow Wilson’s idea of self-determination of 
peoples. Instead of giving each ethnic group its own state where it would be clearly dominant-as was done, for 
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A predominant feature of President Tito’s government was the creation of a Yugoslav identity, 
which throughout his time in power undermined nationalist or secessionist tendencies in the 
republics by maintaining a sense of apparent unity. This was in large part due to an inherent 
deference towards the Yugoslav constitution, as in the Yugoslav social system ‘[C]onstitutional 
norms were more important than the convictions espoused by the ruling Communist Party,’ 
according to former Yugoslav Minister of Justice and legal scholar Tibor Varady. 610 
 
The Yugoslav ideology as such was thus largely driven by a distinct sense of rationality, which 
from the state's very inception heralded a multicultural existence as the preferable option 
over a forced national identity. Thus, schools, media, theatre and newspapers were not only 
permitted, they were in fact encouraged and supported by the ruling party.611 The Communist 
regime regarded nationalism as its biggest enemy, thus, ensuring that everything considered 
nationalistic would be persecuted with all the instruments available to an authoritarian 
regime. An important consequence of this approach was the very strict prohibition of any 
attempt to protect or advocate the interests of a nation or of an ethnic group.612 Any 
structuring of ethnic groups was considered a direct attack on the party itself. The party thus 
had a monopoly over identifying and redressing ethnic grievances, and any recognition or 
representation of a group identity was perceived as a disturbance of the one party political 
system. Furthermore, structures at the national and regional level were created balancing the 
power of the Serbs, as the largest ethnic group within Yugoslavia, with those of the other 
ethnic groups meaning that the Yugoslav state formed after World War II was ‘[u]ndeniably 
based on a concept of multiethnic coexistence.’613 This notion of equality between the peoples 
                                                                                                                                           
example, in the case of Poland, the Allies combined several groups into one state. Before World War II, Yugoslavia 
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of the Former Yugoslavia, created with a view to averting ethnic tension, gained its clearest 
expression in the Constitution614 adopted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and thus acted 
as a bulwark against nationalist tendencies for decades. Since the communist regime's main 
preoccupation was with the balancing, or wherever possible, suppression of ethnic/national 
antagonisms, grievances and aspirations, they granted some degree of autonomy within 
Serbia to the predominantly Albanian region Kosovo (Kosovo Metohija) and to Vojvodina, 
which contained a large Hungarian minority, while opting for the formation of the republics of 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1974.615 It is thus undeniable that Tito's methods for 
‘unity’ ensured a largely peaceful co-existence of the state until the 1980s. 
  
As discussed in Chapter IV, following the death of Tito in 1980 state structures began to 
crumble allowing an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety to prevail with the voices of so-
called ‘nationalist’ leaders, such as Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tuđman, Ante Gotovina, Milan 
Babić, Alija Izetbegović, Momčilo Kraijšnik, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, finding fertile 
ground. But, as described previously, the rise of these political players was more a reaction of 
anxiety and clinging on to hope for a sense of familiarity and structure amidst a tide of sea 
change that enveloped Europe far beyond the borders of Yugoslavia, namely the collapse of 
Communism and the demise of the Soviet Union. Thus, the clinging on to hope found its 
expression in the support of admittedly nationalist and exclusionary ideas, but these 
ideologies were not necessarily borne out of a primordial instinct, or ‘ancient ethnic’ rivalries, 
as has so often been stated in Western popular discourses. Indeed, the thesis seeks to further 
divorce the Yugoslav conflict from the representation in much scholarly literature of the 
Balkans as a violence-prone area characterised by seething ethnic feuds and rivalries.  That 
ethnicity was not the root cause of the conflict, but rather an artificially constructed and static 
attribute of interest, has been suggested by political theorist V.P. Gagnon, who has argued 
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that the representation of the Yugoslav conflict in much of the dominant scholarship has been 
founded on a ‘myth of ethnic war’.616 As he has put it in relation to the escalation of violence 
in the region:  
‘In trying to account for this outburst, most western journalists, academics and policy-
makers have resorted to the language of the premodern: tribalism, ethnic hatreds, 
cultural inadequacy, irrationality; in short, the Balkans as the antithesis of the modern 
West. Yet, one of the most striking aspects of the wars in Yugoslavia is the extent to 
which the images purveyed in the Western press and in much of the academic 
literature are so at odds with the evidence from the ground.’617 
On this view, ethnicity is conceived of as a fluid and relational process of identification based 
on social interactions founded on complex structural factors. The violence witnessed in ‘ethnic 
conflicts’ is not meant to mobilise people by appealing to ethnicity, but is aimed at 
fundamentally altering or destroying social interactions founded on intricate structural factors. 
It is, precisely, the inability of political elites to play the ‘ethnic card’ that leads them to rely on 
massive violence in order to demobilise and homogenise previously heterogeneous political 
space and, thus, silence the voices calling for fundamental shifts in the structures of 
power.618Following Gagnon’s argument, it is therefore not altogether surprising that massive 
violence was deployed as a mechanism of destruction of previously heterogeneous 
communities that had co-existed side-by-side for decades, if not centuries, in particular 
regions such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as massive violence was the only means whereby such 
communities could be destroyed. 
In this way, the thesis provides a further contrapuntal analysis, or an alternative viewpoint to a 
debate that has frequently insisted on its own correctness, while denying other perspectives 
the chance to find expression.  As stated previously, the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict 
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cannot be divorced from its socio-political or economic context.619 While the exact economic 
factors contributing to the demise of the Yugoslav state are too complex to enumerate here, it 
is worth noting that several developments coincided to cripple the status and stature of 
Yugoslavia in international relations. As shown previously, the transformation taking place in 
Europe and the global order in the 1980s, including tougher fiscal measures adopted by 
international financial institutions towards their debtors, while institutions such as the 
European Union and the European Free Trade Association both substantially toughened their 
bargaining stance in relation to the renewal of association agreements with Yugoslavia and 
with NATO taking a more aggressive stance towards the Eastern Mediterranean, in different 
registers, led to the perception in the Yugoslav defence establishment of the West as a 
growing security threat eventually ushering in the demise of the state.620 A perhaps most 
symbolic indicator of things to come amidst the atmosphere of deepening European 
integration, was the message by the new U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia that the country was 
no longer of any strategic significance to the United States.621 
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Thus, the European Union played a crucial part in the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia. In the 
same way that the economic crisis cannot be explained without grasping the impact of 
external economic shocks imposed through suddenly stiffening IMF loans in 1982, the physical 
return of workers and émigrés who had been living abroad to participate directly in support of 
anticommunist and nationalist forces and the actions of the international community cannot 
be omitted from a structural analysis of the dissolution.622 Unlike much current legal 
scholarship, the thesis, thus, believes that the international community made the actual 
outbreak of violence more likely.623 Woodward has identified three ways by which foreign 
actors strengthened the causes of violence: by contributing to the weakness of the federal 
government and state capacity, by legitimising the people and ideas that would win, and by 
failing to do, much less understanding the hard work needed to make peace when they 
accepted the peacemakers' role.624 While, this is not the place for the thesis to produce an 
authoritative documentation of the international community's complicity in the outbreak of 
conflict, it is nonetheless crucial to point out the contextual understanding within which this 
project operates. In lieu of offering a detailed historical trajectory of the key events marking 
the Yugoslav conflict, the thesis through its analysis of select case law offers an alternative 
account of the conflict by highlighting specific situations arising out of the Bosnian context that 
most vividly embody the nature of the brutality that pervaded much of the conflict, as seen 
through a feminist lens.625 Specifically and rather uniquely, the conflict became synonymous 
with the practice of 'ethnic cleansing'626, alongside terms such as ' mass rape', 'genocidal rape' 
and 'rape as a weapon of war', as the next segment goes on to assess.627  
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Part IV  
The Terminology of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ as Central to the Framing of Sexual Violence Crimes in 
ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence  
 
As stated previously the thesis is a critical feminist analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence and the surrounding debate. How sexual violence is framed in tribunal decisions 
thus becomes crucial to the representation of identity in wartime. As has been shown, 
language and the deployment of specific terminology play a central role in how armed conflict 
is conceptualised and understood in the popular imagination. One of the most ‘hypervisible’ 
terms associated with the Yugoslav conflict in both feminist and non-feminist discourses was, 
thus, the phrase ‘ethnic cleansing’. While not a term of law, it was frequently invoked in 
feminist legal debates around the different prosecution strategies to be adopted by the ICTY in 
order to ensure that rape would be prosecuted as a form of genocide. Over time, the 
boundaries within which the concept was invoked became increasingly blurred, as some 
equated ethnic cleansing outright with genocide, while at other times the connection was less 
certain.628 The term ethnic cleansing was quickly deployed by feminists and non-feminists alike 
to describe many of the events that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This stands in contrast to 
its early origins, which conceptualised it as an administrative matter characteristic of 
                                                                                                                                           
Chamber Judgment, (16 November 1998), at paras. 104-108. It is interesting to note that the trial chamber uses 
the term 'ethnic cleansing' only in the context of Serb war strategies, never in the context of Croat, or Bosnian 
Muslim campaigns. The following paragraph, describing the Yugoslav National Army campaign illustrates this 
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notoriety under the term ‘ethnic cleansing’. Ibid at para. 213. The Final Report of the Commission of Experts has 
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former Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to 
remove persons of given groups from an area. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ is contrary to international law. Further, ‘[e]thnic 
cleansing’ has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial 
executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, 
displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians 
and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity and 
can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the 
Genocide Convention. Ibid, at para. 56.  
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behaviour displayed by Kosovo Albanians in the then Yugoslav autonomous province of 
Kosovo towards the Serbian minority.629  
 
Today, 'ethnic cleansing' as a strategy of war is exclusively associated with ethno-nationalist, 
culturalised motivations believed to have been at the heart of the Serbian war strategy with 
Serbia as the commonly identified aggressor of the conflict, whose hubristic thinking led it to 
believe that a 'Greater Serbia' on Serb-inhabited land within Bosnia-Herzegovina would 
become a reality. The term, thus, took on a life of its own and became symbiotic with the 
portrayal of the conflict itself.  The Commission of Experts has described the practice as 
follows:  
 
‘With respect to the practices by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, “ethnic 
cleansing” is commonly used as a term to describe a policy conducted in furtherance of 
political doctrines relating to “Greater Serbia”. The policy is put into practice by Serbs 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and their supporters in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. The political doctrine consists of a complex mixture of historical claims, 
grievances and fears and nationalistic aspirations and expectations, as well as religious 
and psychological elements. The doctrine is essentially based on ethnic and religious 
exclusivity and the dominance of Serbs over other groups in certain historically claimed 
areas. This doctrine breeds intolerance and suspicion of other ethnic and religious 
groups and is conducive to violence when it is politically manipulated, as has been the 
case.’630 
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The portrayal of ethnic cleansing as a practice was first mentioned by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
then Special Rapporteur of the former Commission of Human Rights, who deployed the term 
to characterise various ‘terrorising measures’ pursued during the Yugoslav war.631 The most 
common measures of terror identified by Mazowiecki and later widely used by the ICTY to 
characterise the strategies used by Bosnian Serbs soldiers, or armed civilians involved: 
robbery, terrorization and intimidation in the street632, massive deportation campaigns of the 
civilian population, detention and ill-treatment of the civil population and their transfer to 
prisons and camps, shootings of selected civilian targets and blowing-up and setting fire to 
homes, shops and places of business633, destruction of cultural and religious and monuments 
and sites634, mass displacement of communities635, and discrimination of refugees on the basis 
of ethnic difference.  Most importantly for purposes of the thesis, the report identified rape 
and other forms of sexual abuse, such as castration as specific elements of ethnic cleansing.636 
This led to the finding by the Commission of Experts that rape had been used most frequently 
against women of different ethnic origin, and that it had been committed systematically.637 
These findings also gave rise to the suggestion that special women’s camps had been 
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established for the purpose of sexual violence, and that rape had been committed with the 




The Camp as the Space of ‘Bare Life’ 
 
The camp as a specific political-juridical structure is of particular interest to the thesis, as it is 
within so-called ‘rape camps’, although not exclusively, where many of the crimes of a sexual 
nature against women took place. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has extensively 
theorised the camp as the place in which the most absolute conditio inhumana ever to appear 
on Earth has been realised. Agamben has called the camp the ‘hidden matrix and nomos of the 
political space in which we still live.’639 He has linked the establishment of the camp as the site 
of violence to the state of exception, which is not born out of ordinary law, but is rather the 
space in which the law is suspended. It is thus in the suspension of the law, or in the creation 
of martial law, that we find the constitutive nexus between the state of exception and the 
concentration camp, as occurred in Prussia in the mid-nineteenth century with the institution 
of the Schutzhaft (protective custody), which provided the juridical foundation for the 
internment of individuals, regardless of any relevant criminal behaviour and exclusively to 
avoid threats to the security of the state.640 The derivation of the Nazi Lager can be traced 
                                            
638
 This pattern of ‘women’s camps’ or ‘rape camps’ led to the declaration of the UN Security Council in its 
Resolution 798 (1992) on 18 December, 1992 UN Doc. S/RES/798 (1992) that it was ‘appalled by reports of the 
massive, organized, and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina’, and demanded that ‘all detention camps, in particular camps for women, should be immediately 
closed.’ This passage has decidedly structuralist overtones in its portrayal of the camps as ‘women’s camps’, thus 
creating the impression so roundly criticised by Halley of the Yugoslav conflict being a ‘war against women’, 
which this thesis has also discredited. As for the use of rape as a strategy of impregnating women, see for 
example, Rape and Sexual Abuses by Armed Forces, Amnesty International, January 1993, AI Index: EUR 63/01/93, 
at 5.  
639
 G. Agamben, ‘What is a Camp?’ in Means Without an End: Notes on Politics, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), 37.  
640
 As Agamben has noted, the Schutzhaft was a juridical institution of Prussian derivation that Nazi jurists 
sometimes used as a measure of preventive policing. The camps were at first officially described by the SS as ‘re-
education camps’, but they were soon renamed as ‘concentration camps’ taking the name from camps set up by 
the British during the Boer War (1899-1902) to ‘concentrate’ Boer farming families during the conflict. See: 
http://reocities.com/vienna/strasse/8514/holocaust.html. The legal origin of the term Schutzhaft lies in Prussian 
law on the state of siege that was passed in June 4, 1851 and was subsequently extended to the whole of 
Germany, except for Bavaria, in 1871, as well as the earlier Prussian law on the ‘protection of personal freedom’ 
(Schutz der persönlichen Freiheit) that was passed on February 12, 1850. Both these laws were extensively used 
during World War I. It was also thanks to the Schutzhaft that in May 1933 Heinrich Himmler was able to create a 
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back directly to the institution of the Schutzhaft, which provided the precedent for interning 
people without cause or reason.641 
 
Following the work of Agamben, the thesis understands the camp as ‘the space that opens up 
when the state of exception starts to become the rule’642. In it, the state of exception, which 
was essentially a temporal suspension of the state of law, acquires a permanent spatial 
arrangement that, as such, remains constantly outside the normal state of law.643 Agamben’s 
theorisation on the state of exception and the camp as its embodiment is of central 
importance to this chapter, as the camp epitomises the tragedy of the Yugoslav conflict more 
vividly than any other site of violence. The parallels of what he describes in relation to the 
atrocities committed in the Nazi Lagers during World War II are striking when reflected against 
the atrocities that marked the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The events that took place inside 
the camps will always be beyond human comprehension, but what is more crucial is the 
understanding that the camp as the structure in which the state of exception is manifestly 
realised, in other words the camp as the space in which the law is completely suspended, is 
today no longer an aberration but the norm. As Agamben argues, the camp is the space in 
which the people, who enter it, move about in a zone of distinction and indistinction between 
the outside and the inside; it is the space in which its inhabitants have been stripped of every 
political status and reduced completely to naked life.  Thus, the camp is also the most absolute 
biopolitical space that has ever been realised- a space in which power confronts nothing other 
than pure biological life without any mediation. The camp is then the paradigm itself of 
political space in which politics becomes biopolitics and the homo sacer becomes 
indistinguishable from the citizen. 644 
 
                                                                                                                                           
‘concentration camp for political prisoners’ at Dachau and to immediately entrust it to the SS, as this suspension 
of the law allowed him to place it outside of the jurisdiction of the criminal law, as well as prison law, with which 
it neither then or later had anything to do with.  Agamben (2000), at 38.9.   
641
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provided the precedent for interning people without cause or reason. With the creation of the  first 
concentration camp in Dachau in May 1933, which occurred in a space of exception in which the law had been 
suspended, soon more camps were added (such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen) that remained virtually 
always operative. The number of inmates varied at times and during certain periods (in particular between 1935 
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The atrocities committed in so-called ‘rape’ or ‘death camps’ became a synonymous feature of 
the Yugoslav conflict.645 The deployment of certain terminology to describe the events has, 
moreover, become central to the manner in which the conflict has been portrayed in the 
public discourse taking on a life of its own and heavily influencing the legal modalities through 
which a majority of cases have been prosecuted. Determinations about those who carried 
responsibility for the oversight of the camps became crucial in framing culpability, and in 
inscribing victimhood on their inmates. These debates were reflective of a wider trend in 
popular discourses around the Yugoslav conflict of framing it as a ‘uniquely’ heinous conflict, a 
metaphor for the barbaric and tribalist proclivities of the region and its inhabitants, which 
became central to the way the conflict was depoliticised in the wider scholarship. But as 
Agamben has noted,   
 
‘The state of exception, which used to be essentially a temporary suspension of the 
order, becomes now a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by that naked life 
that increasingly cannot be inscribed into that order. The increasingly widening gap 
between birth (naked life) and nation-state is the new fact of the politics of our time 
and what we are calling  “camp” is this disparity.’646  
 
In other words, the camp as a ‘dislocating localization’ is the hidden matrix of the politics in 
which we still live, it is now firmly inside the political system, it is the new biopolitical nomos of 
the planet. This perspective directly contradicts the labels commonly associated with the 
Yugoslav conflict, which have rendered it a unique phenomenon in late modernity. Agamben 
in this way provides a counterargument to the frequently essentialised and deeply culturalised 
stereotypes associated with the Balkans as a region, while at the same time showing the 
brutality of the camp as a space in which little, if no agency is ever possible, given that those 
who perpetrate atrocities on the inside can rely on the suspension of the law to absolve them 
from any sense of culpability. That this is now a regular state of affairs, as evidenced by the 
discriminatory treatment of the Roma, or the treatment of African migrants fleeing from 
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 The term ‘rape camp’ has been used by some commentators, despite not appearing in the judgements. See for 
example Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy in International 
Courts and Tribunals, 88 Minnesota Law Review (2003-2004), 30. For a critique of the deployment of this 
terminology see K. Engle (2005), 778.  
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 Agamben (2000) at 42.3.  
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political unrest in their home countries into EU member states, such as Italy, lends Agamben’s 
writings additional potency. This is a challenging perspective, as it defies the common 
perception that latent ethnic divisions or perceived cultural attributes lie at the root of 
conflict. It is instead late modernity, which normalises the state of exception and divides 





i) The Findings of the Commission of Experts 
Eighty percent of the rapes committed during the Yugoslav conflict are said to have occurred 
in detention camps. The Commission early on identified Bosnian Serbs as operating the camps, 
where grave breaches and other violations of international humanitarian law, including killing, 
torture and rape had reportedly occurred on a large scale.647 The camps ranged in size from 
small detention centres designed to temporarily house a few prisoners to camps that housed a 
large number of prisoners with varying durations and purposes and under different control.648 
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 According to the Commission, there were a total of 715 camps, most of which were subsequently closed. Of 
the 715 camps, 237 were operated by Bosnian Serbs and the former Republic of Yugoslavia; 89 were operated by 
the Government and army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; 77 were operated by Bosnian Croats, the Government of 
Croatia, the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council; 4 were operated jointly by the Bosnian 
Government and Bosnian Croats, and there were another 308 camps for which it was not definitively established 
under whose control they were. See: Final Report of the Commission of Experts (Yugoslavia), Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, Part IV Substantive Findings, part E, at para. 
55.  
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 As the Final Report states, ‘Owing to the nature of the several conflicts and the military structure of the 
warring factions, the control of the camps varies. At different points in time, the same camp may be controlled by 
the army, the central Government, local and police authorities, the police, various military groups and local 
armed civilians. Ibid at paras. 110-128, also at annex III. The use of pre-existing structures, such as municipal 
buildings, administrative offices, schools, sports arenas within the occupied areas and larger facilities on the 
outskirts of those areas, such as factories and warehouses, was specifically designed to facilitate control of these 
structures, as the use of pre-existing facilities allowed for quick and easy control and displacement of the 
targeted population of a conquered geographical region by one of the warring factions. As the Report further 
notes, the camps were frequently used to detain the civilian population that has been forcibly replaced from 
particular regions. The detention is either preceded or followed by armed engagements in these regions. 
Ethnicity is invoked in this context in relation to the finding that ‘whole sale detention of persons from another 
ethnic or religious group occurs even in situations in which there is nothing to suggest that internment of civilians 
is necessary for any valid legal purpose. Ibid at paras. 129-150 and annex III).Moreover, in pattern b) the Report 
identifies the purpose of the different facilities as having specific purposes such as mass killing, torture, rape, and 
exchange and holding of civilian prisoners. Ibid at paras. 231-252 and annexes IX and IX.A.  Interestingly in pattern 
J, the Report notes that at the larger camps, beatings, more severe torture and killings escalate when there has 
been a Bosnian Serb military setback and when there are Serb casualties. The Report does not seem to identify an 
identical occurrence when the setback is on the Croatian or Muslim side, and when the casualties are Serbs. Ibid 
at point j). 
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With respect to the camps established in Bosnia-Herzegovina under Bosnian Serb control, the 
Commission linked this war strategy to broader political motives inextricably tied to ethnic 
identity stating that:  
 
‘The Bosnian Serbs use camps to facilitate territorial and political control of a 
geographic region and to expel and eliminate other ethnic and religious populations 
from that area.’649  
 
This links the space of the camp to the practice and policy of ethnic cleansing, as the 
Commission ascertained in its findings that camps are ultimately “intended to achieve ‘ethnic 
cleansing’”.650  The common methodology preceding the rapes was of women being selected 
randomly at night with rapes being carried out in a manner that would instil terror in the 
women’s prisoner population.651 In its identification of the methodologies adopted, the 
Commission implied that women did not have much agency in either choosing to obey orders, 
or in resisting them, as presumably this would have resulted in their deaths. Early on, thus, in 
the texts produced by international institutions rape was conceived of as part of a broader 
strategy designed to instil terror and fear in the prison population. But by seeing rape in this 
industrialised, if not entirely systematic fashion the danger is that the act of individual rape 
could lose meaning as a gender-based crime and instead mutate into just another tactic of 
terror. It is also interesting to remark that rape as a tactic designed to instil terror in the 
female prison population suggests that it would not necessarily have had the same impact on 
male witnesses. The report also noted that the group most targeted for sexual assault 
consisted of young women between the ages of 13 and 35, and that mothers of young children 
were often raped in front of their children and were threatened with the death of their 
children, if they did not submit to being raped.652 This is significant from the critical feminist 
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 Ibid at para. 57, point 3.  
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 Ibid at paras. 129-150 and 151-182 and annex V.  
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 Women and children and men over the age of 60 were usually separated from other detainees and taken to 
separate camps.  
652
 As the Report outlines, a typical pattern would be an age separation of young and older women with the 
former taken to camps where they were raped several times a day, for many days, often by more than one man. 
Many of these women would disappear, or they would be returned to the camps after having been raped and 
‘brutalized’ only to be replaced by younger women. It is interesting to note here that the psychological impact of 
the rape becomes central to the way in which the physical impact of the rape on the women is construed. Ibid at 
paras. 231-252,at point o). 
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perspective adopted by this thesis, as it appears that the woman here is constructed through 
the subjectivity of the mother, a construction that Chapter VI goes on to critique.  
 
 
ii) Patterns of Rape and the Centrality of Ethnicity 
A series of interviews was carried out by the Commission in Croatia and Slovenia in March 
1994 for which 146 witnesses from Bosnia and Herzegovina were interviewed. 31 of those 
interviewed had been raped, and two had been suspected by the Commission to have been 
raped, but were unwilling to speak of their own experiences.653 The information gathered was 
specifically based on 223 interviews that were made available to the Prosecutor of the ICTY.654 
As a result, five distinct patterns of rape and sexual assault could be identified based upon the 
Commission’s database and the interviews conducted.  
 
Pattern I: This was identified as taking place before any widespread or generalised fighting 
broke out in the region. It typically involved individuals or small groups, who committed sexual 
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 Final Report of the Commission of Experts (Yugoslavia), Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, Part IV Substantive Findings, part F at para. 65. It is also remarkable to note 
that only one of the men from Bosnia and Herzegovina interviewed was a victim of sexual assault committed in a 
detention facility. The Report also includes statistics on where the rapes took place finding that among the 
women 66 had been raped in their homes, while 13 had been raped while in detention. Among the additional 
male and female interviewees, there were 21 witnesses to additional cases of rape or sexual assaults meaning 
that a total number of 55 persons in the pilot study had either been victims or witnesses to rape or sexual assault. 
A large number of the women-77 ‘victim-witnesses’ interviewed were from Croatia, of whom 11 had been victims 
of rape. In addition, there were six men from Croatia, who had been victims of sexual assault. Interestingly, in the 
case of all but one man, the violations occurred predominantly in a detention context, whereas in the case of the 
women, seven had been raped in their own homes. There is thus an interesting dichotomy between the rape of 
men as being performed in the public space, and the rape of women as confined to the private sphere of the 
home even in times of armed conflict. But the rape of women in their own homes could also suggest that the 
boundaries of agency, choice and consent could be further blurred, as is perhaps more difficult to ascertain 
whether consent was freely given or not within the confines of the home, in which presumably there is not the 
same level of terror and intimidation as in a camp-like environment. However, the Commission concluded that 
the women raped in their homes had been subjected to multiple and/or gang rapes involving up to eight soldiers 
in yet another strategy emblematic of the conflict. Such constructions have been strongly criticised by feminist 
scholars, as outlined in Chapter II. Moreover, of the four women raped in detention, one was raped on almost 
daily basis thus adding a systematic, planned quality to the rapes.  Among the other men and women interviewed 
from Croatia, nine were witnesses to additional cases of rape, or sexual assault thus involving a total of 27 
persons from Croatia, who were either victims of or witnesses to rape and sexual assault. Ibid at paras. 66 and 67.  
654
 Although there had been insufficient time between the end of the interview process, which had commenced 
on 31 March, 1994 and was finalised in the Final Report on 30 April, 1994 for a detailed analysis to be conducted, 
the information gathered by the Commission supported the findings that five distinct patterns of rape and sexual 
assault could be identified based upon its database and the interviews conducted. Ibid at paras. 67-70.  
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assault in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target ethnic group.655 The 
Commission chose to illustrate this pattern through the interview of a gang-raped woman, 
who had been raped by eight men in front of her six-year old sister and her five-month old 
daughter for, as it appears ethnic reasons, as one of the men involved was instructed to rape 
her as she was ‘an Ustaša’.656 Moreover, when she reported the crime to the local authorities 
the reply was that nothing could be done as she was Croat. Thus, the Commission presented 
the first pattern of relatively small-scale violence through the instrumentalisation of the most 
violent manifestation of rape, namely ‘gang rape’, which in turn was portrayed through an 
ethnic lens, as the violence seemingly originated in the ethnic identity of the victim.  
 
Pattern II: This involved individuals or small groups committing sexual assaults in conjunction 
with fighting in an area, often including the rape of women in public.657 During the attacks of 
towns and villages, forces would round up the population and then divide it by sex and age. 
Some women were raped in their homes, as the attacking forces secured the area, while 
others were raped publicly following which they were later transported to camps. This pattern 
is demonstrable in most of the case law addressed by the thesis.  
  
Pattern III: This concerned the sexual assault of people in detention mainly because 
individuals or groups had easy access to their targets.  Once the local population had been 
rounded up, men were either executed or sent off to camps, while women were sent off to 
separate camps generally.658 This pattern also involved numerous allegations of gang rape, 
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 The common elements underlying this pattern are described as involving growing tension in area leading 
members of different ethnic groups to control the regional government and beginning to terrorise their 
neighbours. Typically, this would involve two or more men breaking into a house, intimidating the residents, 
stealing their property, beating them and often raping the women present. As the Commission describes it, often 
there would be a ‘gang atmosphere’, where the abuses are part of the same event and all the attackers 
participate, even if they do not sexually assault the victim. Ibid at para. 70. 
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 ‘The ‘Ustaša’ movement was created by the  former leader of the Croatian Party of the Right, Ante Pavelić, 
who in 1929 following trials against prominent member of the Croatian Peasant Party fled Croatia to form the 
fascist Ustasha (Insurgent) movement in Mussolini’s Italy. During the Second World War, Pavelić’s Ustaša 
followers treated the Serbs as the Nazis treated the Jews, as vermin to be exterminated. This practice was not 
imposed by the occupying forces, but sprang out of the Ustasha’s own ideology, which incorporated a conception 
of Croats as a pure Aryan race. For a detailed account of some of the practices deployed by the Ustašas against 
the Serb population of Yugoslavia see: L. Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), at 53 and 78.  
657
 Ibid at para. 70.  
658
 As the Commission outlines, soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries and even civilians were allowed to enter the 
camps, pick out the women, take them away and rape them and then either kill them or return them to the site.  
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commonly accompanied by beatings and torture.659 The Commission for the first time also 
identified sexual violence against men based on interviews conducted with 15 people, whose 
major allegations related to the same detention camp-there were numerous male witnesses, 
who attested to sexual violence in the camps, while reportedly all the women had been 
raped.660 This pattern is significant for the imputation of superior command responsibility, as 
the women were sometimes gang raped in the presence of the camp commander, who had 
allowed guards from the external ring of security around the camp, as well as soldiers who 
were strangers to the camp access for the specific purpose of rape.661 With respect to the 
sexual assaults on men, it was reported that prisoners were forced to bite other prisoners’ 
genitals, while ten of those interviewed had witnessed deaths by torture and seven of the 
group had survived or witnessed mass executions.662 
 
Pattern IV: Added another dimension of terror to sexual violence, as it identified individuals or 
groups committing rapes against women for the purpose of terrorising or humiliating them, 
often as part of the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’. This pattern perhaps most starkly illustrates 
the ethnic dimension accompanying sexual violence, thus serving as precursor to the way 
sexual violence would later be interpreted in the judgements.663 Some captors, moreover, 
stated that they had raped women for the purpose of impregnating them presumably to 
change the ethnic composition of the offspring. Thus, pregnant women were detained until it 
was too late for an abortion.664 
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 According to survivors’ accounts, women were also raped in front of other internees, or that other internees 
were forced to sexually abuse each other. Ibid at para. 70. 
660
 The Commission refers to the women as ‘women victims’, whereas the men are referred to neutrally.  
661
 In one case, according to witness testimony, a woman died after being in a coma for a week as a result of the 
‘sadistic rapes’ by guards. Ibid. 
662
 Further incidents collected by the Commission involved prisoners being lined up naked, while Serb women 
from outside undressed in front of male prisoners. According to witness testimony, if a prisoner was found to 
have an erection, his penis was cut off, and it was reported that a Serb woman took such a measure in one 
instance, thus adding an ethnic dimension to the atrocity. Moreover, another ex-detainee told of having electric 
shocks administered to his scrotum, and of seeing and father and son, who shared his cell being forced by camp 
guards to perform sex acts on each other. Ibid at para. 70.  
663
 But as the Commission is careful to point out, survivors of the camps felt that they had been detained for the 
specific purpose of being raped, as evidence suggested that all of the women had been raped quite frequently, 
and often in the presence of other internees. These rapes were frequently accompanied by beatings and torture.  
664
 The Commission highlights this pattern through the interview with a Muslim woman, who had been raped by 
her neighbour near her village for six months for the ostensible purpose of giving birth to a ‘chetnik’ boy, who 
would then be groomed to kill Muslims when he grew up. 
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Pattern V: This involved the detention of women in hotels or similar facilities for the allegedly 
sole purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers, rather than causing a reaction in the women, as 
the Commission puts it rather cryptically. What differentiated this pattern from the foregoing 
ones was that women were reportedly more often killed than exchanged, unlike women in 
other camps, and that the women were of mixed ethnicity.665 
 
The Commission found that the largest number of reported victims had been Bosnian 
Muslims, and the largest number of alleged perpetrators Bosnian Serbs. Interestingly, there 
had been few reports of rape and sexual assault between members of the same ethnic 
group.666 This led the Commission to conclude that a ‘systematic rape policy’ existed in certain 
areas, but that it remained to be proven whether such overall policy existed, which was to 
apply to all non-Serbs. Moreover, it found that some level of organisation and group activity 
were required to carry out many of the rapes suggesting that rape and sexual assault should 
be examined in the context of the practice of ‘ethnic cleaning’, while finding that grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions had occurred throughout the territory, alongside 
numerous other violations of international humanitarian law.667 As stated previously, these 
findings and legal modalities influenced much of the subsequent adjudication of wartime 
sexual violence cases. The next segment thus overviews in detail the most significant ICTY 
wartime sexual violence cases adjudicated upon to date. To some extent these have already 
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 According to one of the witnesses, all women were raped when the soldiers returned from the front line every 
15 days, and they were compelled to oblige because the women in another camp had reportedly been exhausted. 
Ibid at para. 70.  
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 As the Commission summarises, in Bosnia, some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases committed by 
Serbs, mostly against Muslims, are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct without evidence of 
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Commission as not appearing to be random, but as indicative of a policy of encouraging rape supported by a 
deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the 
personnel under their authority. Ibid, at para. 71.  
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The Tadić Case: Paving the Way for the Inclusion of Specific References to Sexual Violence 
 
The significance of the Tadić case for the development of contemporary international criminal 
law cannot be overstated, as has been shown earlier. It was expected to be the first 
international criminal case in history to prosecute rape separately as a war crime, and not 
solely in conjunction with other crimes.668 Moreover, the case paved the way for the future 
inclusion and specific reference to sexual violence in the indictments presented at trial, and 
perhaps most significantly it defined the scope of customary international law pertaining to 
internal and international armed conflict, the applicability of crimes against humanity, and the 
scope of the grave breaches to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It thus reconceptualised the 
principal international humanitarian law treaties that regulate contemporary armed conflicts, 
and recognised them as comprising customary international law. 669 It was also the Tadić 
decision that established that international humanitarian law increasingly governs non-
international, or internal armed conflict alongside international armed conflict.670 Moreover, it 
produced findings regarding the legitimacy of the tribunal and made the armed conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia more justiciable by defining it as partly international in scope.671 It also 
extensively developed the joint criminal enterprise theory of responsibility with the Appeals 
Chamber having first articulated the theory based largely on jurisprudence derived from the 
post-World War II Nuremberg Trials.672 From a gender perspective, the case was deemed 
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 See for example S. Murphy, ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
Tribunals: Current Status', 93 American Journal of International Law, (1999), 101; Askin (2003), 288.  
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 As Kirsten Campbell describes it, the final indictment ‘[a]rticulates the legal wrong that the court adjudicates.’ 
The indictment is thus of significance in delineating the legal harm under adjudication. In K. Campbell, ‘The 
Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’, 1 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2007), 421.  
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 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2. Oct. 1995 
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demonstrate that the ‘internationalisation’ of the armed conflict also had implications for the manner in which 
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international and non-international armed conflict provided in Tadić, see: D. Kritsiotis, 'The Tremors of Tadić’, 43 
Israel Law Review (2010), 262.  
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 For a discussion see: I. Bantekas & S. Nash., International Criminal Law, (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2003); I 
Bantekas & S. Nash, International Criminal Law, (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).  
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 See Tadić, ( IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber Judgement, 15 July 1999.  
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pivotal for the reclassification of rape and other forms of sexual violence as priority crimes in 
the ICTY.673 
 
i) The First Signs of Feminist Governmentality 
One of the most remarkable illustrations of feminist intervention and subsequent 
prosecutorial responsiveness occurred in the very first trial of the ICTY. Thus, Judge Odio-
Benito-described as the only woman on the ICTY trial court panel-questioned the Prosecutor 
on the treatment of rape as a lesser offence than other crimes directed predominantly against 
men, such as beatings. This led Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone to promptly write a letter 
to several feminists, who had previously issued an amicus curiae brief on the same matter.674 
In the letter Goldstone acknowledged that the affidavit did not sufficiently reflect the ICTY's 
policy of equating rape with other serious violations of international law and went on to 
promise that rape and other sexual assaults would be prosecuted under the Statute's 
provisions for torture, inhumane treatment, wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury 
to body, inhumane acts, alongside other provisions that adequately encompassed the nature 
of the acts committed and the intent formulated.'675 Goldstone’s relenting thus signalled that 
feminists had finally gotten a purchase on the events, as they were successful in winning him 
over for their cause. His endorsement of feminist organisational strategies became evident in 
his later reflections on his time as Chief Prosecutor. As he has put it:  
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 The background to this is former Prosecutor Richard Goldstone's decision to seek transfer of jurisdiction for 
Tadić from a German court to the ICTY. At the time, the affidavit gave 'decidedly secondary consideration' to the 
conditions affecting women and to the severity of rape, for example treating it as a less serious offence than 
beatings. Quite poignantly, the affidavit described an episode in which one man was forced to bite off the testicle 
of another as 'what was worse', presumably then the rapes also alleged. I quote here from Halley's excellent 
article on some of the background stories, which are reflective of entrenched institutional attitudes towards 
wartime sexual violence prosecution prompting later feminist intervention. For a critical analysis of the feminist 
interventions leading to the shift in attitude towards the prosecution of wartime sexual violence in the Tadić case, 
see J. Halley (2008-2009), at 13-15.  
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 The feminist advocacy groups were all of US-origin and included the International Women's Human Rights 
Clinic, the Harvard Human Rights Program, and the Jacob Blaustein Institute. The aim of the affidavits issued by 
these institutions was to warn against the trivialisation of gender-based violence in international criminal 
proceedings, and to urge the ICTY to adopt a more serious, thus punitive approach toward the prosecution of 
such offences. For an overview of some of the background feminist advocacy see: R. Copelon, ‘Surfacing Gender: 
Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in International Humanitarian Law’, 5 Hastings Women's Law Journal (1994),  
at 243, 253-254. 
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 This is taken from Copelon's article quoting the letter from Justice Richard Goldstone, Prosecutor to Rhonda 
Copelon, Felice Gaer & Jennifer Green (Nov., 22, 1994). Ibid at 253-254 
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‘There has been substantial progressive development of humanitarian law as a 
consequence of the establishment of the ICTY. Of real importance are the 
developments in the law with respect to gender offenses. From my first week in office, 
from the middle of August 1994 onwards, I began to be besieged with petitions and 
letters, mainly from women’s groups, but also from human rights groups generally, 
from many European countries, the United States and Canada, and also from non-
governmental organizations in the former Yugoslavia. Letters and petitions expressing 
concern and begging for attention, adequate attention, to be given to gender-related 
crime, especially systematic rape as a war crime. Certainly, if any campaign worked, 
this one worked in my case….’676 
 
As Janet Halley has commented rather sardonically, this episode of feminist intervention is 
both a story of ‘intense legal drama’, a moment from which feminist activism emerged from 
the sidelines with ‘spectacular sudden success.’ Thus, feminism had arrived, ‘active and alert, 
in the persons of Judge Odio Benito, Judge Pillay and the NGOs…..but it was scrambling for a 
place at the table.’677  This intervention certainly illustrated that feminist activism was no 
longer an aberration, or an organisational phenomenon on the margins, as by the time of the 
negotiations for the drafting of the Rome Statute, feminists had formed NGOs with highly 
articulate and explicitly feminist agendas for the prosecution and advocacy of gender-based 
causes. 
 
ii) The ‘Globalisation of Human Rights’ 
The Tadić case, further, exemplified the ‘globalisation of human rights’ by showcasing the 
increasing penetration of international law into the domestic sphere of national legal systems. 
Tadić was arrested in Germany following request of the Prosecutor under Rule 9 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. Under Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the court 
has the right to ask domestic courts, such as the German courts, to defer to the competence of 
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 R. Goldstone, ‘The United Nations’ War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment’, 12 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law (1997), 227, 231.  
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 The reference to Judge Pillay is related to her instrumental role as the only woman on the Tribunal in the 
Akayesu case. In Halley (2008-2009), at 17.  
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the tribunal.678 Germany had indicted Tadić for war crimes in the Balkans prior to turning him 
over to the ICTY, thus, his extradition to The Hague on the basis of ‘crimes against humanity’ 
jurisdiction appears to have constituted and ‘act of solidarity’.679 The act of extradition also 
exemplifies the promotion of normative instantiations in the name of human rights, 
independent of the affected state, in the name of promoting a ‘global rule of law and justice.’ 
As Ruti Teitel has argued, the contemporary globalisation of rights enforcement, however 
sporadic, challenges the immediate post-war emphasis on international institutions, as well as 
the more particularist, local understandings of justice.680  
 
To sum up, the Tadić trial is of monumental significance from a range of perspectives, 
including for the far-reaching precedent it set for the future prosecution of gender-based 
crimes under international law.  In reaching its verdict, the ICTY Trial Chamber included 
specific references to sexual violence and convicted Tadić of crimes of a sexual nature. It also 
allowed for anonymous testimony of three victims of sexual assault to be brought forward 
without having their identities disclosed to Tadić or his counsel.681 However, the trial is also 
emblematic of the difficulties inherent in sexual violence prosecutions, as even anonymity 
proved insufficient for a victim identified as ‘F’. Tadić had been charged with the rape of this 
prisoner at the Omarska camp, but as soon as the proceedings began, the rape charges were 
dropped because victim ‘F’ was too afraid to testify.682 This shows that despite all the 
successes achieved in instituting protective measures for victims, there were still inadequacies 
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iii) The Facts and Background  
The case dates back to the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 1992, when Bosnian 
Serb forces attacked Bosnian Muslims and Croat population centres in the municipality of 
Prijedor.683 As part of the attack, most of the population was forced from their homes and 
more than 3,000 people were confined to detention in the Omarska camp, a former mining 
complex. The accused Duško Tadić, a low-ranking official at the Omarska camp and member of 
the Bosnian Serb forces operating in Prijedor, participated in killings outside Omarska camp 
and acted as one of the ringleaders. About three weeks after the Serb forces took control of 
the government authority in the region they began interning prisoners in the Omarska camp 
while continuing to round up Muslims and Croats in surrounding towns. Amongst the 
detainees were many local Muslim and Croat intellectuals, professionals and political 
leaders.684  
 
Of the approximately 3,000 prisoners there were approximately 40 women in the camp, while 
the other prisoners were men.685 Most of the women were confined to the administration 
building where most of the interrogations took place. Living conditions were described by the 
prosecution as brutal with overcrowding a common feature, as well as little or no facilities for 
personal hygiene provided for the prisoners.686 Prisoners had no change of clothing, no 
bedding and received no medical care. Moreover, severe beatings were commonplace with 
camp guards physically abusing prisoners, using all types of weapons during these beatings, 
including wooden batons, metal rods and tools, rifle butts and knives amongst others.687 Both 
female and male prisoners were beaten, tortured, raped, sexually assaulted, and humiliated. 
Many, some of whose identities were never established, did not survive the camps. After 
collecting thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in late May 1992, Serbian groups including 
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 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Initial Indictment, (IT-94-1-I) (13 Feb, 1995), at para. 1. This is also consistent with the 
findings of the Final Report of the Commission for Experts, which noted as a common pattern underlying the 
wartime tactics deployed by the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict that during the rounding-up process of local 
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Duško Tadić later entered villages in which Muslim and Croat residents had remained during 
the siege continuing to kill villagers and driving others away from their homes.  
 
 
iv) Wartime Sexual Violence Charges  
Many parts of the second amended indictment addressed sexual violence against females and 
males.688 They alleged that Tadić, a Serb, had participated in the killing and ‘maltreatment’ of 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats within and outside Omarska camp.689  As stated, approximately 
forty women were in Omarska, where both female and male prisoners were ‘beaten, tortured, 
raped, sexually assaulted and humiliated’.690 Similarly, in the Trnopolje camp the indictment 
alleged that female detainees had been subjected to sexual violence.691 Count 1 of the 
indictment charged Tadić with a crime against humanity, specifically with persecution on 
political, racial, and/ or religious grounds for taking part in a ‘campaign of terror, which 
included killings, torture, sexual assaults, and other physical and psychological abuse’.692 He 
was also charged for his participation in the torture of more than 12 female detainees, 
including several ‘gang rapes.’693 Counts 2-4 alleged that Tadić had subjected victim F to 
‘forcible sexual intercourse’ inside one of the buildings attached to the Omarska camp, 
thereby, causing great suffering to her as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions 
recognised by Article 2(c) of the Statute of the Tribunal.694 For these acts he was charged with 
a grave breach for inhuman treatment (Count 2), ‘forcible sexual intercourse’ as inhuman 
treatment (Count 2) and a violation of the laws or customs of war recognised by Article 3 of 
the Statute and Article 3(1) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,695 and rape as a crime against 
humanity (Count 4) as recognised by Article 5(g) and 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. To prove a crime 
against humanity for purposes of Article 5, the prosecution had to demonstrate that the 
alleged acts or omissions were part of a ‘widespread or large-scale or systematic attack 
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689
 Ibid at para. 1 
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directed against a civilian population’, specifically the Muslim and Croat populations of the 
Prijedor municipality.696  
 
v) Opinion and Judgement 
Tadić was found guilty of his participation in a general, widespread and systematic campaign 
that included beatings, torture, sexual assaults, and other physical and psychological abuse 
directed at the non-Serb population in the Prijedor region.697 He was found guilty of crimes 
against humanity for criminal acts of persecution including crimes of sexual violence such as 
rape, which were considered constituent elements of a widespread or systematic campaign of 
terror against the civilian population. But the prosecution did not have to prove that rape itself 
was widespread or systematic, it only had to show it as one of many types of crimes 
committed on a widespread or systematic basis underlying the aggressor's campaign of 
terror.698  Moreover, the Trial Chamber did not analyse gender-based discrimination as a form 
of persecution, but only focused on persecution on religious or political grounds.699 The 
chamber signalled a potential limitation to the prosecution of gender-based crimes by holding 
that while persecution was a required element of crimes against humanity, it was more 
important to highlight the ethnic dimensions of the crime, rather than to address its gendered 
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 In a passage synonymous with the overall portrayal of the Yugoslav conflict as embedded in long-standing 
ethnic tension and hostility, the ICTY describes the immediate events leading to outbreak of the conflict as 
follows: 'In opština Prijedor during the days following the take-over of the town of Prijedor by JNA forces on April 
30, 1992...Serb nationalist propaganda intensified. The need for the ‘awakening of the Serb people’ was stressed 
and derogatory remarks against non-Serbs increased. Muslim leaders who attempted to speak on the radio were 
barred while SDS leaders had free access to it. Even more propaganda against Muslims and Croats began in 
earnest after an incident in the Hambarine region on May 22, 1992. Examples include statements that a Croat 
doctor castrated newborn Serb boys and was performing sterilisation surgery on Serb women and that a Muslim 
doctor intentionally administered the wrong drug in an attempt to kill his Serb colleague.’  This description thus 
sets the tone for a visualisation of the events in the run up to the Yugoslav conflict being ethnically motivated 
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Tadić, (IT94-1-T), Opinion and Judgement, (IT-94-1-T) (7 May 1997), at para 93. 
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elements. It did, however, accept that rape may come within the purview of possible 
persecutorial acts in certain situations.700 Moreover, charge 5 referred to other abuses of a 
sexual nature, namely the beating of several male prisoners while ordering them to perform 
sexual acts upon each other, amounting to gross and humiliating treatment and therefore to 
torture.701  
 
The court also noted that during the confinement in the camps, ‘both male and female 
prisoners were subjected to severe mistreatment, which included beatings, sexual assaults, 
torture and executions’.702 Moreover, women at Omarska camp were ‘routinely called out of 
their rooms at night and raped.’703 This statement was supported by testimony of a medical 
worker in Trnopolje, who personalised the rape through a description of its imputed impact on 
the victims in the following way:  
 
‘The very act of rape, in my opinion,-I spoke to these people, I observed their reactions-
it had a terrible effect on them. They could, perhaps, explain it to themselves when 
somebody steals something from them, or even beatings or even killings. Somehow, 
they sort of accepted it in some way, but when the rapes started they lost all hope. 
Until then they had the hope that this war could pass, that everything would quieten 
down. When the rapes started, everybody lost hope, everybody in the camp, men and 
women. There was such fear, horrible.’704  
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 The 1996 I.L.C. Draft Code the chamber states that there is now a recognition in international criminal law that 
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This quote underlines the decision’s potency, as the Trial Chamber instrumentalised gender-
based violence as an act constitutive of personal feeling exceeding all other types of harm. It 
also abstracted the political context in which these acts were committed by conceptualising 
rape as a uniquely terrifying experience that reiterates the victim’s inferiority vis-à-vis the 
assailant precluding any possibility of agency. The tribunal also found Tadić guilty of 
persecution for his indirect participation in ‘a campaign of terror, which included killings, 
torture, sexual assaults, and other physical and psychological abuse’.705 Although it was not 
proven that Tadić himself had committed sexual violence, his participation in the general 
campaign of violence described meant that under customary international law his direct 
individual criminal responsibility and personal culpability for assisting, aiding and abetting or 
participating in a [covered criminal act] were invoked.706 Thus, Tadić’s culpability was based on 
his participation in the seizure and imprisonment of the people within the camps (described as 
brutal both within and outside the camp), his knowledge of a policy that criminally 
discriminated against and persecuted non-Serbs and his perpetration of sexual mutilation of 
Harambasić, one of the male detainees.707  
 
vi) Summary 
Much has been made in feminist circles of the significance of the Tadić judgement, and of the 
fact that its adjudication bears the mark of feminist advocacy.708 Thanks to this case, for 
example, witness testimony does not need to be corroborated, as the tribunal’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, especially sub-rules 89 (C) and (D) permit the introduction of ‘any 
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relevant evidence having probative value…unless its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial’.709 Feminists have interpreted this as sign that 
the ICTY takes the testimony of female witnesses seriously thus bolstering the credibility of 
victims of sexual violence in rape proceeding.  
 
Moreover, this case has been praised for allowing feminist judicial activism to influence 
proceedings, a development which feminists have generally welcomed.  But as Halley has 
remarked, ‘[T]he ICTY has actually held that experience as a feminist activist in international 
legal work can be a qualification for service as a judge on the court’.710 While Halley’s 
assessment might seem somewhat harsh, it nonetheless raises questions around whether 
female judges ought to be included in high-profile sexual violence trials merely on account of 
their gender, and whether these types of feminist interventions necessarily produce desirable 
results for women. It is certain that the Tadić judgement has ushered in the notion of 
individual accountability in modern-day international criminal proceedings and has 
significantly expanded the ICTY’s subject-matter jurisdiction through its determination of the 
Yugoslav conflict as international in character. As such, it is an unprecedented legal finding. In 
this vein, the judgement not only reconceptualised the parameters of modern-day armed 
conflict, but also introduced a wider international audience to the idea that the conflict had 
been fought along ethno-nationalist lines. Not only is this a powerful legal tactic, it is arguably 
also a strand of depoliticisation whereby wartime identities and their actions could easily be 
imbued with ethnic motivations. From the point of view of this thesis, this simplification of 
political events has been problematic, as it has reduced the understanding of armed conflict to 
a clash between those, who have culture, and those ‘whom culture has.’711 
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The Furundžija Judgement: The Recognition of Rape as Torture 
 
i) Facts and Background 
This case occurred against the backdrop of the armed conflict between the Croatian 
Community  of Herzeg-Bosna (‘HZ-HB’), which considered itself an independent political entity 
inside the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the armed forces of the government of the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from around 3 July, 1992 through at least mid-July, 1993.712 
The conflict between these two sides ought to be understood against the backdrop of the 
declaration of independence by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been 
announced on 6 March, 1992. The conduct of war underlying the Croatian military strategy 
reflects to a large degree the modus operandi of the Bosnian Serb forces engaged in the 
conflict, thus from the outset of the hostilities in January 1993, the Croatian Defence Counsel 
(the HVO) attacked villages predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims in the Lašva River 
Valley region in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, which resulted in the death and wounding of 
numerous civilians. The additional acts perpetrated against the local population included 
forceful detention, transportation from their places of residence, the performance of sexual 
labour, sexual assault, and other physical and mental abuse.713  
 
The general allegations against Anto Furundžija concerned his role as the local sub-
commander of a paramilitary unit of the HVO, known locally as the 'Jokers', whose members 
had a ‘terrifying reputation.’714 During the attacks carried out by forces under his command, a 
civilian woman of Bosnian Muslim origin, identified as Witness A, was arrested and taken to 
the headquarters of the Jokers. The headquarters were located in the town of Nadioci in a 
building termed the "Bungalow', where Furundžija, who was the only accused on trial because 
he was the only indictee in the custody of the tribunal, verbally interrogated Witness A, while 
another, Accused B, physically assaulted her. Both were sub-commanders of the Jokers thus 
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potentially subject to individual responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute for 
violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute.  
 
ii) Rape as Torture and a Violation of Customary Law  
The interrogators forced Witness A to stand nude before a group of laughing soldiers. During 
the initial phase of interrogation, Accused B repeatedly ran a knife up the victim-witness’ inner 
thigh and threatened to stick it inside her and cut her sexual organs if she failed to 
cooperate.715 Over the course of the day, Accused B proceeded to rape Witness A several 
times in multiple ways, such as orally, vaginally and anally, often in the presence of Furundžija 
and others. The prosecution charged Furundžija in the Indictment with two counts of 
violations of the laws or customs of war: torture and ‘outrages upon personal dignity, 
including rape’.716 The defendants also interrogated and beat Witness D, a Bosnian Croat male 
member of the HVO, who had already endured beatings at the hands of Furundžija's 
subordinates, as he was suspected of assisting Witness A and her sons, in the same room 
where Witness A was being raped and otherwise abused.717 Furundžija, in his position of 
command, was present during part of the sexual violence, as Witness A was being subjected to 
oral and vaginal sexual intercourse with one of the lower-ranking soldiers. According to the 
prosecution, his role in verbally interrogating her during the infliction of the violence, as well 
as his words, acts, and omissions, encouraged and facilitated the crimes. The tribunal found 
that the elements of rape in this case were met ‘when Accused B penetrated Witness A’s 
mouth, vagina and anus with his penis;’ the rape was attributable to the accused because the 
Trial Chamber had also found that the crimes were committed as part of the interrogation 
process in which Furundžija participated.718 Although consent was not raised in this case, the 
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Trial Chamber stressed that ‘any form of captivity vitiates consent.’719 The judges also noted 
the increased efforts by international bodies to redress ‘the use of rape in the course of 
detention and interrogation as a means of torture, and therefore as a violation of international 
law.’720 It further noted that when the requisite elements are met, rape might also constitute a 
crime against humanity, a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws and 
customs of war, and act of genocide.721 
  
Moreover, in determining the appropriate definition of torture to implement in the case, the 
Trial Chamber adopted the definition of torture found in the Convention against Torture722, 
which imposes a ‘state actor’ requirement typically involving a large number of people in the 
torture process who perform different functions, which however minor, impose personal 
liability.723 It stressed the different roles played by Furundžija and Accused B and highlighted 
the sexual dimension of the torture process in the following way:  
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 Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as:  
 
1. ‘[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
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acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain 
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or 
may contain provisions of wider application. 
See: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 
Art. 1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 (entered into force June 26, 1987), Art. 1.  
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involved in the torture process by performing different functions thus rendering them liable for torture, 
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consequence of the torture and yet another one procures the information gained as a result of torture in 




‘Witness A was interrogated by the accused. She was forced by Accused B to undress and 
remain naked before a substantial number of soldiers…..The interrogation by the 
accused and abuse by Accused B were parallel to each other…There is no doubt that the 
accused and Accused B, as commanders divided the process of interrogation by 
performing different functions. The role of the accused was to question, while Accused 
B’s role was to assault and threaten in order to elicit the required information from 
Witness A and Witness D.’724 
 
The Trial Chamber further expanded the list of prohibited purposes behind the Torture 
Convention’s definition of torture to include humiliation, stating:  
  
‘among the possible purposes of torture, one must also include that of the humiliation of 
the victim. This proposition is warranted by the general spirit of international 
humanitarian law: the primary purpose of this body of law is to safeguard human 
dignity.’725  
 
At this juncture the act of rape is personalised and the psychological impact of the rape is 
propelled to the forefront of the court’s interpretation of sexual violence, since it finds that 
Witness A was raped during the course of her interrogation in order to ‘degrade and humiliate 
her’.726 Moreover, the court concluded that the verbal interrogation by Furundžija, which was 
described as ‘an integral part of the torture’, as well as the physical perpetration by Accused B, 
‘became one process’, and these acts caused severe physical and mental suffering to the 
victim.727 For these crimes, the tribunal found Furundžija guilty of individual responsibility for 
the sexual violence as a co-perpetrator of torture and as an aider and abettor of outrages 
upon personal dignity including rape.728 In a further significant finding from a gender 
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perspective, the judges found that forcing a third party to witness  rape also formed part of 
the torture of Witness D due to the psychological impact on the witness, who was 
interrogated and beaten while Witness A was being raped in his presence:  
 
‘The physical attacks on Witness D, as well as the fact that he was forced to watch sexual 
attacks on a woman, in particular, a woman whom he knew as a friend, caused him 
severe physical and mental suffering.’729  
 
This effectively brings in a third party element as an aggravating factor to the rape as torture 
charge. In analysing the ‘outrages upon personal dignity including rape’ charge, the Trial 
Chamber reached the conclusion that Witness A ‘suffered severe physical and mental pain, 
along with public humiliation, at the hands of Accused B in what amounted to outrages upon 
personal dignity and sexual integrity.’ Despite the fact that Furundžija had not physically 
perpetrated the violence against Witness A, his ‘presence and continued interrogation of 
Witness A’ was found to have ‘encouraged Accused B’ thus ‘substantially contributing to the 
criminal acts committed by him.’730 The judges sentenced Furundžija to ten years of 
imprisonment for the torture conviction and to eight years of imprisonment for the outrages 
upon personal dignity conviction, which were to run concurrently instead of consecutively.731 
 
 
iii) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and the Appearance of Judicial Bias 
A number of delicate issues concerning gender-based advocacy arose during the trial with 
significant implications for the way in which future cases of wartime sexual violence would be 
prosecuted. One of the issues centred on the disclosure of statements that had been made to 
a rape counselling centre and the weight given to a victim’s testimony in relation to her 
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credibility when suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTDS) or rape trauma 
syndrome (RTS).732 The Trial Chamber held that there was no evidence to suggest that a 
witness suffering from extreme trauma cannot give accurate information or provide wholly 
reliable testimony.733 The decision was upheld by the ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgement 
rendered on July 21, 2000.734 This was significant in so far as it also signalled that the 
introduction of the witness’ prior sexual history would not be permitted in court proceedings, 
as it could lead to judicial bias.  
 
On appeal, however, the defence alleged that the presiding judge in the case, Florence 
Mumba, should be disqualified for appearance of bias.735 The allegations were based on 
Mumba’s past record as representative of Zambia to the United Nations Commission on the 
Status of Women (CSW), during which the Commission had strongly condemned rape and 
urged its prosecution and punishment. The defence further alleged that her outspoken 
feminist views made Judge Mumba predisposed to promoting a common feminist agenda. 736 
The Appeals Chamber then reviewed domestic case law regarding the appropriate standard in 
determining judicial bias finding that a general rule existed, which required judges not only to 
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207 
 
be free from bias, but also from the appearance of bias.737 Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber 
determined that there was no basis for the allegations that her position and role as a member 
of the CSW had even created the appearance of bias. In fact, the Appeals Chamber concluded 
that, even if Judge Mumba shared the goals of objectives of the CSW of promoting and 
protecting the human rights of women, ‘she could still sit on a case and impartially decide 
upon issues affecting women.’738 The Appeals Chamber thus effectively ruled that it is not a 
disqualification for a judge to share the view that rape is reprehensible and a terrible crime 




To sum up, the precedent set by this case was the recognition of rape and serious sexual 
assault as self-standing war crimes. Rape was thus charged as a war crime based on article 4(2) 
(e) of the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which enumerates rape as a war 
crime under the rubric of ‘outrages upon personal dignity’.740  Rape was also for the first time 
deemed to be a part of customary law, as all substantive offences prohibited by Article 4 of 
Additional Protocol II were defined as breaches of customary law, thus enhancing the 
                                            
737
 Ibid at para. 189. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber adopted the following principles to direct it in 
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 (A) A Judge is not impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists.  
 (B) There is an unacceptable appearance of bias if: 
  i) a Judge is party to the case, or has a financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of 
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protections already afforded to civilians by common Article 3. Moreover, from a feminist 
perspective, the tribunal’s rejection of the idea that gender advocacy backgrounds could 
impact female judicial thinking and that female judges are inherently biased against men in 
sexual violence cases has been seen as an important step in the development of ‘progressive’ 
wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. Finally, the case introduced concurrent sentencing, 
both for the ‘outrages upon personal dignity’, as well as for the torture charges for sexual 
violence offences.  
 
Part VIII 
The ‘Čelebići’ Judgement 
Considered a landmark decision, the case had significant implications regarding superior 
command responsibility, the treatment of various forms of sexual violence committed against 
male detainees, and the development of the law of torture when victims are tortured by 
means of rape.  Aside from its significant gender implications, the case assumed added 
significance for the fact that it was the first at the ICTY to charge and try multiple accused at 
the same time.741 The case is also reflective of the wider trend in international law of ‘human 
rights globalisation’, as two of the defendants Zejnil Delalić and Zdravko Mučić, (like Tadić) had 
been arrested in Germany and Austria under Rule 40 of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
on 18 March, 1990.742 Further, the decision is emblematic of the patterns described by the 
Commission of Experts in its findings as to the strategies underlying the commission of 
wartime sexual violence. It is thus reflective of the sexual violence committed within the 
confines of detention-like situations, specifically within camp life, or so-called ‘rape camps’. 
The case also examined the psychological impact of rape suggesting that it often leads to 
‘social ostracism’ from the community. In this way, the tribunal linked the individualised 
nature of rape to a form of communal harm. 
 
i) Facts and Background 
This case is based on the events that took place at the detention facility in the village of 
Čelebići located in the Konjić municipality in central Bosnia-Herzegovina during May to 
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 The Prosecutor v. Delalić, Indictment, (IT-96-21-I), 19 March 1996 [hereinafter Čelebići Indictment], at para. 33 
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November 1992.743 All charges centre on acts perpetrated within the Čelebići prison camp 
during the attack on the municipality.744  This was a largely inter-ethnic community that 
assumed military significance during the conflict in large part due to its large arms factory and 
strategic location as the transport link between Sarajevo and Mostar, the two largest cities in 
Bosnia.745 Another factor behind the strategic importance of Konjić was its location on the 
fault line between the areas which Croats and Serbs considered within their spheres of 
influence, the Bosnian Croats were thus laying claim to the entire area of Herzegovina, while 
Serbs were primarily interested in the eastern Neretva valley.746 
  
The defendants belonged to a force consisting of predominantly Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats, who took control of several villages inhabited by Bosnian Serbs in and around Konjić 
starting at the end of May 1992.747 As part of their military campaign the attackers forcibly 
expelled Bosnian residents from their homes, and held them at collection centres. Most 
women and children were held in local schools or in other locations, while most of the men 
and some women were taken to a former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) facility in Čelebići, 
referred to as the Čelebići camp.  The Indictment alleges that detainees in the camps were 
‘killed, tortured, sexually assaulted, beaten and otherwise subjected to cruel and inhuman 
treatment’.748  
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 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mučić (The Prosecutor v. Delalić et al.), (IT-96-21-T)-(hereafter referred 
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The accused included Zejnil Delalić, the commander of the camp and therefore in a position of 
authority; Zdravko Mučić, the de facto commander of the camp; Hazim Delić, a subordinate, 
who worked in the camp and Esad Landžo, who acted as guard. Crucially, three defendants, 
Delalić, Delić and Mučić, were charged with both individual responsibility, as well as superior 
command responsibility for failing to prevent, halt, or punish crimes committed by 
subordinates acting under their authority. They had thus ‘wilfully caused great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health’ as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions under 
Article 2 of the Statute, and were charged with cruel treatment as violations of the laws or 
customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute for acts committed by their subordinates, which 
included subjecting two male detainees to abusive treatment by having a burning fuse cord 
placed around their genitals.749 The three accused were also charged with superior 
responsibility for the grave breach of inhuman treatment and for cruel treatment as a violation 
of the laws and customs of war when subordinates forced two male detainees to perform 
fellatio on each other.750 As stated previously, due to the limitations inherent in this project, 
the thesis does not focus on incidences of male sexual violence, although it acknowledges it as 
a thoroughly invisible phenomenon of modern-day armed conflict requiring a lot more 
sustained academic research in future.  
 
ii) Multiple Rape as Torture 
Mučić and Delić were also charged with individual responsibility for their direct involvement in 
sexual violence crimes, while Landžo, who did not hold any position of authority, was charged 
solely with individual responsibility. The charges also included various forms of sexual violence 
brought against the three accused arising from the actions of Hazim Delić, as deputy 
commander of the Čelebići camp, who alongside his accomplices subjected a Bosnian-Serb 
woman and store owner in Konjić, Groždana Čecez, to repeated incidents of forcible sexual 
intercourse. During this period, she was allegedly raped by three different men in one night 
and on another occasion she was raped in front of four other men.751 Specifically, counts 18 to 
20 concern torture as a grave breach punishable under Article 2(b) of the Statute and a 
violation of the laws and customs of war. The Trial Chamber emphasised that in order for rape 
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Čelebići Indictment (IT-96-21-I). Ibid at para. 2.   
750
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211 
 
to be included within the offence of torture it had to meet each of the elements of this offence 
contained in the Convention Against Torture, and held that when any form of sexual violence 
satisfied these elements, it may constitute torture.752 In defining the elements of torture as 
constitutive of rape, it stressed that rape is:  
 
'[a]' despicable act which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity. 
The condemnation and punishment of rape becomes all the more urgent where it is 
committed by, or at the instigation of, a public official, or with the consent and acquiescence 
of such an official. Rape causes severe pain and suffering, both physical and psychological. 
The psychological suffering of persons upon whom rape is inflicted may be exacerbated by 
the social and cultural conditions and can be particularly acute and long lasting. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at the instigation 
of a public official, could be considered as occurring for a purpose that does not, in some 
way, involve punishment coercion, discrimination, or intimidation. In the view of this Trial 
Chamber this is inherent in situations of armed conflict.’753 
 
According to the evidence adduced at trial, Delić interrogated Ms. Ćećez upon her arrival at 
the camp. During the course of the interrogation, Delić repeatedly raped her as he questioned 
her to the whereabouts of her husband. Three days later, he subjected her to multiple rapes 
when she was transferred between buildings in the camp, and he again raped her in the camp 
two months later.754 The Trial Chamber held that ‘the acts of vaginal penetration by the penis 
under circumstances that were coercive, quite clearly constitute rape.’755  Moreover, it found 
that the rapes committed by Delić caused severe pain and suffering756 and they were 
committed against Ms. Ćećez for the purpose of obtaining information about the whereabouts 
of her husband, to punish her for not providing information, to punish her for the acts of her 
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 Čelebići Trial Chamber Judgement, at para. 496. 
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husband, and to coerce and intimidate her into cooperating.757 But as the subsequent analysis 
in Chapter VI demonstrates, the finding that rape can constitute a form of torture is still 
primarily construed through a male lens, in spite of the seeming inclusion of rape as a gender-
specific act under its umbrella.  
 
The Trial Chamber also emphasised that Delić used sexual violence as an instrument of terror 
and subordination, given that he committed the rapes with the aim of ‘intimidating not only 
the victim, but also other inmates, by creating an atmosphere of powerlessness.’758 Specifically 
he subjected a detainee (Witness A), another Bosnian-Serb woman, to repeated incidents of 
forcible sexual intercourse, both vaginal and anal in nature. From about 15 June 1992 until the 
beginning of August 1992 Witness A was raped over a period of six weeks starting with her 
initial interrogation after which she was raped every few days.759 Hence, the court concluded 
that Delić had repeatedly raped Witness A for the purpose of intimidating, coercing, and 
punishing her, and these rapes caused severe mental and physical pain and suffering. The 
tribunal found him guilty of torture for the actus reus of forcible sexual penetration.760 Sexual 
violence as an instrument of terror was closely connected with ‘powerlessness’ as the Trial 
Chamber suggested. Thus, Witness A, the female victim, in an instant was rendered powerless 
presumably for the fact that she was a woman. This stands in notable contrast to the manner 
in which gender-based violence against men is construed, interpreted and prosecuted by the 
court.  
 
iii) Superior Command Responsibility  
Another development arising from the judgement concerned the Trial Chamber’s examination 
of the scope of criminal responsibility for military commanders or for other persons having 
superior authority. The court, thus, explained that holding a superior criminally responsible for 
unlawful conduct of subordinates was a ‘well-established norm’ of international customary 
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law and conventional law.761 It identified three essential elements of command superior 
responsibility, which involves the failure to act when there is a legal duty to do so, as follows: 
 
i) The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship 
ii) The superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or 
had been committed; and  
iii) The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the 
criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.762 
 
These elements led the judges to conclude that persons in positions of authority, whether in 
civilian or within military structures, may incur criminal liability under the doctrine of superior 
command responsibility on the basis of ‘their de facto as a well as de jure positions as 
superiors’.763 The absence of formal legal authority to control the actions of subordinates thus 
did not preclude the imposition of such responsibility.764 The most significant element 
underlying criminal accountability was whether the civilian or military commander had 
‘effective control’ over subordinates committing the crime, ‘in the sense of having the material 
ability to prevent and punish the commission of the crimes.’765 In cases in which knowledge is 
impossible to ascertain for lack of evidence be it through the absence of a paper trail, or lack 
of eyewitness testimony, the prosecution will typically attempt to establish knowledge 
through circumstantial evidence.766 The Trial Chamber determined that the appropriate 
standard in determining whether the superior had ‘reason to know’ of crimes committed by 
subordinates was inquiry notice, thus whether the information had been available so as to put 
a superior on notice about possible criminal activity by subordinates.767  
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The Appeals Chamber, in fact further elaborated upon this standard by giving an example of 
inquiry notice, as a superior, who ‘has received  information that some of the soldiers under 
his command have a violent or unstable character, or have been drinking prior to being sent 
on a mission, may be considered as having the requisite knowledge’.768 Hence, the Trial 
Chamber was careful to stress that a superior could only be held criminally responsible for 
failing to take such measures as are within his powers’, meaning that the measures required 
but not forthcoming had to be within his ‘material possibility.’769  
 
iv) Summary 
This case was significant from a gender perspective, as superior responsibility for crimes 
committed by subordinates was held not to be limited to war crimes, but also applicable to 
other crimes, including crimes against humanity and genocide. Similarly, superior 
responsibility was not confined to military leaders but deemed to have been used to hold 
civilian leaders accountable for crimes of sexual violence committed by subordinates, which 
the superior negligently failed to prevent or punish.770 The precedent from this case was 
important in so far as it could be used in future to hold superiors responsible for failing to 
adequately train, monitor or supervise and punish subordinates, who commit rape.771 It also 
added further protection to women and girls recognising their ‘extreme vulnerability’ when 
separated from their families and held in detention facilities, where they might be at high risk 
of sexual violence. The case was also considered to be of importance for its interpretation that 
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The Kunarac et al. Judgement: Finding ‘Mass Rape’ as a Phenomenon of the Conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia 
 
Considered a landmark decision in the area of wartime sexual violence, the Kunarac 
judgement was rendered by Trial Chamber II of the Yugoslav Tribunal on February 22, 2001.772 
This decision is considered groundbreaking primarily for its determination that the rape of 
Muslim women amounts to a crime against humanity, thus, highlighting the significance of 
ethnicity in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning.773 The decision also held that conduct constituting 
sexual slavery and rape classifies as enslavement, thus, qualifying as crimes against humanity 
situations when victims were held in facilities and repeatedly raped over a period of days, 
weeks or months. The judgement, thus, rendered the first rape as a crime against humanity 
conviction in the ICTY and the first ever conviction of enslavement in conjunction with rape. It 
made extensive holdings regarding the element of enslavement, and it further clarified the 
elements of rape and torture under international law.774 The case is further noteworthy in that 
it is the first case solely to focus on the rape, mistreatment and torture of women during the 
Yugoslav conflict. Moreover, as Doris Buss points out, it is the first case to consider the 
phenomenon of ‘mass rape’ in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.775 The accused were 
eventually each charged with and convicted of various forms of gender-based crimes, 
including rape, torture, enslavement and outrages upon personal dignity.  As has been 
discussed in previous chapters, the labelling of the sexual violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
committed on a mass scale gave the event its headline grabbing moment. Thus, defining rape 
as ‘mass rape’ is what distinguished it from other crimes, while at the same time shocking an 
(until then) largely complacent Western world and mobilising feminist activism.776 
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i) Facts and Background 
The original indictment centred on eight accused charged with various forms of sexual 
violence committed during the siege of the municipality of Foča by Serb forces in April 1992.777 
The population of the town was gathered together by the military following which Muslim and 
Croatian men were separated from women and children and taken to separate detention 
facilities.778 These detention centres had been set up at the local high school and sports hall. 
For the Muslims detained in Foča conditions were described as extreme with facilities 
reportedly unhygienic, little food made available to the detainees and routine abuse of 
prisoner being commonplace.779 Women and children were typically collectively held, and in 
these facilities, they were subjected to ‘systematic’ rape, ‘gang rape’ by Serb soldiers with 
some women and young girls being subject to public rape, while others were routinely taken 
out of the facilities to be raped and then returned. Yet others were permanently removed 
from the facilities to be held elsewhere for sexual access whenever their captors demanded 
it.780 The three defendants were involved, in different capacities, with those rapes as well as 
with the removal of the group of women and girls, most of who were in the age range of 
twelve to twenty, from these centres to local houses and apartments, where they were raped 
by the defendants and by other soldiers. Some of these women were detained for several 
months and were subjected to constant rapes, taken as the ‘property’ of the individual 
defendants, and made to perform household chores such as cleaning and cooking.781 After a 
period of time, some of these women and girls, including a twelve-year old girl, were then sold 
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ii) The Sexual Violence Charges 
The three defendants were charged with rape as a crime against humanity under Article 5 (g) 
of the ICTY Statute and as a violation of the laws of war under Article 3, and rape as torture, 
constituting both a crime against humanity under Article 5 (h) and a violation of the laws of 
war under Article 3. In addition the defendants were charged with enslavement as a crime 
against humanity as per Article 5(c) and with outrages upon personal dignity under Article 3. 
As Buss comments,  
 
‘[T]he multiple charges are significant, as in most cases, the multiple charges of rape (as 
a crime against humanity and as a violation of the laws and customs of war) and torture 
(also as a crime against humanity and as a violation of the laws and customs of war) are 
made in respect of the same incident. 783  
 
The fact that multiple charges were brought is therefore significant, as it constitutes a 
recognition that wartime rape occurs in different contexts, for different reasons and with 
various impacts on the victims. 784 The Trial Chamber found that individual acts of rape 
committed against Muslim women specifically by the accused amounted to crimes against 
humanity, and were part of a larger policy to terrorise Muslims, evict them from their 
residential areas, and convert the region into a Serb stronghold.785 
 
iii) Expanding on Existing Rape Definitions and the Issue of Consent  
One of the most contentious issues arising during the Kunarac trial-certainly from a feminist 
perspective-was the allegation made by two of the defendants that some of the sexual activity 
between them and individual Muslim women was consensual. Despite the coercive 
circumstances of the situation, the tribunal nonetheless decided to consider consent in this 
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instance, as Kunarac had raised the defence under Rule 96 of mistake of fact thinking that the 
woman had consented. According to the evidence, one witness took an active part in initiating 
sexual activity with Kunarac after being threatened that if she did not seduce and sexually 
please him, she would suffer severe consequences. The Trial Chamber, after considering the 
overall pattern of conduct of the accused, and the relative position of the victims, refused to 
accept that consent had been given. It stated unequivocally that it was proven ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ that although witness D.B. had had sexual intercourse with Kunarac in 
which she had taken an active part by  
 
‘[t]aking off the trousers of the accused and kissing him all over the body before having 
vaginal intercourse with him’, the conclusion had to be that she had only initiated the 
sexual intercourse with Kunarac because she was afraid of being killed by “Gaga”, if she 
did not do so’.786           
 
The judges, therefore, rejected Kunarac’s claim that he did not know that D.B. only initiated 
sex with him because she feared for her life. They found it entirely unrealistic that Kunarac 
could have been confused by D.B.’s actions, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing 
war and her detention by enemy forces.787 Not only does this passage have implications for 
female agency in wartime by presuming that under circumstances of coercion consent is 
almost always impossible, but it also speaks to the broader motivations and policies underlying 
the conflict thus reducing this instance to another unfortunate side effect of the conflict. The 
issues of female agency and consent are engaged with more critically in Chapter VI.  
 
A more interesting segment for purposes of determinations of female autonomy during 
wartime is presented in the charges against the co-accused Vuković of rape and torture for 
certain instances of sexual violence committed against women and girls in Foča. Much like 
Kunarac, Vuković strongly contested the allegations of sexual torture against him arguing that 
even if it were proved that he had committed rape he ‘would have done so out of a sexual 
urge, not out of hatred.’788 This is perhaps the most emblematic of the expressions produced 
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 Ibid at paras 644-45.  
787
 Ibid at para. 654.  
788
 Ibid at para. 816.  
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by a defendant in an ICTY sexual violence case. The defendant’s claim that he did not commit 
the rape for a prohibited purpose necessary for establishing torture and the Trial Chamber’s 
response to it are instructive in that the defendant’s interpretation of events is eschewed in 
favour of  a reading of the conflict as entirely ethnic, and therefore beyond any discussion of 
agency. Thus, the tribunal explains that ‘all that matters in this context is his awareness of an 
attack against the Muslim civilian population of which his victim was a member, and for the 
purpose of torture, that he intended to discriminate between the group of which he is a 
member and the group of his victim.’789  
 
It is this reified, if not flawed legal reasoning of wartime identity that gives rise to the critique 
of this thesis. Although the judges stressed in their reasoning that torture could be committed 
for any number of reasons and that one of the prohibited purposes merely needed to be part 
of the motivation behind the torture, not necessarily the principle motivation, it is clear that 
ethnicity was seen as the central catalyst driving the perpetrator’s actions.790 Moreover, in 
imputing ethnic motivations to the act, the Trial Chamber did not have to engage with a chain 
of potentially intricate and complex set of events that might have established that the sexual 
interaction between the defendant and the woman had happened on entirely consensual 
basis that was not at all prompted by fear or duress. The tribunal found Vuković guilty of 
torture as a war crime and a crime against humanity for sexual torture.  
 
iv) Sexual Violence as an ‘Outrage upon Personal Dignity’ 
The third defendant, Kovač, was charged with ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ for sexual 
violence committed against women and girls held in enslavement conditions.791 Particular 
emphasis was placed on the fact that the suffering did not have to be long-lasting to qualify as 
an ‘outrage upon personal dignity’, as long as the humiliation or degradation was ‘real and 
                                            
789
 Ibid at para. 816.  
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 As the Chamber points out, there is no requirement in customary international law that the conduct must  
solely be perpetrated for one of the prohibited purposes of torture, such as discrimination. The prohibited 
purpose need only be part of the motivation behind the conduct and need not be the predominant or sole 
purposes. Ibid at para. 816.  
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 An outrage against personal dignity has been defined as an act that is ‘animated by contempt for the human 
dignity of another person. The corollary is that the act must cause serious humiliation or degradation to the 
victim.’ This was determined in the Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgement, (IT-14/1-T) 25 June, 1999, at para. 56 
[hereinafter Aleksovski Trial Chamber Judgement]. The Aleksovski Trial Chamber made extensive findings with 
regard to this offence. See at paras. 54-57 in particular.  
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serious’. Moreover, it was held to be immaterial whether the victim had recovered or had 
overcome the effects of such an offence.792 But here, as in previous paragraphs, the perceived 
psychological impact of the sexual violence on the woman is implied in the language used by 
the tribunal. Thus, in convicting Kovač of outrages upon personal dignity for occasions in which 
women and girls were made to dance nude on a table together-and at times individually in 
front of him and others-for their seeming entertainment, the Trial Chamber suggested that 
Kovač knew that having to stand naked on a table, while being watched was ‘a painful and 
humiliating experience’ for the three women involved, a factor further exacerbated by their 
young age.793 Thus, the court looked to the effect of the crime, while implying that it would 
inevitably cause a ‘psychic wound’ in the victim, which suggests that her body is ‘already and 
always violated’, regardless of whether the act might have brought sexual gratification to the 
perpetrator, or possibly even the victim herself.794 
 
v) Enslavement as a Crime against Humanity 
Most of the women in this case were ‘enslaved’ for weeks or months, and during this period 
they were systematically and repeatedly raped during all or part of their time in captivity. On 
some occasions they were given keys to the house where they were held, and at other times 
they would find the door of where they were staying open. The Trial Chamber here had to 
determine whether the absence of physical barriers was relevant to the psychological or 
logistical barriers present. Hailed as one of the most groundbreaking aspects of the Kunarac 
decision, extensive findings were made in relation to enslavement with reference in particular 
to the Slavery Convention, which has consistently defined slavery as ‘the status or condition of 
a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’ 
thus codifying customary international law. The actus reus element of the crime was defined 
as ‘the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person’, 
while the mens rea was defined as the ‘intentional exercise of such powers.’795 The sub-
elements of the offence were determined to include control and ownership; the restriction or 
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 Kunarac Trial Chamber Judgement, at para. 501.  
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 Ibid at paras. 773-74. According to the ICTY Statute, to be charged under this category, it is not necessary to 
show that the perpetrator specifically intended to humiliate the victim, as long as he knew that his act or 
omission would have such an effect. Ibid.  
794
 The ICTR Trial Chamber had previously recognised in the Akayesu Judgement that serious humiliation was a 
clearly foreseeable consequence of forced nudity. Moreover, forced nudity could be classified as crime against 
humanity, thus not being restricted to ‘outrages upon personal dignity’, or even war crimes charges. In Akayesu.  
795
 In Kunarac Trial Chamber Judgement, supra at note 147 at para. 540.  
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control of an individual’s autonomy; freedom of choice or freedom of movement; the accrual 
of some gain to the perpetrator; absence of consent or free will; exploitation; ‘the exaction of 
forced labour or compulsory labour or services, often without remuneration and often, though 
not necessarily, involving physical hardship,’ including  sex, prostitution, trafficking in persons, 
assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, an control of sexuality.796 The 
judges found that free will or consent is impossible or irrelevant when certain conditions are 
present, such as the ‘threat or use of force or other forms of coercion: the fear of violence, 
deception, or false promises; the abuse of power; the victim’s position of vulnerability; 
detention or captivity, psychological oppression or socio-economic conditions.’797 
 
The judgement emphasised that control over a person’s sexual autonomy, or obliging a person 
to provide sexual services, may be proof of enslavement, but such indicia are not elements of 
the crime. The facts of the case demonstrate that the enslavement and rape were inseparably 
linked, and that the accused enslaved the women and girls as a means to effectuate 
continuous rape. Since a primary, but not necessarily exclusive motivation behind the 
enslavement was to hold the women and girls for sexual access at will and with ease the crime 
would most appropriately be characterised as sexual slavery. According to Askin, for example, 
it is regrettable that the term ‘sexual slavery’ was never used in the judgement. 798 
 
The Appeals Chamber Judgement of June 12, 2002 upheld and reinforced the Trial Chamber 
Judgement’s holdings concerning rape, torture and enslavement.799 Indeed, the Appeals 
Chamber rejected  the assertion that resistance, force, or threat of force are elements of rape, 
as such factors are simply evidence of non-consent and it found that not only may rape 
constitute torture, but also that rape is an act that ‘establishes per se the suffering of those 
upon whom it was inflicted.’ 800 
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 Moreover, the Trial Chamber retained discretion in considering duration as a factor in determining whether 
somebody had been enslaved. Ibid at para. 542-543.  
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can never consent to such crimes as slavery and torture.  
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 In Askin (2003) 340.  
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While the Kunarac judgement has, undoubtedly, advanced the scope of gender-based violence 
further by redefining sexual violence as a form of slavery and therefore a crime against 
humanity and by narrowing the consent defence to a degree which suggests that in situations 
of wartime it is almost impossible for a woman to meaningfully consent, there are a number of 
problematic side-effects from a critical feminist perspective. Firstly, the case implies that 
torture against women can only be committed in the form of rape. Secondly, it reinforces the 
sense that women are tortured in ways different to men, given that rape as form of torture is 
closely interlinked in the judgement with the female experience, while male sexual violence as 
a form of torture is ignored. This creates a reified category of women, the presumption being 
that all women suffer torture in the same way, while precluding the possibility that the 
torturers could be women themselves in this way denying female agency. A feminist critical 
reading, thus, suggests that the preservation of separate definitions and special 
acknowledgments about women reiterates persistent stereotypes. This is not helped by the 
fact that for an act to classify as torture in international law it has to be committed at the 
hands of a public official. The case is also relevant for highlighting the intersectional nature of 
gender and ethnicity in wartime and it has notably contributed to the culturalised and 
depoliticised interpretation of gender in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, as 
Chapter VI goes on to analyse in detail.  
 
Part X 
The Kvočka Judgement: Rape as Persecution in the Context of a Joint Criminal Enterprise  
This case is of significance from a gender-based perspective for its finding that rape can be 
used as a form of persecution incurring individual liability and for rendering important 
holdings in relation to threats of sexual violence as constituting torture. This case also defined 
standards of liability for any foreseeable, consequential or incidental rape crimes when 
committed during the course of a joint criminal enterprise, thus, extensively developing the 
joint criminal enterprise theory of responsibility.801 This was taken further in the present 
decision, which specifically examined the common purpose doctrine/joint criminal enterprise 
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 The Appeals Chamber in the Tadić decision had first articulated the theory based largely on jurisprudence 
derived from the post-World War II Nuremberg Trials.See Prosecutor v. Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber 
Judgement, (15 July, 1999).  
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theory in the Nuremberg case law and applied the theory of responsibility to persons 
knowingly working in the Omarska prison camp in Bosnia.802 This legal technique and modality 
has become a preferred charging preference in ICTY indictments, and has been especially used 
when charged in conjunction with persecution.803 Participation in a joint criminal enterprise, 
for example, had been a prominent feature in the Milošević trial.804 
 
i) Facts and Background 
The case centred around five defendants, who worked or regularly visited the Omarska prison 
camp, which had been established by Bosnian Serbs in Prijedor in May 1992 with the 
purported aim of suppressing an uprising of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the region. 
The camp operated for approximately 3 months in 1992 during which over three thousand 
men and approximately 36 women were detained. Mistreatment and inhumane conditions 
were pervasive, and crimes such as murder, torture, rape and persecution were rampant. 
Counts 1-3 of the Amended Indictment charged the five accused with persecution and 
inhuman acts as crimes against humanity and with outrages upon personal dignity as a war 
crime. The persecution count alleged that the accused persecuted non-Serbs detained inside 
the camp through several means, namely: murder, torture and beating, sexual assault and 
rape, harassment, humiliation and psychological abuse, and confinement in inhumane 
conditions.805 
 
In addition, Counts 14-17 charged one of the accused Mlađjo Radić, a guard shift leader in the 
camp, with rape, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity for the sexual violence he 
allegedly committed personally against women detained in the Omarska prison camp.806 In 
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 See Kvočka et al., (IT-98-30/1-T), Trial Chamber Judgement, (2 November, 2001).  
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 See for example, Prosecutor v.  Milošević, (IT-02-54-1), First Amended Indictment [Croatia], 23 October, 2002; 
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 Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Amended Indictment, (IT-98-30/1-I, 21 August, 2000, at para. 25. [hereinafter Kvočka 
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 The charges were Count 14, torture as a crime against humanity; Count 15, rape as a crime against humanity; 
Count 16, torture as a violation of the laws and customs of war; and Count 17 outrages upon personal dignity as a 
violation of the laws or customs of war. Ibid at para. 42.  
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relation to gender-based violence, the Trial Chamber found that ‘female detainees were 
subjected to various forms of sexual violence’ in the camp,807while pointing out that sexual 
violence covered a broad range of acts including rape, molestation, sexual slavery, sexual 




ii) Joint Criminal Enterprise Responsibility 
The case is of further significance for building upon the development of the common 
purpose/joint enterprise theory contained in the Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgement, and its 
holding that such theory of responsibility is implicitly included within Article 7(1) concerning 
individual responsibility of the Statute of the tribunal.809 The Kvočka Trial Chamber specified 
that a joint criminal enterprise may exist: 
 
‘[w]henever two or more people participate in a common criminal endeavour. This 
criminal endeavour can range anywhere from along a continuum from two persons 
conspiring to rob a bank to the systematic slaughter of millions during a vast criminal 
regime comprising thousands of participants. Within a joint criminal enterprise there 
may be other subsidiary criminal enterprises….Within some subsidiaries of the larger 
criminal enterprise, the criminal purpose may be more particularized: one subset may 
be established for purposes of forced labor, another for purposes of systematic rape for 
forced impregnation, another for purposes of extermination, etc.’810 
 
Based on the brutality of the crimes and their pervasiveness throughout the camp, the Trial 
Chamber ultimately concluded that Omarska camp operated as a joint criminal enterprise 
established to persecute non-Serbs contained therein, thus, imputing the ethnic dimension to 
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the act.811 There was no direct physical element that could be ascribed to the perpetrators, 
thus the three accused were not convicted of having physically perpetrated the crimes, 
mistreated the detainees, aided in the establishment of the camp or exercised any significant 
influence over abusive policies in the camp. However, they undoubtedly knew that a range of 
crimes were committed on an everyday basis and that the camps functioned to gather, 
persecute, and eliminate non-Serbs.812 Because the defendants continued to show up for work 
every day in the Omarska camp, despite being aware of the criminal activities committed 
therein, their efforts were held to have contributed significantly to the continued and effective 
functioning of the camp, which facilitated the commission of the crimes even allowing them to 
continue at ease. Through these actions they incurred criminal responsibility for participating 
in the criminal enterprise.813 
 
An interesting detail emerged in the judicial reasoning with regard to the fact that although 
there was no evidence admitted at trial to indicate that the defendants had knowledge of the 
rapes or other forms of sexual violence, it was nonetheless evident that by knowingly working 
in the camp where criminal activity was rampant, the participants had assumed the risk of 
incurring criminal responsibility for all foreseeable crimes, including rape crimes. As the Trial 
Chamber has put it:  
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 The Trial Chamber relied on ‘an enormous amount of evidence’, which helped it conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Omarska camp functioned as a joint criminal enterprise. The crimes committed in Omarska were not 
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Ibid at paras. 408, 464, 500, 566.  
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‘Any crimes that were natural and foreseeable consequences of the joint criminal 
enterprise…can be attributable to participants in the criminal enterprise if committed 
during the time he participated in the enterprise.’814  
 
Holding that sexual violence in the camp was patently foreseeable and virtually inevitable 
under the circumstances, it reasoned that: 
 
 ‘In Omarska camp, approximately 36 women were held in detention, guarded by men 
with weapons, who were often drunk, violent and physically and mentally abusive and 
who were allowed to act with virtual impunity. Indeed, it would be unrealistic and 
contrary to all rational logic to expect that none of the women held in Omarska, placed 
in circumstances rendering them especially vulnerable, would be subjected to rape or 
other forms of sexual violence. This is particularly true in light of clear intent of the 
criminal enterprise to subject the targeted group to persecution through such means as 
violence and humiliation’.815 
 
This led the court to conclude that participants in a joint criminal enterprise, whether aiders 
and abettors or co-perpetrators may be held liable for any natural or foreseeable crimes 
committed while they participate in the criminal enterprise.816 The judgement is remarkable in 
that it implies that any such act committed in detention, whether in a large facility where 
many women are formally detained or in a house where a small group or even one woman in 
unlawfully kept, may constitute a criminal enterprise, if individuals knowingly participate with 
others in criminal activity.817 Indeed, the decision is highly significant for its implication that 
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 A similar holding was rendered in the Krstić case. Although the Trial Chamber was not convinced that many 
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extra measures may be needed to protect women for rape in such situations. Thus, the Trial 
Chamber specified that: 
 
‘[I]f a superior has prior knowledge that women detained by male guards in detention 
facilities are likely to be subjected to sexual violence, that would put him on sufficient 
notice that extra measures are demanded in order to prevent such crimes.’818  
 
The implication here is that the extensive evidence of wartime rape generated by media 
reports is now virtually universal knowledge, thus, it is expected that women are always in 
grave danger of being subjected to sexual violence and that this is particularly true during 
periods of hostility and or mass violence. The decision can thus be interpreted as imposing a 
burden on those detaining females to ensure that adequate protections are devised to prevent 
sexual abuse, and to monitor facilities where there is a likelihood that such crimes might take 
place.’819 While this development is, on the one hand, undoubtedly attentive to women’s 
needs, it at the same time has the potential to produce overly protective gendered images, as 
it reinforces the idea that in situations of detention women will inevitably fall victim to sexual 
violence thus precluding any sense of female agency. The judgement is also notable for 
recognising that persecution takes many forms and is not limited to physical violence. 
According to the tribunal:  
 
‘Just as rape and forced nudity are recognized as crimes against humanity or genocide if they 
form part of an attack directed against a civilian population or if used as an instrument of 
genocide, humiliating treatment that forms part of a discriminatory attack against a civilian 
population may, in combination with other crimes, or in extreme cases alone, similarly 
constitute persecution.’820  
 
This is significant from a gender-based perspective in so far as it recognises the psychological 
impact of sexual violence as a form of persecution, thus, reiterating the conceptual finding in 
                                            
818
 Ibid at para. 318.  
819
 Ibid at para. 190.  
820
 Ibid at para. 190.  
228 
 
Akayesu that sexual violence manifests itself in multiple forms and can constitute a crime 
against humanity, despite the absence of any manifest physical contact.  
 
 
iii) The Charges against Radić 
An important aspect of the decision concerned the ruling on the rape and torture charges 
against Radić, a guard shift leader in the camp. The allegations against him ranged from 
groping, blatant threats and attempts at sexual violence to the outright commission of rape. 
Finding that Radić had committed sexual violence against some women in the camp, the 
chamber recalled the definition of sexual violence promulgated in Akayesu, as ‘any act of a 
sexual nature, which is committed on a person under circumstances, which are coercive.’821 It 
found that ‘the sexual intimidations, harassment, and assaults committed by him clearly fell 
within this definition, given that he had physically perpetrated rape against women detained 
in the camp’.822 
 
Interestingly, in its determination that rape and other forms of sexual violence constituted 
torture, the Trial Chamber imbued the decision with distinct ethnic undertones stressing that 
the rape and other forms of sexual violence were committed ‘[o]nly against the non-Serb 
detainees in the camp, and solely against women, making the crimes discriminatory on 
multiple levels.’823 It also stressed that Radić intentionally raped and attempted to rape, and 
that these acts in and of themselves ‘manifest his intent to inflict severe pain and suffering,’ 
amounting to torture.824 Finding that the accused had intentionally inflicted severe pain and 
suffering on the women by subjecting them to groping, harassment, and threats of rape, the 
Trial Chamber concluded that these acts too satisfied the requirements of torture:825 
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 [T]he Trial Chamber takes into consideration the extraordinary vulnerability of the victims and the fact that 
they were imprisoned in a facility in which violence against the detainees was the rule, not the exception. The 
detainees knew that Radić held a position of authority in the camp, that he could roam the camp at will, and 




In an interesting legal twist, however, although the judges found that Radić had committed 
rape and torture as a crime against humanity, they held that due to lack of clarity on this issue, 
the persecution conviction already covered the rape crimes for which he had been separately 
charged. Given that the amended indictment had not specifically identified these crimes as 
different from the rape crimes identified in the persecution charges (which alleged 
persecution for physical, mental, and sexual violence and mistreatment),826 consequently, the 
rape and torture as crimes against humanity counts were ‘dismissed’ and were subsumed 
within the persecution as a crime against humanity conviction.827 From a feminist perspective, 
this case was, thus, not a wholesale victory, as the relegation of a rape to an arguably more 
potent category in international law dented its earlier recognition as a standalone crime 
against humanity. Ultimately, the tribunal thus convicted Radić of sexual violence under the 
persecution charge, while the sexual violence as torture charges were not similarly subsumed 




The Kvočka case has had considerable implications for securing criminal responsibility for sex 
and gender crimes committed either during a joint criminal enterprise or as part of a 
persecution scheme. This is especially important given the ICTY trend of indicting leaders and 
subordinates under the joint criminal enterprise theory and using the persecution as a catch-
all category to cover a broad range of crimes, such as murder, torture, rape, deportation, and 
destruction of homes or religious facilities without indicting each crime separately.828 
Moreover, in this case as in each of the above cases, a female judge was a member of the Trial 
Chamber hearing the case, and occasionally it was a female intervention that facilitated the 
judicial redress process and impacted the development of gender crimes. As some have 
argued, the presence of qualified female judges, prosecutors, investigators, translators, 
                                                                                                                                           
raped or otherwise subjected to sexual violence in the camp. The fear was pervasive and the threat was always 
real that they could be subjected to sexual violence at the whim of Radić. Under these circumstances, the Trial 
Chamber finds that the threat of rape or other forms of sexual violence undoubtedly caused severe pain and 
suffering….and thus, the elements of torture are also satisfied in relation to these survivors Ibid at para. 561.  
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Kraijisnik & Plavšić, Consolidated Amended Indictment, (IT-00-39&40, 7), Mar. 2002.  
230 
 
defence attorneys, and facilitators (for example in the Victim and Witnesses Unit) has 
improved the record in affording redress for gender-related crimes.829 Yet a critical feminist 
analysis might suggest the contrary and argue that this is yet another manifestation of 
‘governance feminism’ that has not been entirely emancipatory for women across the board, 
as Chapter VI goes on to analyse in detail.  
 
Part XI 
 Conclusion  
This chapter has aimed to underline wartime sexual violence as a fusion of issues cutting 
across human rights, gender, ethnicity and culture. Through a review of the salient wartime 
sexual violence cases generated by the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the chapter has 
provided both an analysis of the legal accomplishments of the tribunal, while also conveying as 
sense of space and circumstance within which this type of violence found expression. The 
chapter has, moreover, shown that the interpretation of sexual violence and gendered identity 
is strongly mediated by legal terminology, which has potent effect in determining 
subjectivities. How armed conflict is interpreted and history is narrated in popular discourses 
can have a powerful impact on the construction of its actors in the popular imagination 
allowing little room for critical refection, much less for divergence from dominant narratives.  
 
As has been shown in this chapter, while monumental legal successes have been accomplished 
by the ICTY, gender has been closely entwined with culturalised notions of ethnicity. Women 
therefore continue to be defined along recurring traditional stereotypes, which have not been 
altered despite the most sustained feminist advocacy. But as shown in previous chapters, the 
portrayal of female identity in this way might have been perpetuated by feminists themselves. 
The various feminist judicial interventions described in this chapter have demonstrated that 
this is a type of feminism feeling more comfortable in its own skin- it is what Janet Halley has 
termed a form of ‘governance feminism’ that now feels at ease with power.  The thesis 
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contends that governance feminism has failed to interrogate the ontological essence of the 
Yugoslav conflict, and it has not meaningfully engaged with the root causes of conflict. Perhaps 
this was an unrealistic expectation, given the ICTY’s institutional nature and its symbolic 
location with a new global order situated at the 'end of history'. But this should not absolve 
the ICTY from critique, as its lack of structural inquiry into the war has arguably undermined 
the implicit goals behind the establishment of the tribunal, which aimed at providing an 
accurate historical and geographic account of the conflict. 
A contrapuntal analysis was provided in part III of the chapter in its discussion of the internal 
and external forces of power that contributed to the collapse of the Yugoslav state and its 
institutions. This segment sought to complicate the prevailing narrative around the Yugoslav 
conflict as based on ‘ancient ethnic rivalries’ by examining closely the multiple structural and 
financial causes that contributed to the breakdown of the Yugoslav state and its institutions. In 
this way, the chapter was able to complicate the parameters of the debate by suggesting that 
the popular discourse has sought to camouflage, or ‘depoliticise’ pervasive, fundamental and 
deeply entrenched social problems, such as inequality and subordination.  Moreover, part IV 
critically assessed the role of language, as reflected in the use of terminology such as ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, which helped frame the idea of an ‘ethnic conflict’ in the law. It was suggested that 
the deployment of such terminology warrants further complication.  
 
This chapter has, thus, sought to further stimulate critical debate and provided a springboard 
for the final chapter, which explores in more detail what the institutionalisation of gender-
based violence means for women in the contemporary political and legal moment.  In this 
vein, it aims to address whether international criminal law ought to be the 'preferred vehicle' 
for feminist advocacy and whether the move to institutions, which resulted in a near 'seamless 
performance of consensus' within feminist argumentation and rule preference, is the way 
forward in achieving the twin feminist goals of gender justice and equality.830 It is, therefore, 
worth recalling feminism’s original roots, which did not set out to achieve consensus, much 
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less find triumph through criminalisation, but rather to contest persistent structural 
inequalities against women.  To quote Karen Engle:  
 
‘That many feminists now have a sense of achievement with regard to the development 
of international law in this area is surprising not only because feminists do not generally 
associate their efforts with success.'831  
 
It is with this thought in mind that the thesis aims to bring back critique as an opportunity for 
identifying a more nuanced analysis of power. Its aim is to reshape assumptions underlying 
dominant norms, rather than to come up with proposals for quick-fix reforms. Critique is, thus, 
an opportunity to examine positions, rather than remain trapped in the contemporary 
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The Value of Critique and the Representation of Female Identity in ICTY 
Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence  
 
Part I  
 
Introduction 
As stated previously, the thesis pursues a critical feminist analysis of wartime sexual violence, 
as it is constructed in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence and the surrounding debate. 
So far, the thesis has been concerned with laying out the legal and theoretical background for 
the analysis. To recap, Chapter II provided a detailed summary of recent developments 
concerning gender-based violence in international human rights law by charting the key 
developments that contributed to its visibility and incorporation into contemporary 
international criminal law. At the same time, the chapter provided a sense of the crucial 
advocacy work delivered by various feminist groups in gaining recognition for women’s  
human rights and acknowledgment of gender-based violence as a serious violation of 
international human rights law. This chapter constituted the first pillar in the transition from a 
discussion to a more critical analysis of wartime sexual violence. Yet, it adopted a critical 
feminist analysis of certain concepts such as the gender mainstreaming policies prevalent 
within United Nations institutions in order to showcase the feminist concerns animating this 
project. The argument that these developments might have not been uniformly emancipatory 
for delivering the twin feminist aims of gender justice and equality first found expression 
there. 
 
Chapter III provided a sense of wartime sexual violence as a long-standing historical 
phenomenon by focusing on the events that triggered the establishment of the ad-hoc 
tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia and that helped to propel this issue to the forefront of 
the international agenda. The attention with which wartime sexual violence was treated 
starting in the early 1990s stood in notable contrast to the response to earlier widespread 
reports of sexual violence, as the analysis of the handling of sexual violence during the 
Vietnam War and the Bangladeshi conflict has shown. In addition, the chapter provided a 
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sense of the key feminist critique of international humanitarian law in order to illustrate the 
patriarchal notions informing the laws of armed conflict, which have largely regarded women 
as objects rather than subjects, while at the same time demonstrating the monumental work 
accomplished by the ad-hoc tribunals in redefining international humanitarian law and 
expanding the tribunal statutes in order to make acts of sexual violence justiciable in 
international criminal proceedings. In this way, the tribunals have (amongst others) provided 
landmark definitions of rape, redefined classical categories of international criminal law, such 
as crimes against humanity to incorporate multiple forms of sexual violence against women 
and men and made significant accommodations for a gender-based perspective by instituting 
gender-based legal advisers and by allowing for the first time the contribution of feminist 
activism to the development of the jurisprudence through amicus curiae submissions and 
other initiatives. As such, the tribunals have, inevitably, been hailed by both feminist and non-
feminist scholars as unparalleled successes, while little concern has been raised about what 
these legal accomplishments might mean for the substantive equality of the women 
concerned.  
 
Chapter IV has furnished the thesis with its theoretical underpinnings for the analysis of 
wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, carried out in this chapter. It has canvassed the various 
feminist approaches to the study of human rights, gender, culture, the law and armed conflict. 
In highlighting their respective advantages and disadvantages, the thesis has clarified its own 
position by suggesting a more critical approach towards the study of armed conflict and 
wartime identity. It has shown that feminist activism around the issues of gender-based 
violence and wartime sexual violence is strongly informed by structuralist perspectives of 
women’s subordination, which have permeated both feminist rule preference and legal 
strategy. While it remains true that international law perpetuates deeply entrenched images 
of women based on essentialised notions of female identity, which are often dressed up as 
legal successes, it is also true that feminists themselves have been complicit in this process in 
their quest for quick-fix solutions at the expense of more strategic, long-term feminist goals. 
While there has been much debate in feminist circles about how to incorporate a more 
feminist perspective into the law, there has been little focus on what these developments 




Chapter V has constituted the second limb in the transition from the legal developments 
surrounding gender-based violence to a more critical account by charting in detail the 
landmark cases of sexual violence prosecuted in the ICTY to date and by reflecting on their key 
jurisprudential achievements. It has overviewed the key patterns underlying acts of wartime 
sexual violence against women, thus, reflecting on the fact that the conflict has often been 
described as a systematic war against women. It has also shed light on the detention camp as 
a space, which symbolised the violence against civilians during the Yugoslav armed conflict, yet 
today may well be part of a new political reality. In this way, the chapter has sought to 
distance the thesis from the almost universally endorsed idea that the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was a uniquely evil event, characteristic of en entire cultural landscape and its 
inhabitants. The chapter focused on a number of select cases drawn from the Bosnian conflict 
to flesh out their notable contribution to the evolution of international wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence. At the same time, it presented a preliminary critique of the legal 
tactics used by the ICTY in drawing attention to the intersectional nature of gender and 
ethnicity in the relevant judgments. The present chapter provides a more in-depth analysis of 
the legal tactics deployed by the tribunal and argues that these modalities have reiterated, 
rather than dismantled firmly entrenched and strongly essentialised notions of women.  
 
The present chapter represents the final transition from a discussion of the legal 
developments surrounding wartime sexual violence developments in international criminal 
law set out in the previous chapters to their feminist evaluation pursued here. This chapter 
ultimately crystallises the actual critical feminist approach adopted by the thesis, as not 
exclusively based on one type of feminist theory. Rather, it consists of a series of insights 
garnered across various strands of contemporary feminist, as well as non-feminist theorising. 
Together, these insights are conducive to the type of critical feminist analysis of wartime 
sexual violence jurisprudence and the surrounding debate pursued in this thesis. This chapter, 
thus, crystallises the overall approach of the thesis by explaining its constitutive elements, 
which are categorised as follows.  
 
Part II of the chapter purports to assert the value of critique as itself a worthwhile 
transformative academic and political strategy, in contrast with some feminist preoccupations 
with legal reform and the theory/practice division. This is perhaps the most important element 
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of the approach, adopted by the thesis. Part III addresses the problem of the perceived crises 
of normativity and subjectivity informing much of the debate in current feminist scholarship 
by arguing that the absence of a unified subject need not block certain feminist pursuits. Part 
IV gives an indication of how such a narrative pursuit might proceed, with particular reference 
to the idea of counterpoint, which helps to clarify the narrative and academic strategy of the 
thesis. Part V aims to highlight the two salient trends in ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence: the reading of gender identity through an ethnic lens, and the portrayal of 
women as either victims or mothers. As noted in Chapters I and II, these two trends constitute 
the focus of the chapter because they form the ‘feminist’ core of the debate. Part VI focuses 
on demonstrating the intersection of gender and ethnicity in key ICTY decisions by showing 
that dominant feminist readings of wartime identities have produced a problematic narrative 
of gendered identity in wartime.  To this end, this part of the chapter provides an account of 
the rhetoric of female victimhood as tied to ethnic identity, as it shines through the 
judgements and the dominant feminist discourses surrounding it. Part VII then turns to the 
opponents of these interpretations of female victimhood and of the idea that the Yugoslav 
conflict was in essence a ‘war against women’, highlighting how these as well are more often 
than not articulated within the same conceptual framework. Part VIII takes a step back, in 
order to consider the limitations of the currently prevailing preoccupation with the 
intersection of gender and ethnicity, as well as with notions of autonomy and consent. It adds 
another dimension to the analysis highlighting what the current feminist rhetoric might 
eclipse-namely the possibility of conceptualising wartime agency in different terms. Part IX 
emphasises the desirability of admitting the possibility that women’s subordination and 
inequality might not be analytically resolvable by feminism alone. It implies making room for 
analytical axes other than feminism, sometimes even those apparently incompatible with it, 
which will be an important aspect of the critique pursued in this chapter. Part X, thus, 
proposes an alternative framework, which is not necessarily inspired by feminist thinking, nor 
relies on the increased regulation of gender-based violence as the way forward in 










The Value of Feminist Critique 
As might have emerged from Chapter IV, much of feminist scholarship, in particular the 
structuralist/universalist strand, shares numerous reservations about critique. As Janet Halley 
and Wendy Brown illustrate powerfully in their introduction to a 2002 collection, intended to 
revitalise the tradition of left critique in the United States legal-political context, frequently 
recurring student questions bring out the following concerns:  
 
- Why just now, when women (blacks, Latinos, homosexuals) are finally gaining 
subjectivity, must we engage in a critique of the subject? 
- Postmodern social and critical theory is an indulgence of ‘tenured radicals’ and has 
nothing to say about how power really works. 
- It’s easy to criticize; what do you have to offer that’s better? 
- Your critique is so far removed from the courtroom of everyday politics that it can’t 
possibly be of practical value.832  
 
This snapshot of questions demonstrates the very real anxieties concerning feminist critique as 
a methodological tool for inquiring into the parameters of discourses ranging from gender 
equality legislation, to anti-discrimination provisions, to the way in which gender-based 
violence is currently mobilised in international criminal law. The present discussion intends to 
show that conceding to these anxieties is neither intellectually justifiable nor politically 
desirable. In contrast, they often block intellectual and practical developments within feminist 
theory. It might therefore be preferable, or at least worthwhile, to pursue an approach that 
could purport to operate as if the ‘prohibitive dicta listed above were suspended.’833 Wendy 
Brown’s recent defence of the value and purpose of critique serves as a key element in the 
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ensuing explanation of such an approach.834 She notes that ‘anxiety about critique, reduction 
of it to dismissal or mere negativity, is ubiquitous in contemporary political and legal 
theoretical culture today.’835 This observation is certainly applicable to international feminist 
circles. Brown and Halley argue that critique: 
 
‘[i]s variously charged with being academic, impractical, merely critical, unattuned to 
the political exigencies at hand, intellectually indulgent, easier than fixing things or 
saying what is to be done-in short, either ultra-leftist or ultra-rhetorical, but in either 
case without purchase on or in something called the Real World.’ Critique is thus 
characterized as an abandonment of politics, in so far as it is an abandonment of the 
terms and constraints of real political life, a flight to an elsewhere, politically and 
theoretically.836 
 
Brown persuasively confronts these misconceptions by examining the historical trajectory of 
critique in western thought. She recalls that critique has its origins in the ancient Greek krisis, 
which was a ‘jurisprudential term identified with the act of making distinctions on acts that 
were considered essential to judging and rectifying an alleged disorder in or of the 
democracy.’837 This stands in contrast with contemporary views of critique as evading 
judgement and therefore ‘either destructive or irrelevant’.838 Moreover, Brown and Halley 
distinguish two broad directions in the 18th/19th century critical traditions: the Hegelian-
Marxist tradition, with the early Frankfurt school and Derridian deconstruction being more 
recent varieties, and Nitzschean genealogy, of which Foucault is the most notable 
contemporary theorist, as his work challenges the core of the text in order to bring forth the 
‘unspoken or suppressed constituents of its existence’.839 Modern interpretations or rather 
misconceptions of critique have in contrast asserted that critique signifies an evasion of 
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judgement, and is at best either irrelevant, or at worst potentially destructive.840 Although 
much of the first variety in particular has presumed revelation of truth, (as particularly evident 
in contemporary international criminal jurisprudence), as critique’s ultimate object, the thesis 
deems that it is not an indispensable or even a necessary attribute of critique.841 Rather, the 
premise of critique is not objectivity, but perspective.842  The implication is that critique does 
not guarantee outcomes or resolutions.843 Despite critique’s disquieting quality, this does not 
mean suspension of political values or normative judgement. Brown and Halley also emphasise 
what they call critique’s ‘relief effect’, meaning addressing one’s ‘political anxieties, or 
discontents’.844 It gives one an opportunity to examine positions, rather than remain trapped 
in the contemporary obsession with position-taking. Critique is thus not a process of rejection, 
but of thorough scrutiny, and re-engagement.  As Brown has noted, it is precisely the 
importance and omnipresence of the object of critique that does not allow us to reject or 
dismiss it as insignificant.845 Rather, critique is a practice of continued re-evaluation and 
renewal of the object. Ultimately it is aimed at the object’s transformation.  
 
In a similar vein to Brown and Halley, Nicola Lacey has rejected the dichotomy of feminist 
critique/feminist strategy by arguing that critique itself is a strategy.846 She has argued that it 
is misleading to measure the success of the feminist legal project in terms of straightforward 
legal reform, which is often the case as legal reforms tend to be perceived as the most tangible 
indication of feminist progress- certainly feminist advocacy around the establishment of the 
ICTY, the drafting of its Rules of Evidence and Procedure and the vociferous lobbying for the 
inclusion of acts of gender-based violence into the tribunal’s statute exemplify this trend.  
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According to Lacey, ‘to regard legislative reform as the invariable core of feminist legal politics 
is to exaggerate the power of such reform and to undervalue the power of legal critique’.847  
Thus, not all ‘feminist’ problems can be matched with legal solutions. This is especially evident 
from the fact that many such solutions, introduced for the benefit of women, have turned out 
to be rather anti-emancipatory, inevitably generating new forms of subordination and 
discipline, in which women are even further away from the ostensible feminist goal of 
liberation and empowerment.848 To the extent that such new forms of repression are largely 
invisible and difficult to pinpoint, feminist critique that does not see theory and practice as 
radically divorced becomes all the more appropriate.  
 
Lacey’s conception of ‘critique as strategy’ means that feminist critique is in a way a form of 
political action, a ‘discursive intervention in the production of dominant meanings, albeit one, 
which still has an uneven hold.’849 In this way, it implies ‘a broader conception of the political’ 
underlying the legal and a sharpened ‘sense of the questions we need to confront.’850 
Moreover, Lacey argues that ‘the closure/critique, modernism, post-modernism dichotomies 
are themselves not helpful in feminism and are consistently rejected in the more ‘persuasive’ 
academic literature. On her view, ‘the most persuasive feminist work represents neither a real 
transcendence of the closure/critique dichotomy, nor the unsatisfactory compromises 
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suggested by the idea of a foot in both camps’, but rather rejects the conceptual straightjacket 
which a rigid closure/critique dichotomy seeks to impose, and questions the need to 
understand closure and critique in strongly dichotomised terms’. 851 
 
Critique also has close connections with modalities of feminist theory that engage with law as 
a discourse, and gendering practices852 involving a reconfiguration of feminist theorising to 
identify a more nuanced analysis of power.853 Through generating critique of the dominant 
norms, such feminist aspirations are more long-term: it is to transform assumptions underlying 
the norms, rather than coming up with proposals for quick-fix reforms. As Wendy Brown has 
put it: 
‘Theory’s most important political offering is [the] opening of a breathing space 
between the world of common meanings and the world of alternative ones, a space of 
potential renewal for thought, desire and action. And it is this that we sacrifice by 
capitulating to the demand that theory reveal truth, deliver applications, or solve each 
of the problems it defines.’854 
 
The thesis aims to contribute to a transformation of the existing discourses as a more 
worthwhile pursuit than taking positions on some spectrum within the confines of the existing 
parameters, where some important possibilities for transformation may be lost. The 
limitations of international criminal jurisprudence have become apparent throughout the 
thesis and will further be crystallised in this chapter, while human rights, liberalism, violence, 
the nation and ethnicity, as well as dominant modalities of feminism will be constantly 
scrutinised.   
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As has been discussed previously, there are noticeable tendencies in recent feminist theory to 
ignore or underestimate the material dimensions of women’s subordination, such as the 
oppression of capitalism and the gendered division of labour. This has been analysed in 
previous chapters with reference to Susan Woodward’s, Nira Yuval-Davis’, and Anne Orford’s 
work on the structural dimensions underlying the outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia. The 
argument of the thesis is that these dimensions are persistent and omnipresent as ever, 
despite having been erased in the resulting jurisprudence. The material dimensions affecting 
gendered realities in societies undergoing war, thus, remain relatively unaffected by decades 
of feminist advocacy. Although this thesis doesn’t directly engage with materialist critiques 
and modalities of feminism, materialist concerns do not vanish altogether through its 
preoccupation with discursive practices. It is more accurate to characterise its method, which 
is indebted to Wendy Brown’s work, as an engagement with ‘existing discourses’. Such an 
engagement aims to highlight how framing issues through certain discursive practices 
‘presumes the creature it needs to explain’855 and thus erases the (materialist) questions of 
structural conditions in which subjectivity is formed. The thesis has, thus, argued that the 
framing of wartime sexual violence issues as human rights claims under available legal 
frameworks has assigned deep political social problems to a rather impoverished analytical 
spectrum, which evades power and history, understood in a broader, more materialist sense. 
Thus, rather than ignoring the materialist and structural dimensions the aim is to bring them 
to light.  
 
Part III 
Questions of Normativity and Subjectivity in Feminist Theory 
This part of the chapter will elaborate (more explicitly than previously) on the salient feminist 
anxieties around the issues of normativity and subjectivity that have dominated the debate. 
This is an indispensable methodological clarification in view of the importance that the issue 
has assumed in recent feminist debates. There is currently a widespread perception that 
feminist theory is experiencing a crisis of normativity, which is commonly blamed on 
postmodernist tendencies to fragment female subjectivity, which is considered to be 
extremely counterproductive to the attainment of feminist goals.  
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This part of the chapter argues that this perception is misleading because: (1) normative 
judgement always underlies both critical feminist theory, no matter how ‘postmodern’ or 
‘disorientating’; and (2) a unified sense of the subject is not necessary in order to pursue 
certain normative commitments. In other words, the argument is that feminist normativity is 
not in crisis. According to Joanne Conaghan, feminism as such has been particularly normative 
as its ‘history, concept, focus, concepts, methodologies, political and intellectual objectives are 
all imbued with an overriding sense of wrongfulness, of violation, exploitation, repression, of 
silenced voices and excluded Others.’856 On this view, feminist scholarship is an inherently 
normative project insofar as it goals, most broadly defined, are concerned with ‘prescribing 
and effecting transformation, informed by a range of normative ideals including sexual 
equality, social justice, and individual self-development.’857 
 
It is doubtful that postmodern and poststructuralist varieties of feminism operate outside of 
these normative parameters, however modernist the origins of these may be. As to the 
normativity of ‘postmodern’ feminism, Judith Butler, for example, asserts unequivocally that 
‘feminism is about the social transformation of gender relations’.858 Despite her radically 
poststructuralist stance, she suggests that normativity is ubiquitous as ‘norms can operate 
both as unacceptable restrictions and as part of any critical analysis that seeks to show what is 
unacceptable in that restrictive operation.’859 Thus, she reiterates the indispensability, even 
desirability of normative judgement. So, there is ample evidence to support the proposition 
that feminist theorising is always and quite unavoidably normative. Why then is there such a 
strong sense in many feminist circles that normativity is in crisis?  
 
In a seminal essay written more than a decade ago, Wendy Brown locates what she describes 
as a ‘palpable feminist panic’,860 caused by postmodernist deconstructions of the subject in a 
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strong modernist ethos, even a certain ‘foundationalism’, prevalent in mainstream feminism. 
The link between feminism’s modernist ethos and its panic in the face of ‘something called 
postmodernism’ that does away with singular, unified notions of women, can be understood  
through Foucault’s discussion of the confessional subject, who is presumed to contain ‘truth’ 
as a secret with which to purge his soul through confession. To the extent that feminism hails 
breaking the silence about women’s oppression as a way to liberation, the voicing of women’s 
experiences acquires ‘[a]n inherently confessional cast’.861 Thus, ‘feminist foundationalism 
transports the domain of truth from reason to subjectivity, from Geist to inner voice.’862 This is 
what makes staunchly modernist feminists express concerns such as those articulated by an 
earlier critic of postmodern feminism Christine di Stefano:  
 
‘To the extent that feminist politics is bound up with a specific constituency or subject, 
namely women, the postmodernist prohibition against subject-centred inquiry and 
theory undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based organized movement dedicated to 
articulating and implementing the goals of such a constituency’.863 
 
Essentialism as such is not the problem here. Rather, it is the particular type of essentialism: 
the equation of subjectivity with truth, normativity and perhaps most problematically-politics. 
The problematic conflation of subjectivity and politics is also characteristic of the scholarship 
of Seyla Benhabib, a leading Habermasian feminist: she cannot conceive of politics ‘without 
positing [in some form] norms of autonomy, choice and self-determination.’864 
 
The core of Brown’s argument against strongly modernist, or what she calls feminist 
foundationalist concerns about the crisis of the subject is that ‘gender can be conceived as a 
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marker of power, a marker of subjects, an axis of subordination without thereby converting it 
to a “center of selves”  understood as foundational.’865 She cites as an example the fact that 
even the most radical poststructuralists do not claim that pervasive gender subordination 
structures do not exist because feminists cannot agree on ‘who or what “woman” is or what it 
is that she wants’.866 There is, thus, a clear distinction between politics and ontology, a fact 
that seems to have escaped those feminists, who decry the destabilisation of the subject as 
paralysing normative pursuits. As Brown and Halley reiterate, critique promises perspective, 
rather than objectivity. It is then exactly the perspective of critique that sustains normative 
feminist engagement with political, social and legal issues-insofar as perspective is offered by 
the normative technique of counterpoint, which provides the impetus for the ensuing analysis 





Counterpoint as a Methodological Tool for Analysis 
As explained previously, there is a widespread perception that feminist normativity is in crisis, 
which tends to be linked with a crisis of subjectivity. How then might feminism be normative-
how might it engage in critique and political lobbying-in the absence of unifying truth claims 
about the subject, whose putative interest it purports to represent? Brown’s own vision that 
 
‘Dispensing with the unified subject does not mean ceasing to be able to speak about 
our own experiences as women, only that our words cannot be legitimately deployed 
or construed as larger or longer than the lives they speak from.’867 
 
is, thus, useful as the destabilisation of the universal woman does not mean the silencing of 
women’s voices. One possibility of perspective is found in the normative technique of 
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counterpoint, which provides the impetus for the ensuing analysis of ICTY wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence. The thesis is, thus, loosely guided by the idea of counterpoint, as 
already stated in the introductory chapter, which was advanced by Wendy Brown as a 
‘provisionally proposed technique for holding together the inherent slide of gender on the one 
hand and the powers comprising regimes of male dominance on the other.’868 
 
Counterpoint can be described as an anti-hegemonic, open-ended and tactical practice of 
multiplicity that does not rely on methodological techniques such as dialectics, which seeks 
out the opposition and contradiction in texts. The aim of counterpoint is, therefore, to bring 
out the complexity that cannot emerge through a single representational practice. It does not 
seek to harmonise, or find solutions to intricate problems, but seeks to provide an elsewhere 
to dominant narratives, thus, contesting dominance and power through the work of 
juxtaposition.869 In this way, counterpoint can provide a technique for resisting both the 
essentialist and fragmenting impulses in a manner that does not simply put the two into 
opposition, but uses one to complicate the other, thus, indicating ‘the possibilities of 
transforming the usual assumptions as framing each other’.870 Thus, counterpoint is not only 
normative in the sense of pursuing the objective of tackling the ‘endless variety and 
monotonous similarity of gender and gender oppression’, but also in the sense of being a 
technique, through which feminist critique can be pursued.  Specifically, counterpoint as a 
methodology reflects the normative aspiration that feminist scholarship would benefit from 
the sort of engagement that seeks to complicate and interrogate discursive modalities and 
understandings, prevalent at a particular time. As Brown explains, such a complication does 
not necessarily carry a contradiction rather it is driven by anti-hegemonic sensibilities.  
 
This is exactly what this chapter sets out to do. It adopts contrapuntal strategies in both its 
structure and substantive approach to the analysis. It gives an account of gendered identity as 
constructed in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. This account represents the 
dominant position espoused by various feminist groupings in the current wartime sexual 
violence debate. This analysis particularly focuses on the Prosecutor v. Kunarac decision, for it 
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provides fertile ground for the critical feminist analysis pursued by this thesis. Not only does it 
encapsulate the full range of gendered experiences occurring in wartime its depiction of 
gendered identity has also elicited a wide range of feminist reactions that this thesis seeks to 
put into perspective. Thus, first, an account of the standard portrayal of female identity in 
international law and its attendant discourse is provided. Secondly, the opposite position is 
put forward, in counterpoint to the dominant one. Third, these are complicated by a more in-
depth analysis of the parameters of the debate, which purports to interrogate the underlying 
assumption on which both positions rest. Fourth, a final counterpoint is advanced in an 
attempt to reformulate the frames of the debate. Throughout this analysis reference is made 
to related wartime sexual violence jurisprudence and the specific feminist discourses that 
surround it. Before proceeding with this analysis, the rest of the present chapter explains the 




The Representation of Female Identity in ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence Jurisprudence 
This segment considers the first of two trends informing current ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence, i.e., the preoccupation of the legal trial with reproducing and naturalising 
dominant social norms and practices, including those that normalise women’s inequality. 
International wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, as has been argued, rests on 
dichotomised and hierarchical gendered subjectivities that are brought into being through the 
law. Returning to the critique first advanced by Dianne Otto, the thesis argues that far from 
constructing a unitary trope of ‘woman’, three recurring subjectivities emerge, overlapping 
frequently and producing complex and productive interrelationships.871 The recurrent 
subjectivities are that of the ‘wife and mother’, who needs ‘protection’ during both times of 
war and peace and is more often an object than a subject of international law; second, the 
women, who is formally ‘equal’ with men, at least in the realm of public life; and thirdly, the 
‘victim’ subject, who is produced by colonial narratives of gender, as well as by notions of 
women’s sexual vulnerability.872 The thesis is predominantly concerned with demonstrating 
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how the subjectivity of the ‘wife and mother’ and the ‘woman as victim’ materialise, for the 
woman who is formally equal to men has been largely absent from ICTY wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence possibly because very few women occupied high-ranking military, or 
political posts during the Yugoslav conflict.873 The forthcoming analysis demonstrates that 
although the representations of men and women in the judgements appear to be fluid, as 
different subjectivities are seemingly showcased, the gendered duality whereby male 
dominance depends on his dissimilarity with the  feminine ‘Other’ is resurrected.874 The 
analysis, thus, shows that these gendered identities and their attendant hierarchies have 
‘displayed an uncanny ability to survive’, despite the vocal feminist lobbying and advocacy for 
gender justice and equality. In short, they have repeated women’s marginalisation and 
exclusion from full humanity.875  
 
i) Gendered Wartime Identity in the Kunarac decision 
The Prosecutor v. Kunarac case provides the focus for this chapter, as it showcases the central 
modalities by which gendered identities came into being in ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence.876 To refresh the more detailed account provided in Chapter V, the case 
concerned the ‘systematic’ rape including ‘gang’ rape by Serb soldiers of Bosnian Muslim 
women held inside local high schools and sports halls that had been transformed into 
detention centres during the Serb takeover of the town of Foča in central Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in April 1992.877 As reiterated various times across the judgement, some women and girls were 
being subjected to public rape, while others were routinely taken out of the facilities to be 
raped and subsequently returned. Other women, in turn, were permanently removed from 
the facilities and held elsewhere for sexual access whenever their captors demanded it.878 The 
ICTY ruled the rape of women to be a crime against humanity, and held that both sexual 
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enslavement and rape qualify as crimes against humanity, when victims held in circumstances 
of detention are subjected to repeated rape over days, weeks, or months.  
 
The judgement rendered the first rape as crime against humanity conviction and the first ever 
enslavement in conjunction with rape conviction. Furthermore, it made extensive holdings 
regarding the element of enslavement, while at the same time further clarifying the elements 
of rape and torture under international law.879 Moreover, the case was significant, for multiple 
charges against the defendants were brought with rape being variously charged as a crime 
against humanity, a violation of the laws and customs of war, and a form of torture, thus, 
classifying it as a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws and customs of war. The 
fact that multiple charges were brought was significant because it constituted a recognition 
that wartime rape occurs in different contexts, for different reasons and with various impacts 
on the victims. 
 
Jurisprudentially, the Kunarac case has been widely seen as a success amongst feminist 
advocates and scholars; the aim of the segment, however, is to show that the law continues to 
present a very partial idea of the body through the representation of the female identity as 
inevitably rooted in victimhood. The first indicative paragraph to illustrate the notion of 
women as victims and their lack of agency is as follows: 
 
                ‘Numerous witnesses stated that soldiers and policemen would come constantly, 
sometimes several times a day; they would point at women and girls or call them by 
their names and take them out for rape. The women had no choice but to obey those 
men and those who tried to resist were beaten in front of other women. The girls and 
women were generally taken for a few hours and returned, sometimes overnight, and 
some of them were taken away every day. After about 10-15 days, most of them were 
transferred to Partizan Sports Hall.’880 
 
 Female victimhood is implied here through a purported absence of choice to resist the rapists. 
Moreover, in referring to women in the same breath as girls, which is achieved rather 
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effectively through the use of the passive verb to describe the women’s ordeal, any sense of 
resistance or autonomy is precluded. This is emphasised in the following passage: 
 
‘Some women who had testified before the Trial Chamber had been taken out so often 
by so many soldiers, that they were consequently unable to assess with precision the 
number of times they had been raped.’881 
 
While this passage illustrates the indiscriminate nature of rape and the incalculable harm 
suffered by the women, at the same time the women here are presented as the opposite of 
the abstract, rational individual subject of international law. The emphasis on their inability to 
remember the precise details, or number of rapes implies that they might have been 
overtaken by emotion, or humiliation-characteristics commonly associated with women and 
suggestive of the often infantilised (hence the inability to recollect precise details) victim 
subject of international law, who is utterly subjugated by her male bearer of ‘civilization’, in 
this instance the male captor, as the central protagonist of this war, thus, reinforcing the 
protectionist and proprietary notions of women described earlier.882 While it is undoubtedly 
true that victims of sexual violence suffer from memory loss and sometimes cannot remember 
exact details when faced with the formal and utterly oppressive atmosphere of the court 
room, it appears as if the women’s gap in memory and their inability to remember facts are 
central to their very subjectivity as women. In this way, the tribunal characterises female 
identity through a deeply essentialised lens.  
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The deployment of the passive verb to characterise the treatment of women is once again evident in this passage.  
Moreover, the inference that soldiers had ‘easy access’ to the women suggests that the women offered very little 
resistance, reinforcing a sense of objectification, a rendering of women as passive recipients of the violence 
constituted through the corporeal aspects of their existence. The passage not only vividly embodies the women’s 
subjectivity in international law as defined by victimhood, but also reinforces their sense of helplessness and 






ii) Contested Wartime Agency and the Case of Witness FWS-87 
One of the key testimonies during the trial came from witness FWS-87, a woman who had 
been transported from the nearby town of Buk Bjela to Foča High School in July, 1992. After 
testifying to having endured multiple rapes inside the Foča High School and Partizan Sports 
Hall detention camps for several weeks, the witness was then transferred to a private 
residence in the town, where the abuse continued under the authority of Dragoljub 
Kunarac.883  Following her stay in the private residence provided by the defendant, the witness 
was subsequently transferred to yet another private apartment belonging to Radomir Kovač in 
the Lepa Brena block. While testifying about the almost daily oral and vaginal rape she had to 
endure at the hands of Kovač in this instance, she also recalled several incidents in which she 
was made to strip in front of him and another soldier, Jago Kostić, who were both armed at 
the time.884 A startling passage indicative of the sense of emotional harm experienced by the 
witness during her time of captivity inside the residence attests to a situation of extreme 
duress, where  
 
‘On another occasion, Radomir Kovač forced her alone to undress, climb on a table and 
dance to music. While he was watching her, he pointed a gun at her. FWS-87 was 
frightened and ashamed; she had the feeling that Radomir Kovač owned her’.885 
 
The description of the emotional impact of the sexual abuse carries protectionist undertones, 
for although designed to reinforce the sense of trauma experienced by the witness, the 
passage portrays female identity through the female body as the soldier’s property. It thus 
reinforces a sense of déjà-vu indirectly sustaining the historical treatment of sexual violence by 
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the law, which was marked by a complete absence of registering female subjectivity as 
anything other than rooted in bodily corporeality, given that its essence was ‘damage to the 
proprietary value of virginity or chastity to an ‘owning’ male rather than recognition of a 
woman’s interest in her own sexual freedom’.886 
 
The passage reinforces the proprietary notions of the female body as the central objective of 
the offence, while devaluing any sense of the violation as a harm against female subjectivity. 
The tribunal, thus, instrumentalises the female body as a mechanism for keeping intact firmly 
entrenched gendered subjectivities resting on dominant hierarchies inherent in the very 
nature of the law. Female autonomy in this rendering is not about exercising any meaningful 
choice, but is an interest which the disembodied subject has in controlling access to ‘[a] rather 
curious object to which she stands in a position of ownership-her body’.887 The feeling of 
emotional harm experienced by the victim is not generated through a violation of her 
autonomous self, but through the idea of the injury to the body, as a proprietary value that 
has been interfered with. The emphasis on the corporeality of the harm, thus, obscures its 
emotional implications, as an emphasis on shame and humiliation does not encompass the full 
range of emotions experienced during the process of violence. Female subjectivity in this 
rendering has come full circle-in drawing attention to the gendered harm experienced by the 
witness the tribunal has drawn attention to the sense of precariousness and vulnerability of 
women in wartime. An alternative and more fruitful judicial strategy might have been to 
underline the women’s survival instinct in the face of such extreme circumstance. Yet, instead 
the judges chose to focus on female identity as closely linked to a sense of helplessness, lack of 
agency and victimhood, a strategy that forecloses any possibility of conceiving of their 
courage, if not outright heroism in having survived the ordeal described on these pages.   
 
iii) Complicating Identity The Intersection of Gender and Ethnicity in Kunarac  
 
A rather effective legal modality deployed by the Trial Chamber was its overdetermination of 
gender and ethnicity as two intersecting axis of subordination that constantly combine to 
create the impression that the women were raped, or otherwise sexually violated due to their 
ethnic belonging. In a passage concerning allegations that some of the women might have 
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consensually engaged in sexual relations with their captors (a point the thesis will return to 
later), witness FWS-191 denies these allegations by stating that ‘[i]t is inconceivable that FWS-
87, or for that matter “any Muslim girl” could have moved around Foča freely.’888 
 
This statement is significant from an intersectional perspective, as it emphasises the sense of 
victimhood and powerlessness as inextricably tied in with Muslim identity in wartime Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The witness in question was, thus, seemingly unable to move around freely both 
on account of her gender, as well as her ethnic identity, which together combine to deny her 
any sense of agency or choice in her interactions with the Bosnian Serb soldiers. The 
implication here is that a Bosnian Muslim woman could not have meaningfully consented to 
any social, let alone sexual interaction with her captors because her gendered identity, 
evidently entirely informed by her ethnic affiliation, prevented her from exercising any 
meaningful choice in this situation.889 The intersectional construction of sexual violence in ICTY 
jurisprudence is taken up again in the analysis of the Čelebići judgement at which point a 
contrapuntal perspective on the intersectional tendencies of ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence is presented.  
 
As seen from the analysis of the Kunarac judgement thus far, much of the testimony about the 
female experience of war hinges on statements made by witness FWS-87, whose ethnic 
identity has been made central in producing the main narrative on wartime sexual violence. 
This segment of the chapter aims to demonstrate how the Trial Chamber presumes that 
Bosnian Muslim women lacked agency in all kinds of situations, whether coercive or not, by 
highlighting a number of passages that portray the witness in a rather different way, thus, 
complicating her identity rather significantly to suggest that she was indeed able to make 
informed choices, in spite of the apparently coercive circumstances of the situation. In an 
insightful passage Kunarac describes taking witness FW-87 aside for a talk in the Karaman's 
house after hearing that she had been transferred there instead of having been taken back to 
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the Partizan detention facility.890 Upon taking her upstairs and inquiring about her well-being, 
given his impression that she looked like a ‘depressed vegetable’, the witness expressed that 
she 'did not expect him just to want to talk, but expected to be raped by him like the others 
did.'891 In fact Kunarac stresses at this juncture that the two did not have sexual intercourse on 
the occasion and that he only asked her to slightly unbutton her shirt, so that ‘if a man came 
in, he would not be suspicious.’892 Kunarac claims to have left the room shortly thereafter.  
 
This passage is of great interest to the thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, it complicates 
the picture provided thus far in the Trial Chamber judgement of the existence of a linear story 
of female agency or lack thereof, juxtaposed against the binary of an utter sense of male 
domination and oppression of women. Upon closer inspection of the statement, a sense that 
the interaction between Kunarac and the witness might have been rather multifaceted and 
not entirely driven by fear and coercion is created. Rather than a sense of female victimhood, 
the impression here is of the male protagonist captor acting in a sensitive fashion towards the 
woman’s needs, not only because it suggests that he did not intend to physically harm her, but 
more so because he goes as far as to express concern about her well-being.  While this 
statement is to be read with great care, as it is entirely based on the defendant’s subjective 
recollection of events, this situation nonetheless suggests the possibility of male compassion. 
Theirs could possibly have been a relationship of intimacy, which would overthrow the sense 
created so far of an interaction driven by male domination and female submissiveness. The 
passage, thus, in subtle ways, complicates the picture of male oppression and female 
victimhood presented throughout the judgement.893   
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iv) The Testimony of Radomir Kovač 
The projection of FWS-87 as a passive victim of war without any sense of agency was most 
strongly challenged by the testimony of the co- accused, Radomir Kovač, whose account 
strongly suggested that he and the woman were not only engaged in mutual sexual relations, 
but were in fact in love with each other.894 This was corroborated by the testimony of 
numerous witnesses, who stated that FWS-87 looked 'happy' with Kovač and that the two 
were actually engaged in a consensual romantic relationship.895 
 
It is significant at this juncture to remark upon the fact that the defence introduced the 
testimony of seven female witnesses, who were privy to the ‘intimate’ relationship between 
the defendant and the witness and were therefore able to comment on its nature. According 
to one witness, for example, Kovač would regularly refer to the girl as 'my little one', which in 
the witness’ mind suggested that theirs was a romantic relationship based on intimacy, if not 
love, but certainly not founded on duress.896 
 
In a rather startling passage, which yet again invokes the close intersection of ethnicity and 
gender in this situation, witness DM, a cousin of the defendant’s father claimed that Kovač 
came to visit her with a girl-FWS-87-going as far as to introduce her as his girlfriend at the end 
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of November 1992, thus, after months already spent in captivity.897 Another witness 
testimony-that of DH, a cousin of Radomir Kovač, who lived in the same apartment block after 
the latter had moved in the autumn of 1992 goes even further to suggest that Kovač lived on 
the top floor with a girl whom he introduced as his girlfriend, thus, indicating that theirs was 
not a relationship based on captivity and sexual violence, but was one of mutual co-
habitation.898 
 
A further witness, who was unrelated to Kovač by virtue of family ties was witness DV, a nurse 
who worked with his unit during the war. In one seemingly insignificant, yet highly nuanced 
glimpse into their relationship she recalls an incident during which she provided him with 
medicine and sanitary towels, which he had requested for his ‘girlfriend.’899 The witness stated 
that he looked ‘in love at the time’.900 Moreover, upon seeing the accused and FWS-87 on a 
couple of other occasions when she went to his apartment, DV had come to the conclusion 
that he and the girl had a good relationship, also making reference to the letter he had 
received from the girl to which the witness had been privy.  
 
In yet another piece of key testimony-this time from witness DN-the owner of Café Linea and a 
childhood friend of the accused-Radomir Kovač, accompanied by Kostić and two girls, came to 
the café and sat with the witness for a while. Kovač then introduced one of the girls-allegedly 
FWS-87-as his girlfriend prompting his childhood friend to exclaim that it seemed ‘incredible’ 
that she ‘could be a Muslim’.901 The witness went on to concede that having a girlfriend of this 
ethnic background was ‘highly unusual’ in those days for a Serb and noting that the two girls 
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were the only Muslim customers in the café. 902 While this passage highlights the strong 
intersection of gender and ethnicity as constitutive of female wartime identity, it also 
complicates the linear wartime narrative presented thus far through its assertion that female 
agency was indeed not only possible, but distinctly present in this case. Given the challenges 
and prejudices faced by an inter-ethnic couple (especially male Bosnian Serb and female 
Bosnian Muslim), it is even more remarkable that these two chose to be together. This could 
indicate that witness FWS-87 had exercised her will and choice by engaging in a seemingly 
romantic relationship with a man, deemed her enemy not only by those in her local 
community, but also by outraged international feminists of various stripes who could not 
conceive of such scenarios either in peace, or in wartime.903  
 
Another significant witness for the prosecution—witness DO- a friend of Kovač recalled seeing 
the latter sometime in November 1992 at which point the accused told him about his girlfriend 
admitting that he was in love with witness FWS-87. 904 The witness also recalled seeing Kovač 
in the presence of FWS-87 at the Café Leonardo in December of the same year, the only 
occasion in which he exchanged a few words with the girl. According to witness DO all 
appeared to be in ‘good mood’.  On another occasion Kovač, who at this point had been 
wounded in combat urged him not to say anything about the injuries to his girlfriend so that 
she would not be worried, while later Kovač told him that he had received a letter with a heart 
drawn on it from one of the girls, who he had seen off in Montenegro, in which she expressed 
her gratitude to him, although the witness conceded not having read the letter personally.905  
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The examples highlighted in this segment of the chapter variously illustrate that agency and 
choice in wartime are decidedly more complicated than what transpires in standard 
interpretations of wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. This suggests that, while the picture 
is far more complex than the resulting judgements indicate, the law itself continues to portray 
women in monolithic fashion, as victims of their circumstances, who are utterly unable to 
exercise any sense of individual agency, for they are entirely subjected to male domination 
and control in situations of armed conflict. Yet, as the highlighted passages suggest, female 
agency was present and alive, even amidst these scenarios of extreme coercion. In this light, a 
range of female voices, who were not victims, but women with jobs, with incomes generating 
a living for themselves- even in times of utter instability and precariousness of life-were 
illuminated.  
 
The witness testimonies presented came from women, who worked as nurses, journalists, bar 
owners and administrators illustrating the fact that-even in wartime-women had a voice and a 
purpose, which was not driven by their sexuality. The voices of these witnesses coupled with 
their sense of agency, thus, firmly contradict the predominant wartime gender identities 
constructed in international law. It is unfortunate that these women’s voices were not given 
greater weight in the resulting jurisprudence of the tribunal, as they could have potentially 
explained the material and structural dimensions that contributed to one set of women being 
viciously assaulted for sexual and other motives, while another set of women was seemingly 
able to pursue professions with relative normality, in spite of the situation surrounding them. 
It is then precisely the voices of these women and the constructions of these female identities, 
which ought to have been pronounced to far greater effect in the decisions in order to 
demonstrate the multiple and varied nature of gender identity in times of armed conflict.  
 
As mentioned earlier, this segment of the chapter aims to highlight another set of passages 
where the identity of the woman as mother is most strongly pronounced before turning its 
attention to the dominant feminist representation of wartime sexual violence, as part of the 
contrapuntal analysis pursued by the thesis. The following passage arises out of the testimony 
by witness FWS-75, who spoke about her time in captivity in the apartment of Radomir Kovač 




‘During that time, the girls had to perform household work, such as cleaning up, 
cooking and washing men’s clothes. When the men were not present, they would be 
locked in an apartment.’906 
 
The woman-as-mother figure is implicit in this passage, which portrays women through 
entrenched gender stereotypes prevalent in the private sphere-the women here are not only 
sexually violated, they are also enslaved through having to perform household chores typically 
associated with motherhood and childrearing. It is this portrayal that defines them, as the Trial 
Chamber does not provide any information about what these women might have done prior 
to their captivity-whether they pursued professions, went to university, or what role they 
played in the local community prior to the outbreak of the conflict.  
 
Another 19-year old witness-A.S.-is described as having been continuously raped while she 
lived at Kovač’s apartment and as having had to ‘perform household duties-moreover, she was 
not free to go where she wanted to go.’907 This passage merges both entrenched gender 
subjectivities into one narrative-the woman here is both respectively victim-by way of the 
continuous rape subjected to, as well as mother-by way of the fact that she is made to 
perform domestic duties typically associated with motherhood and the private sphere.  
 
Another passage in relation to A.S.’s experience brings out the gendered dimensions of 
wartime sexual agency, as seen by the Trial Chamber, more strongly:  
 
‘A.S……..had the impression that Kovac had control over what happened in the 
apartment. Jago Kostic would rape her anytime he wanted, orally and vaginally, and 
she had no choice but to comply with his demands; he would also sometimes beat her 
and once threatened to cut her throat. Both women had to obey every command, 
because the two men were armed at all times with knives, rifles or pistols. The 
apartment was locked and there was no access to the outside world. The women had 
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to do housework like cleaning the apartment and the men’s clothes, as well as serving 
them food and drinks.’908 
 
In this passage the two recurring subjectivities emerge, overlapping frequently and producing 
complex and productive interrelationships. The ‘wife and mother’ in need of protection during 
wartime is clearly evident in the contours of this passage as the object, but not the subject of 
international law. Secondly, the victim and her attendant sexual vulnerability, (as frequently 
produced by colonial narratives of gender) emerges strongly in the passage, for it is implied 
that she is at the constant mercy of her captor, who rapes her anytime he wants leaving her 
no choice but to comply with his demands. Furthermore, the women’s utter subjection and 
final humiliation is magnified through the Trial Chamber’s emphasis on the men, who are 
portrayed as being in complete control of the situation. This is also emphasised through the 
description as being armed to their teeth, which gives them further scope to exercise 
complete control over their female captives. The metaphor of the locked apartment from 
which there was seemingly no escape for the women, moreover, infers female vulnerability 
and lack of agency, for there was apparently nothing the women could do to unlock the door 
and escape from detention.  
 
A further passage, arising out of the testimony of witness FWS-87 magnifies the recurring 
gendered subjectivities illustrated above thereby further entrenching gender stereotypes in 
wartime Bosnia:  
 
‘FWS-87 testified that she was taken to the apartment of Radomir Kovac together with 
A.S, FWS-75 and A.B. FWS-87 further described that A.S. would be raped by Jago Kostic, 
while FWS-87 herself would be raped by Radomir Kovac. FWS-87 also confirmed that 
the women had to do household chores during their stay in the apartment and that 
they were locked up in the apartment without any contact to the outside world. FWS-
87’s testimony, also supports A.S.’s statement that the two women were sold together 
by Radomir Kovac for 500 Deutschmarks each to two Montenegrin soldiers and were 
subsequently taken to Niksic and Podgorica in Montenegro’909 
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Both the stereotypes of the woman-as victim, a well as the woman-as mother are amplified in 
this passage by tying them to sexual slavery and trafficking. Thus, the portrayal of women is 
not only objectified through their representation as the soldier’s chattel, it is also implied that 
the women lack any sense of control over their future predicament, as it is a foregone 
conclusion that they will be traded as sexual merchandise to yet another set of male captors, 
in this case Montenegrin soldiers. It should be pointed out at this juncture again that the thesis 
in no way aims to diminish the ordeal experienced by the women during their captivity, 
generated by the terror of seeing not only their own lives altered dramatically by the horrors 
of war, but also through learning that the country they had grown up in and had come to 
identify with would never be the same again. What this segment has sought to point out was 
merely that more attention needs to be drawn to alternative narratives, or possibilities of an 
elsewhere amidst the stories of wartime ruin and oppression, which rather than 
disempowering women could actually enhance their agency and draw attention to their 
subjectivity and autonomy as fully constituted subjects of international law.  
 
Part VI 
The Dominant Feminist Position on Gendered Identity and the Yugoslav Conflict 
 
As already widely discussed throughout the thesis the dominant strand in feminist thinking on 
wartime sexual violence has centred on ‘governance feminism’ which has been especially 
prevalent in the way feminist voices that have emerged across contemporary international 
institutions. The move to institutions therefore led to a strong feminist consensus that 
wartime sexual violence against women is best addressed through international criminal 
prosecution.  Hence, feminist advocacy placed strong faith in the mechanism of the criminal 
trial (with all its anti-feminist attributes) as the preferred vehicle for addressing gender 
injustice. As pointed out, the consolidation of feminist thinking was in large part due to a 
structuralist-feminist worldview, which permeated much of feminist argumentation and rule 
preference.910 This is manifested most clearly in the ‘move to institutions’ advocated by 
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Catherine MacKinnon, who had very dogmatic ideas about the meaning of the rapes in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The most problematic aspect about the ideas espoused by MacKinnon was that 
they presumed that there were ‘essential ethnic differences’ between Serbs, Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims, that women were powerless victims, incapable of defending themselves or 
speaking out to defend others, or-even less likely-that they could take sides and participate in 
the war.  
 
As already stated, most feminist international legal scholars and practitioners have viewed the 
ICTY’s treatment of sexual violence as an important step forward in the long road to gender 
justice and equality. However, there was strong disagreement among ‘governance feminists’ 
as to how to approach the rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina-the question was whether rape was an 
act of genocide against Bosnian Muslims, or whether it was merely a tool in a wider ‘war 
against women’, thus, an attack on women as a universal group, regardless of their ethnicity. 
Catherine MacKinnon was one of the most vocal proponents of the position that rape in the 
Balkans by Serbs was ‘genocidal’.911 Thus, the Kunarac judgement in the numerous passages 
highlighted above embodies the prevailing feminist sentiment of MacKinnon, for it suggests 
that women were raped not only because they were women, but also because they were 
Muslim women. The constant sense of duress implied in these scenarios would therefore 
suggest to a structuralist feminist like MacKinnon that the ultimate motive behind the rapes 
was the elimination in whole or in part of Bosnian Muslim women as a distinct ethnic and 
religious group.  
 
Much of Mac Kinnons’ writings in the 1980s argued that the distinction between everyday 
heterosexual sex and rape embodied in the legal definition of rape was a product of male 
dominance and therefore incoherent and inherently suspect.912In the 1990s, she transposed 
this critique onto the Balkan context by attempting to articulate an international legal 
understanding of rape that would distinguish not between everyday heterosexual sex and 
                                                                                                                                           
women’, and it made ‘ever more sense’ to talk about the war without any acknowledgment that men died in it. In 
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rape, but between ‘everyday’ wartime rape and the rape committed by Serbs. As previously 
described, she did so by referring to the Holocaust as a seemingly useful analogy to the events 
in the Balkans.913 Moreover, in attacking those who opposed her, MacKinnon asked:  
 
‘If all men do this all the time, especially in war, how can one pick one side in this one? 
And since all men do this all the time, war or no war, why do anything special about 
this now? This war becomes just a form of business as usual. But genocide is not 
business as usual-not even for men.’914 
 
Mac Kinnon’s reasoning was that the extent of the rapes against Bosnian Muslim women by 
Serbian men was systematic and extraordinary. Much of the passages highlighted in the 
Kunarac judgement reiterate this view through their heightened emphasis on the systematic, 
if not industrialised nature underlying the sexual violence.  Thus, the feminists, who advocated 
distinguishing the rapes of Bosnian Muslim women as genocidal were encouraged by the 
jurisprudence emerging from the tribunal, which created the sense that the rapes were 
widespread, organised and systematic, in addition to being attacks based on ethnicity, which 
formed the core argument of this position.  At the start of the war, when Mac Kinnon termed 
the Bosnian-Serb rape of both Croats and Muslims as genocidal, she explicitly reiterated the 
ethnic component in distinguishing the rapes by Croats and Muslims from those by Serbs: 
 
‘This genocidal war has been repeatedly mischaracterized as a ‘civil war’, aggressor 
equated with victim ‘all sides’ blandly blamed for their ‘hatred…’But there is no Muslim 
or Croatian policy of territorial expansion, of exterminating Serbs, of raping Serbian 
women’.915 
 
Again, reading through the Kunarac judgement the sense of this being a war fought against 
women marches closely hand in hand with the idea that the intent of the Serbs was to destroy 
Bosnian Muslims, and that mass rape committed by the Serbs was just another part of war.  
According to some structuralist feminists the intent of the rapes themselves would not have to 
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be the destruction of a group-as long as the rapes were widespread or systematic and used in 
a war of genocide, the nexus would be assumed. 916 Hence, the legal modality of the Trial 
Chamber employed in this case of constantly emphasising and reiterating the widespread and 
systematic nature of the rape inflicted on the women in both the detention camps and the 
sports facilities clearly resonates with the structuralist feminist worldview espoused by legal 
feminist scholars, such as Catherine MacKinnon.  The judgement in the Kunarac case then 
easily leads to another highly problematic assumption about gendered identities during the 
Yugoslav conflict and particularly espoused by radical feminists, namely that the effect of the 
rapes on Bosnian Muslim women was social ostracism, which in turn rendered the impact of 
the rape on Bosnian Muslim women ‘unique’, as has previously been demonstrated. Askin, for 
example, has noted that the consequences of rape:  
 
‘[m]ay be “particularly severe in traditional patriarchal societies, where the rape victim 
is often perceived as soiled and unmarriageable, thus, becoming a target of social 
ostracism.”….Adding to the trauma and humiliation is the fact that for many women, 
and to a more extreme extent traditional Muslims, chastity is essential to maintain 
family honor. Stealing the virginity of a Muslim woman, even if by rape, causes the 
survivor to be considered unworthy of a man, casting shame and disgrace on the entire 
family.’917 
 
The overdetermination of gender and shame along the axis of culture is also evident in the 
passage above describing FWS-87’s ‘utter sense of humiliation’ when she was forced to 
perform an erotic dance for Radmir Kovač in a state of undress, which evoked a strong sense 
of shame in the witness for reasons related to her ethnic background. As Karen Engle has 
rightly pointed out, arguments such as Askin’s suggest that such effects (shame and 
humiliation) ‘[a]re intended by the Serbian rapists’ as a means of specifically targeting Muslim 
culture and religion. More problematically, the argument uses the presumed effects to impute 
intent. As Engle has put it: 
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‘That the Muslim communities might respond differently from the ways suggested by 
the stereotype, even with acceptance, is not considered. The cultural effects-and 
therefore intended effects-of rape are overdetermined in this argument.’918 
 
This segment of the chapter has, thus, sought to illuminate how the interpretation of 
gendered identity in wartime is heavily informed by cultural stereotypes purportedly rooted in 
fixed ethnic traits, and it has shown how this representation is in turn reproduced in the 
dominant feminist discourses surrounding wartime sexual violence in armed conflict. The 
jurisprudence emerging from the tribunal thus sustains, rather than dismantles firmly 
entrenched gender subjectivities in international law by failing to complicate the parameters 
upon which such assumptions are built. As stated throughout the chapter, the concern of the 
thesis is to demonstrate how female victimhood replicates itself in the relevant jurisprudence 
and how dominant feminist discourses sustain these notions. Structuralist feminists were not 
alone in treating women as victims of war-on the other side of the debate were feminists, who 
saw all Bosnian Muslim women as rape victims. Their ideas further perpetuated the notion of 
women as eternal victims of war, as the next segment discusses. The second strand of the 
counterpoint technique pursued by the thesis, thus, presents an alternative position to the 
dominant one in order to show that despite its purported difference, it is largely similar given 




The ‘All Women-as Victims’ Alternative and the Čelebići Judgement 
A notable strand in feminist thinking around wartime sexual violence in the Yugoslav conflict, 
which shared many of advocacy goals of the more radical structuralist feminist school of 
thought, argued at the time that the focus on rape-as-genocide was fallacious, as the evidence 
of rape against women was so overwhelming that it could be safely assumed that the rapes 
were committed on all sides, regardless of ethnicity. These feminists, of whom Rhonda 
Copelon was perhaps the most visible, regarded women on all sides of the war as victims, 
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rather than as political participants, or even military participants in the war, and saw the 
sexual violence perpetrated against women as an extension of the everyday. As Copelon has 
put it, 
 
‘With regard to crimes against women, there is unfortunately not so sharp a difference 
between war and everyday life. Torture and rape in conflict situations have too much in 
common with rape in the marital bedroom, battering in the home, and gang rape in 
bars and streets. ….These are examples of egregious gender violence that is committed 
on a widespread or systematic scale and involves policies of legitimation, whether 
policies of active encouragement or policies of knowing omission, invisibilization, and 
toleration.’919 
 
This stance of perceiving wartime violence as a symptom of everyday aggression against 
women, led Copelon to argue that in the context of the Yugoslav conflict all women had been 
victimised equally, regardless of their ethnicity.  For Copelon,  
 
‘Women are targets not simply because they “belong” to the enemy…They are targets 
because they too are the enemy;….because rape embodies male domination and 
female subordination.’920 
 
While this is arguably a structuralist view, Copelon nonetheless sharply departs from 
MacKinnon’s rhetoric in so far as she believes that the emphasis on genocidal rape  does more 
harm than good to women, as it is ‘factually dubious’ as well as risky, for it renders the 
gendered nature of rape invisible once again.’921 In particular, she was critical of the limited 
and narrow understanding of genocidal rape espoused by feminists like MacKinnon, insisting 
that genocidal rape can happen on all sides in a war and is not confined to war, but also 
regularly occurs in peacetime. In the context of ICTY prosecution, Copelon’s main goal was to 
have rape recognised as a crime against humanity whenever it was committed on a mass or 
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large-scale basis. Specifically, she sought recognition of the harm being based on gender, not 
ethnicity, as long as the harm was large scale.922 
 
This stance is best exemplified by the ‘Čelebići’ judgement, the first case to try multiple 
accused at the same time for charges related to sexual violence.923 To refresh the details of 
this case, the defendants belonged to a force consisting of predominantly Bosnian Muslims 
and Bosnian Croats, who took control of several villages inhabited by Bosnian Serbs in and 
around Konjić starting at the end of May 1992.924 As part of their military campaign, the 
attackers forcibly expelled Bosnian residents from their homes and held them at collection 
centres. At the same time, most women and children were held in local schools or in other 
locations, while most of the men and some women were taken to a former Yugoslav People's 
Army (JNA) facility in Čelebići, referred to in the judgement as the Čelebići camp. 
 
It is interesting to note, that the aggressors this time were not Bosnian Serbs, but Bosnian 
Croats and Muslims, who had confined Bosnian Serb civilians to detention camps. The 
Indictment alleged that detainees in the camps were ‘killed, tortured, sexually assaulted, 
beaten and otherwise subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment’.925 The accused included 
Zejnil Delalić, allegedly the commander of the camp and therefore in a position of authority; 
Zdravko Mučić, the de facto commander of the camp; Hazim Delić, a subordinate, who worked 
in the camp and Esad Landžo, who acted as guard at the camp. 
 
Amongst the civilians detained was Groždana Čecez, a Serb woman, who was subjected to 
repeated incidents of rape, which were later deemed to have constituted torture, given that 
they had been committed as part of her interrogation within the camp. The aim of this part of 
the analysis is to show-by way of highlighting relevant passages from the Trial Chamber 
judgement-how gender-based violence is perceived as systematic, yet gender-specific because 
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it is targeted against the women because she is a woman. This interpretation of the act, thus, 
largely confirms Copelon’s position, and while it provides a departure from the structuralist 
interpretation of gender identity in the Kunarac decision, it does little to dismantle the firmly 
entrenched stereotypes described above. Thus, while the view of violence against women as 
an extension of the everyday provides a departure from the ‘ethnicised’ and ‘genocidal rape’ 
discourse, it only adds an additional layer to the debate, but ultimately fails to provide an 
alternative to female subjectivity in wartime continuing to produce it as firmly rooted in 
strongly dichotomised gendered narratives. 
 
 
i) The Surfacing of the Woman-as-Wife  
As stated, one of the recurrent subjectivities produced in ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence is of the woman-as-mother, who has surfaced strongly in the case law discussed 
so far. A related subjectivity in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence has been the 
woman-as-wife figure, who surfaces in the following segment:  
 
‘Ms. Ćećez testified that, during the rape, Hazim Delić told her she was in Čelebići 
prison-camp because of her husband and that she would not have been there if he had 
been around. Further, she testified that Zdravko Mucić had asked about the 
whereabouts of her husband.’926 
 
Two things are at play here: in demonstrating that rape amounts to torture, the woman’s 
individuality is eclipsed through the persona of her husband, who is allowed to take centre 
stage in the interrogation, despite his physical absence. The woman materialises only through 
her belonging to a man, thus, any sense that this crime could have been directed against the 
female autonomy of the woman is subsumed through the emphasis on her subjectivity as a 
wife, thus, reiterating a familiar gendered stereotype in international law of the woman as in 
need of protection.  
 
                                            
926
 Čelebići' Trial Chamber Judgement, at para. 929.  
269 
 
Interestingly, the defence in this case contended that the interrogation regarding the 
witnesses’ husband ended before the alleged rape had begun and was not resumed after the 
rape. It argued that it would therefore have to be proven that the purpose of the alleged rape 
was indeed to obtain information.927 This argument sought to reduce the elision between the 
gendered persona of the woman-as-wife from the actual sexual harm suggesting (albeit 
probably unintentionally) that she might have been raped because she was a woman, not 
because she was somebody’s wife. But the judges chose to follow the interpretation of events 
given by Ms.  Ćećez according to which Delić had told her during the course of the rapes that 
‘the reason she was there, was her husband, and that she would not be there if he was.’928 
 
It is a further passage in which the effect of the rape on the woman surfaces most vividly 
implying that the rape is an act with extreme gendered consequences, if not a fate worse than 
death. In expressing what impact the rapes had on her, the witness describes it as follows:  
 
‘The effect of this rape by Hazim Delić was expressed by Ms. Ćećez, when she stated: 
“…he trampled on my pride and I will never be able to be the woman that I was.”929 
 
The passage proceeds by describing the emotional impact of the rape on the witness in the 
following way:  
 
‘Ms. Ćećez lived in constant fear while she was in the prison-camp and was suicidal. 
Further Ms. Ćećez was subjected to multiple rapes on the third night of her detention 
in the prison camp-when she was transferred from Building B to a small room in 
Building A. After the third act of rape that evening she stated “[i]t was difficult for me. I 
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was a woman who only lived for a man and I was his all my life, and I think that I was 
just getting separated from my body at this time.”’ 930 
 
Several (problematic) interpretations of wartime female subjectivity are at play here: firstly, 
rape, although directed against only one individual, is described through its systematic nature 
reiterating that it necessarily had to be committed multiple times and on a rather systematic 
scale in order to be perceived as serious. Secondly, and confirming Copelon’s view, the rape 
committed here does not appear ethnically motivated, as barely any mention of the woman’s 
Serbian ethnic identity is made in the relevant passages.931 This would also confirm her earlier 
perception of the rapes being committed against all women, regardless of ethnicity. 
Moreover, and given the ease, if not systematic nature with which the perpetrators went 
about raping implies that the act was considered an extension of the everyday, for a certain 
sense of routine within which the abusers operated left open for interpretation whether they 
might have engaged in similar conduct in the past, possibly even in the context of peace.  
Moreover, the tribunal makes explicit that the violence suffered by Ms. Ćećez, in the form of 
rape, was inflicted upon her by Delić because she is a woman, thus, adopting a similar 
argument as Copelon.932  
 
But perhaps most problematically for purposes of the thesis is the portrayal of the woman-as 
victim, which most strongly surfaced in the judgement through the witness’ utterance that as 
a woman, she ‘only lived for man and that she was his all her life’. While this is undoubtedly a 
self-characterisation, it carries connotations about women, which do little to dispel firmly 
entrenched gendered narratives of women in international law. Again, what emerges from the 
witness’ is a sense of utter female subjection, submissiveness and lack of agency. In this 
passage, Ms. Ćećez, who was previously described as a shop owner, (suggesting a strong sense 
of agency required for a less typical female profession), was entirely transformed into the 
victim subject produced not only by colonial narratives of gender, but-perhaps more 
prominently-by notions of women’s sexual vulnerabilities, which seem all-consuming and all-
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defining. The Trial Chamber has, thus, in the space of a few passages accomplished the 
objectification of the female wartime identity through its portrayal of the woman, 
respectively, as both the wife and victim of war, but never as an agent in her own right.933  
 
Her testimony led the Trial Chamber to find that acts of vaginal penetration by the penis under 
circumstances that were coercive constituted rape.934 The purpose of the rape was interpreted 
by the tribunal to have been to obtain information about her husband, who was considered to 
be a rebel, hence she was ‘punished’ for her inability to provide information about his 
whereabouts, and additionally, she was coerced and intimidated into providing such 
information in order to ultimately be punished for the activities of her husband.935 While this 
passage (undoubtedly) was designed to showcase the serious nature of the violence in the 
tribunal’s understanding, what is lacking is any sense of the rape as an act against the woman, 
despite the judge’s best intentions. As the court describes it, Delić’s purpose of seeking to 
intimidate not only the victim, but also other inmates was accomplished through his creation 
of an atmosphere of fear and powerlessness. While this is undoubtedly an accurate reflection 
of the atmosphere prevailing in wartime detention, it heightens the impression that the 
women in this scenario entirely capitulated to their fear, which deprived them of any mental 
or physical capacity to resist.  
 
Thus, while this judgement has presented another dimension underlying the war by focusing 
on rape of two women, as opposed to a large number of women, it has highlighted the more 
individualised nature of sexual violence. Moreover, in line with Copelon’s argument, it has 
demonstrated that sexual violence during the Yugoslav conflict was not necessarily always 
ethnically motivated (at least where Serbian women were targeted), thus, disproving one of 
the central arguments made by MacKinnon that this was genocidal rape committed by Serbs 
with the intent of eradicating the Bosnian Muslim and Croatian population. Thus, her assertion 
that the Yugoslav conflict embodied rape as genocide, a rape directed against women 
‘because they are Muslim or Croatian’, and that this was a part of a campaign by Serbia against 
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non-Serbia’936 does not stand up on close inspection of the present case. Moreover, through 
the description of the routine nature of the rape, the Trial Chamber has created a sense that 
within the context of Yugoslav society, the sexual violence could have well just been an 
extension of the everyday thus giving valence to the idea espoused by a large number of 
feminists of the Yugoslav war being-in its essence-a war against women. In presenting the case 
law analysis of the Čelebići judgement interspersed with Copelon’s commentary as illustrative 
of the a powerful strand in feminist discourses around the conflict, which sought to actively 
contradict the stance espoused by MacKinnon and the more radical feminist variety, the thesis 
has provided an argument in opposition to the dominant one. The next step is to seek to 
complicate the two dominant, albeit differently framed viewpoints by providing an alternative 
perspective that seeks to complicate the standard feminist discourses around wartime sexual 
violence and the Yugoslav conflict.  
 
Part VIII 
Surfacing the Margins of Female Agency and Resistance in ICTY Wartime Sexual Violence 
Jurisprudence  
 
To a large part wartime identities have already been complicated in the in-depth analysis of 
the Kunarac judgement, which-among other things-sought to demonstrate that while the 
narrative of the women-as-victim defined along fixed lines surfaces strongly, any sense of her 
agency or power as a female is marginalised from the Trial Chamber’s legal reasoning. This 
part of the chapter seeks to map out the critical feminist insight that underlies its main 
analysis, for this strand has been highly significant in helping to illuminate the margins of ICTY 
wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. Most notably, it has complicated the picture of ICTY 
wartime sexual violence, thus challenging many of the perceived feminist successes, which had 
previously gone largely unchallenged. Karen Engle’s and Doris Buss’ take on dominant feminist 
interpretations of ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence have been particularly 
indispensable to this project. 
 
Karen Engle, specifically, has critiqued both the direct and indirect roles that feminists played 
in the ‘(re)consideration’ of the international criminalisation of rape. As she saw it, the 
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dominant feminist strands in the debate could be located in two distinct camps-those that 
argued that rapes should be primarily understood as an instrument of ‘genocide’ (personified 
in the writings of MacKinnon), and therefore distinct from ‘everyday rapes’ espoused by the 
second feminist camp, and already illuminated upon previously.937 Engle’s contribution to the 
debate is particularly useful to this thesis, as it questions the premises and assumptions upon 
which the two dominant strands have been built. Most significantly, it criticises the 
institutionalisation of the feminist viewpoint of there being ‘essential’ ethnic differences 
between Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and the portrayal of women as powerless 
victims. As she has put it, these representations have reinforced a sense of women as 
‘powerless victims, incapable of defending themselves or speaking out to defend others, but 
also of taking sides or participating in the war.’938  
 
She has, thus, introduced the thesis to the idea that the international criminalisation of rape 
might not have been as path breaking, or progressive as the doctrinal recognition would 
suggest. She has, moreover, suggested that the approach of the United Nations, and 
particularly the ICTY-largely at the urging of feminists-has at times treated women ‘as part of 
the same concept of ‘women and children’ that has long been deployed as a mechanism to 
provide women with special protection they are seen to need during wartime.’939 In so doing, 
she has raised the possibility that feminist advocates might have unwittingly-also because of 
their own disagreements-denied much of women’s sexual and political agency in ways that 
have ultimately manifested themselves in the approach adopted by the tribunal.  Moreover, 
Engle has complicated the way in which political agency and choice manifest themselves in the 
tribunal’s jurisprudence, and has argued that both feminist camps have treated most women 
as victims of war, thus having done little to dismantle prevailing gender stereotypes in 
international jurisprudence.940 She has pointed out to the thesis the legal modalities by which 
Bosnian Muslim women in particular were seen as rape victims,941 suggesting that silence was 
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often interpreted as a sign of victimisation, a testament to the trauma of rape with strong 
connotations of shame, which defined the Bosnian Muslim woman, as because of her silence, 
she was assumed to have been raped. In other words, the rape of Bosnian Muslim women 
often became ‘the sole factor’ by which they were defined.942  
 
In her analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, Engle has mapped out, very 
helpfully, the three key cases that define international law in the area of wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence-Čelebići, Kunarac and Furundžija-, in which the OTP successfully 
prosecuted rapes alleged to have been committed on all sides, while at the same time 
concentrating its efforts on the Kunarac case that viewed rape as ‘systematically aimed’ at 
Bosnian Muslims.943 In concentrating its efforts on a case denoting the ‘systematic’ attack 
against women civilians, the Trial Chamber has simultaneously highlighted (without even 
producing a finding of genocide) that the rapes of Bosnian Muslim women were ‘different’ 
from the rapes of Serbian and Croatian women, as only the former were found  to have been 
systematic.  
 
In the Čelebići case, for instance, the fact that the women who were raped were Serbian is 
barely mentioned. It has also been noted by Engle that the various references to ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ through the ‘wiping out of all traces of Muslim presence and culture’, for instance, 
suggest that the Trial Chamber was inclined to represent the rape as inherently linked to 
ethnic cleaning, thus, imputing an ethnic dimension to the act of sexual violence. Perhaps 
most useful for this thesis has been Engle’s observation that the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence are based on rather problematic assumptions about women’s wartime agency, given 
in particular the limiting of consent as a defence to rape before the ICTY.944 Indeed, the 
Kunarac Appeals Chamber ‘softened’ the effects of the requirement of the mens rea in its 
interpretation of the rule given that non-consensual and non-voluntary sexual relations had to 
be examined in light of the prevailing coercive circumstances of war.’945 This has led Engle to 
suggest that the tribunal construed consent in a way that made it next to impossible to 
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imagine that it could have been given in a situation that was inherently coercive and marked 
by duress.946 As the thesis has previously shown, consensual relationships appear to have 
taken place in wartime Foča, if the numerous accounts (including from the various female 
witnesses mentioned) are to be believed. Engle has also shown that another legal modality by 
which gender and ethnicity were heavily elided in the jurisprudence was rooted in the 
presumption that the lack of consent was connected to the identities of the Serb as the 
perpetrator, and the Bosnian Muslim woman as the victim, thus, reiterating the view of this 
thesis that the identities of victims and perpetrators were highly ‘ethnicised’ in the tribunal’s 
legal reasoning. She has noted that:  
 
‘The presumption of coercion serves to deny at a formal level that Muslim women 
would have chosen, in the way that we normally use the term “choice” in these 
matters, to have sex with a male Serbian soldier during the war.’947 
 
Engle’s view has thus provided invaluable insight into current ICTY wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence by pointing out the possible ‘unintended consequences’ of a feminist activism 
that has been intent on the criminalisation of wartime sexual violence as a means of 
addressing gendered harms of the past. Much like Wendy Brown, Engle has queried whether 
feminist advocacy and its results are desirable in the current legal and political moment, given 
that it has produced a number of ‘troubling’ aspects, which she identifies as having resulted in 
1) the entrenchment of reified understandings of ‘ethnic difference’; 2) the ‘minimization’ of 
women’s sexual, political, and military agency; and 3) the replacement of a focus on gender 
with a focus on sex.’948 
 
In posing these pertinent questions, Engle has complicated the idea that the legal successes 
achieved in the ICTY have necessarily produced a wholesale feminist victory. In particular, her 
contribution has shown that both dominant strands in feminist legal theory and activism, 
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reflecting ‘governance feminist’ principles, have recreated, rather than critiqued the 
essentialised understanding of ethnic identity found in the prevailing scholarship and in 
popular discourses around the Yugoslav conflict. The danger, as she has shown, is that such 
approaches assume a ‘biological notion of identity’ in particular in relation to whether Bosnian 
Serb rapes against Bosnian Muslim women were perpetrated with the intent of injecting Serb 
sperm into the lineage. By making ‘biological identity’ central to the jurisprudence, the ICTY 
has, thus, reproduced problematic and heavily contested notions around the meaning of 
gender, the nation, ethnicity and culture as heavily informed by essentialist constructions. 
Moreover, in using critique as her methodology for contesting ICTY jurisprudence, Engle has 
reiterated the importance of such a strategy for a feminist concern as topical as wartime 
sexual violence. Her contribution, thus, lies in not shying away from destabilising the 
normative and stable woman subject that ‘governance feminism’ most would like to utilise as 
part of its advocacy efforts.  Elsewhere, Engle has critiqued ‘structural feminism’ for its 
reproduction of the binary divisions in international law-whether through its focus on the 
family as the main site of female oppression or on cultural rituals such as female genital 
mutilation-which she believes is responsible for the theory’s ‘ultimate demise.’949 This binary 
division, as has been made evident throughout the chapter has reproduced the problematic 
tendency of positing women-as-the victims-against men-as the perpetrators in armed conflict.  
 
Engle’s analysis has, thus, provided an ‘elsewhere’ to the dominant gender subjectivities and 
wartime narratives created in international law by interrogating the powers that go into 
producing these ‘sexed’ identities. In so doing, she has provided a counterpoint argument, a 
different insight and perspective to much of the current debate informing feminist legal theory 
and activism around the issue of sexual violence. She has, thus, queried whether the perceived 
legal victory achieved by feminist activism by way of the criminalisation of sexual violence has 
been desirable for a broader understanding of gendered identity in wartime, or whether such 
a trend has in fact produced ‘unintended ‘consequences that have not resulted in ‘gender 
justice’, nor ‘gender equality’ as the twin feminist paradigms in much of the current debate 
around this issue. Moreover, Engle’s insight has pointed out the legal modalities underlying 
the perpetuation of dichotomised gendered stereotypes in ICTY wartime sexual violence 
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jurisprudence, thus, demonstrating that international law more often recreates problematic 
binaries and axis of subordination based on sex. Despite the invaluable insights provided, the 
thesis believes that Engle’s critique remains within the liberal paradigm, which posits female 
autonomy and normativity as central to female subjectivity.  
 
Although she complicates the idea of the unified female subject in international law through 
her willingness to use critique as place from which to destabilise the normative aims of 
feminist theory and activism, her analysis makes little room for analytical axes other than 
feminism. In her desire to promote female agency, by, for example, showing that women 
might indeed be involved at the heart of political and military power in times of war, Engle has 
utilised agency as a way of arguing for a different gendered subjectivity to the one constructed 
in much of the dominant feminist scholarship. However, the insistence on female agency as a 
lens for understanding women’s roles in wartime can itself be rather reductive, as it still fails 
to answer how the underlying structural, systemic, socio-economic and societal dimensions in 
a pre-conflict sphere contribute to the outbreak of sexual violence in wartime. Although the 
focus on female agency to a certain extent subverts and contests the male dominance of the 
law, it does not explain why conflict is construed as ‘ethnic’ in nature, why sexual violence is 
institutionalised, or why the ‘international community’ decided to establish  the ICTY. In other 
words, this approach does little to engage with the socio-political dimensions underlying 
conflict, which this thesis believes is central to reaching an understanding of how gendered 
and ethnicised identities come into being in the resulting jurisprudence.  
 
Moreover, autonomy as a concept is heavily rooted in classical liberal notions of autonomy, 
which in themselves are contested. As Wendy Brown has argued in relation to the 
depoliticising discourse of liberalism, its ‘most profound achievement’ is in its ‘excessive 
freighting of the individual subject with self-making, agency and a relentless responsibility for 
itself’ supplemented with the important ideological ‘reduction of freedom to rights, and 
equality to equal standing before the law.’950 The emphasis on female agency and rights might, 
thus, create the illusion that deep social problems are (fully) redressable through individual 
legal litigation, as they are, in essence, matters of ‘remarks, attitudes, and speech.’951 Thus, 
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Engle’s focus on agency and choice somewhat runs the risk of eclipsing the possibility of 
conceptualising political agency in different terms. Her approach, moreover, works within the 
dominant institutional mechanisms of international criminal justice without questioning fully 
the power dimensions that underlie them. In a way, thus, while Engle’s critique is, 
undoubtedly powerful and highly relevant for purposes of the thesis it remains located within 
a liberal discourse.  
 
Part IX 
Questioning the Limits of Seeing Gender through an Ethnic Lens 
Another powerful voice countering much of the mainstream feminist discourses around the 
Yugoslav conflict has been that of Doris Buss, who has gone further than Engle in 
problematising the notion of conflict being ethnic arguing that this has had a ‘distorted’ and 
‘reductive’ effect on producing and understanding conflict as the complex effect of political, 
economic and geo-political change that played a significant role in creating the conditions for 
the wars in the Yugoslavia. 952 Her main contribution to this thesis lies in showcasing, through 
various nuanced analyses of key ICTY cases, the legal modalities by which wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence has become visible in the emerging international criminal justice 
system largely through the attention placed on ethnicity as a key meta-narrative within which 
sexual violence against women materialises.953  
 
Buss has, thus, queried the limits of seeing women and their gender-specific abuses within the 
framework of international criminal tribunals.  Moreover, she has gone further than other 
feminist observers of the ICTY in viewing the ‘hypervisible’ treatment of women in 
international law as a consequence of a new context in which ‘international liberal legality’ 
reigns supreme. She has, therefore, located the fault line of international criminal justice in its 
ambition to compartmentalise identity categories, such as that of the victim and perpetrator, 
into neat legal boxes, which insist on heteronormativity as their defining standard. The critique 
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is, thus, invaluable as it raises concerns about what is ‘lost’ or ‘unseen’ when ethnicity 
becomes unquestionably the explanatory framework within which these conflicts are 
understood.954 Elsewhere, Buss has described the difficult questions posed by the feminist 
movement as to the strategies to be used in mobilising international legal attention on the 
mass rape of women. The question was whether to showcase the intersecting forms of 
oppression against women in order to draw attention to their fate in wartime, or whether to 
dispense with an intersectional analysis in favour of preventing the destabilisation of female 
subjectivity in international law.955 Buss’s work has focused on the way in which gendered and 
ethnicised subjectivities intersect in both ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence. This is briefly 
elaborated upon in the case law analysis below in order to complicate the legal modalities 
deployed by the ICTY in its approach to wartime identities.  
 
The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić case and Notions of Bosnian Muslim Patriarchy  
The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić case arose out of the circumstances related to the fall of the 
Srebrenica enclave to the Bosnian Serb army on 13 July, 1995. Krstić was the Chief of 
Staff/Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and he was 
accused of having aided and abetted in the genocidal attack against the Bosnian Muslim 
civilian population of the United Nations-protected Srebrenica, as well as having aided and 
abetted murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war, aided and abetted extermination 
and aided and abetted persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds as crimes against 
humanity.956  
There were also numerous reports of rapes committed in Potočari, a nearby town which was 
described as having been taken over by a ‘campaign of terror’ causing grave civilian suffering, 
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which was said to have been aggravated for the women of the town, who had to witness the 
forceful removal of their young sons, who had been ‘dragged away, never to be seen again.’957 
Moreover, U.N. peacekeepers (UNPROFOR) had observed the rape by two Serb soldiers of a 
young Bosnian Muslim woman. Other witnesses, including Bosnian refugees were reported as 
having witnessed the rape, but had been unable to do anything about it because of Serbian 
soldiers standing by.958 Amid the panorama of systematic violence directed against the civilian 
population of Potočari culminating in the atrocious acts committed at Srebrenica, the Trial 
Chamber used highly evocative language to illustrate the trajectory of events. The judges 
created a sense of Muslim Bosnia through the images of conservatism, traditionalism, and 
remote villages, against which the ‘moral map’ of the Bosnian Muslim woman was 
subsequently drawn.959 In one such passage they described ‘patriarchal Bosnia’ in the 
following way: 
 
‘In a patriarchal society, such as the one in which Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica lived, 
the elimination of virtually all that men had made it impossible for the Bosnian Muslim 
women, who survived the takeover Srebrenica to successfully re-establish their lives. 
Often, as in the case of witness DD, the women had been forced to live in collective and 
makeshift accommodations for many years, with a dramatically reduced standard of 
living.’960 
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A further passage similarly evokes the strong sensation of patriarchy, as inherent in Bosnian 
Muslim society and therefore a key cultural factor lying at the heart of the sexual violence 
attacks against women: 
 
‘It was common knowledge that the Bosnian Muslims of the Eastern Bosnia constituted 
a patriarchal society in which men had more education, training and provide material 
support for the family.’961 
 
Apart from producing a strong binary between female and male roles in pre-war Bosnian 
society, the two passages highlighted carry strongly ‘Orientalist’ undertones, which locate the 
cause of violence in culture. This interpretation is, thus, curiously reminiscent of structural 
feminist interpretations of the conflict and its gendered identities, and speaks to the trend in 
much of late liberal discourse of depoliticising issues such as inequality, subordination, and 
social conflict as personal and individual, on the one hand, and as neutral, religious and 
cultural on the other.962 Moreover, as is illustrated in the subsequent passage, the impact of 
the violence is closely associated with the cultural construction of gendered identities in the 
tribunal’s reasoning suggesting that the impact of the violence might somehow be different 
because of the ethnic background of the victims:  
 
‘[F]urthermore, Bosnian Serb forces had to be aware of the catastrophic impact that 
the disappearance of two or three generations of men would have on the survival of 
the traditionally patriarchal society….Intent by the Bosnian Serb forces to target the 
Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica as a group is further evidenced by their destroying 
homes of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and Potocari and the principal mosque in 
Srebrenica soon after the attack.963 
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The impression created here is of the intent of the perpetrators being driven entirely by ethnic 
motivations, which are construed as central to the offence. In this way, the court marginalises 
any sense of the violence as injurious of individual autonomy. The overdetermination of 
gender and ethnicity has been strongly criticised by Buss, who has argued that the tribunal has 
deployed a reductivist understanding of the Bosnian Muslim women of Srebrenica, who were 
constructed as the ‘biological reproducers of the community’.964 Moreover, in its stereotyping 
of Bosnian Muslim women, it has come dangerously close to treating women as a ‘special 
needs’ category to men, thus, reinforcing the marginalisation of women from international law 
in a very predictable way. Not only are the women in the passages highlighted variously 
described as mothers and wives in need of protection, they are inevitably construed as the 
victims of this conflict, produced by colonial narratives that are as present here as in past 
discourses on wartime sexual violence jurisprudence.965 In perpetuating these gendered 
dichotomies along strongly ethnicised lines, the Trial Chamber has used the tactic of 
depoliticising the Yugoslav conflict by reifying identity categories in order to deflect away from 
the powers that initially produced them.  
 
To sum up, the intersectional analysis produced by Buss has been useful in highlighting the 
legal modalities by which gender and ethnicity are made to collide in ICTY wartime sexual 
violence jurisprudence and thereby occlude the deep-rooted, structural factors of armed 
conflict. However, as argued in Chapter IV, an intersectional framework for understanding the 
gendered identity in armed conflict might not be sufficient to meet the complexities inherent 
in such situations.966 In spite of the significant impact of intersectionality in the human rights 
arena, there are thus significant limitations to such a framework.967  Given its insufficient 
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emphasis on the broader, structural dimensions, intersectionality has been challenged on the 
basis that it fragments both subjectivity and the forces that produce it. Recent feminist 
theorising in particular has suggested that intersectionality discourses have run their course, 
as they lack pertinent political effect. As Joanne Conaghan has put it:  
 
‘[E]ven within the context of a focus on subjectivity, current feminist theoretical 
models do not deliver because they fail to produce an effective agent of political 
change. Indeed, the absence of sustained historical engagement in much contemporary 
theorising makes the idea of change conceptually problematic; in a sense there is only 
the present to be confronted and only what is before us to map and represent.’968 
 
The implication is that intersectionality as a theoretical framework fails to capture the 
productive coming together of theory and practice, given its preoccupation with the way in 
which the law represents its subjects. As stated previously, topographical techniques’ cannot 
adequately denote either depth or dimension- they cannot sidestep economic problems, or 
problems of distribution. Intersectionality is, thus, limited in its ability to capture the processes 
through which economic and social disparities are produced.969 
 
While intersectionality analyses of modern-day wartime sexual violence jurisprudence have 
been indispensable for purposes of this thesis and have significantly increased its 
understanding of the margins and fault lines of inequality regimes (at the same time 
complicating the dominant discourses around wartime sexual violence in the Yugoslav 
conflict), they have not sufficiently interrogated and challenged identity categories and their 
social positions as effects of power. While Doris Buss has urged for a greater inquiry into the 
structural dimensions underlying gender-based violence and more attention to the way in 
which social categories, such as ethnicity, are produced by surrounding discourses and the 
powers that sustain them, this thesis suggests that feminist investments with the law in the 
current political and legal moment might not be the best way forward in the pursuit of gender 
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justice and equality. The idea is that law should perhaps not be the starting point on an 
inequality analysis, and that disciplines outside of the law might provide fresh new insights.  
 
Part X 
The Value of non-Feminist Critiques 
This thesis has been informed by the idea that feminism might not have unique epistemic 
purchase on women’s condition. Janet Halley has made a strong case for such a possibility in 
the context of sexuality.970 Her underlying argument is that ‘no one theory, no one political 
engagement, is nearly as valuable as the invitation to critique that is issued by the 
simultaneous incommensurable presence of many theories’. More specifically, she has asked:  
 
‘Whether “our” engagement with erotic, sexual and gender politics would be better off-
whether feminism might be better off-if we left ourselves some room to imagine erotic, 
sexual, and gendered life under terms that some would think, or even that everyone would 
think, to “Take a Break from Feminism?”.  
 
The feminism Halley advocates Taking a Break from is ‘governance feminism’: a feminism that 
‘rules’ and ‘wants to rule’971, even if, (particularly if) this is ‘power masquerading as 
servitude.’972 She has shown this in her discussion of feminist power exercised in global and 
local governance, which is often pursued through ‘informal, opaque, ideologically committed’ 
NGOs that strategise hard and sometimes with success to render themselves indispensable 
when major new fluidities in formal power emerge.’973 Largely through concerted activism and 
NGO initiatives, feminist power has infiltrated international criminal legal processes but, as 
argued previously, without necessarily producing uniformly positive results for women.  
 
By way of reminder, at the heart of governance feminism is its preoccupation with a 
subordination theory: ‘a distinction between something m and something f, a commitment to 
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be a theory, and a practice about the subordination of f to m; and a commitment to work 
against the subordination of f.974 This encompasses a range of liberal, radical, cultural and 
other feminisms, and is encompassed by Brown’s term ‘feminist foundationalism’. Although, 
as noted, Halley’s views are distinctly American in outlook, the type of feminism she deplores 
has, undoubtedly, become the most influential globally, and hence her critique is of wider 
relevance. Although she admits that not all feminist varieties are resolvable into her formula of 
‘governance feminism’, preoccupied with the subordination of women to men, her argument 
is nonetheless indispensible to the critique pursued by this thesis to the extent that it 1) 
criticises dominant modalities of feminism, and 2) introduces the idea of taking decisions in 
the split between theories. This is a form of contrapuntal strategy that attunes well to the 
analysis of this thesis. Attention to this type of argument may promote a more complex and 
insightful feminist analysis, as well as make room for other discourses, which may provide 
refreshingly new insights pertaining to the questions that feminists engage with.  
 
Halley has, thus, asked whether the new civilising modes of feminism could be analogous to 
adult behaviour on the playground running to the rescue of the little girl, who stumbles, falls 
and scrapes her knee.975 At first, the girl is still and composed while waiting for the dizziness 
and surprise of the experience to subside. But up rushes the adult, overindulging in sympathy 
and urgently concerned about whether her leg might be broken. The adult exclaims: ‘has she 
broken her leg? Is she bleeding? How did it happen? We must not let it happen again! Poor 
thing!’976 For the first time, and prompted by the adult screams, the little girl experiences fear 
and begins to cry.  
 
The adult behaviour in the playground serves as a rather powerful metaphor speaking to 
feminism’s commitment to identifying itself with female injury. Thus, to represent women as 
‘end points of pain’ and to imagine them as lacking the agency to cause harm to others and 
particularly harm to men, (as the invisibility of male sexual injury in wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence suggests), is problematic. It is problematic because feminists ‘refuse’ to see 
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women, even injured ones, as powerful actors.977 It is therefore feminism itself that objectifies 
women and erases their agency by unintentionally intensifying their pain.   
 
To be sure, there are pitfalls to ‘Taking the kind of Break’ suggested by Halley. There are 
always ‘costs’978 associated with this endeavour. These include the possibility that the 
epistemic vigilance needed to resist ‘male epistemic hegemony’ could be relaxed and that in 
this way further splits among feminists about their conceptual location would ensue. This in 
turn could risk new fissures in the intellectual, social political and legal endeavour, which could 
demobilise and demoralise feminists and lay them open to cooptation by those who oppose 
women’s well-being.979 As Halley puts it rather powerfully:  
 
‘If, for instance, feminism is our best weapon against the constant pressure of male 
sexual violence, weakening feminism in any of these ways could actually result in some 
guy’s decision to rape a woman he could otherwise leave unmolested, or some 
prosecutor’s willingness to see reasonable doubt in a rape case that would otherwise 
have seemed a clear prosecutorial priority.’980 
 
Halley concedes that these anxieties are valid, but nonetheless believes that a ‘Break from 
Feminism’ is a risk worth taking. It is a danger worth confronting because feminist ‘paranoid 
structuralism’ and ‘convergentism’, (so ubiquitous today in feminist discourses) in their 
normative or political priority of carrying a brief for f have produced undesirable results, chief 
amongst them their inability to see around the corner of their own construction.981 Unless it 
‘Takes a Break’ from itself, feminism won’t be able to see injury to men; it won’t be able to see 
injury inflicted on men by women, and most significantly from the point of view of this thesis, 
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This chapter has provided the second limb in the bridge between the discussion of gender-
based violence and wartime sexual violence jurisprudence as subjects of legal analysis 
overviewed in Chapters II and III, and their more critical inquiry pursued in Chapters and IV, V 
and VI. It has explained and crystallised the constitutive elements of the analytical approach 
adopted in the thesis, most important of which has been to reassert the value of critique as a 
feminist method. It has addressed the problem of the perceived crises of normativity and 
subjectivity informing much of the debate in current feminist scholarship by arguing that the 
absence of a unified subject need not block certain feminist pursuits.  
 
A contrapuntal strategy has helped to clarify the narrative and academic strategy of the thesis 
by adding perspective to the existing debate, and by arguing that wartime sexual violence 
jurisprudence of its own cannot deliver the twin normative feminist aims of gender justice and 
equality, or reflect in full the gendered experience of wartime. The thesis has argued that 
western liberal notions of autonomy and choice interpreted through an ethnic lens have come 
to firmly frame the views and arguments of both the proponents and opponents of the rape- 
as-genocide versus the all women-as victims-debate. In this way, it has exposed the limitations 
of the autonomy/choice/ethnicity framework, which has been treated as an ideological given, 
existing prior to the female self.  
 
Two salient trends in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence have thus been highlighted: 
the reading of gender identity through an ethnic lens, and the portrayal of women as victims, 
wives or mothers. As has been noted in Chapters I and II, these two trends form the ‘feminist’ 
core of the debate. The chapter then focused on demonstrating the intersection of gender and 
ethnicity in key ICTY decisions by showing that dominant feminist readings of wartime 
identities produced a problematic narrative of gendered identity in wartime.  To this end, this 
part of the chapter provided an account of the rhetoric of female victimhood as tied to ethnic 
identity, as it shone through the judgements and the dominant feminist discourses 
surrounding it. In part VIII, the chapter then turned to the opponents of these interpretations 
of female victimhood and of the idea that the Yugoslav conflict was in essence a ‘war against 
women’, highlighting how these as well are more often than not articulated within the same 
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conceptual framework. Part IX finally took a step back, in order to consider the limitations of 
the currently prevailing preoccupation with the intersection of gender and ethnicity, as well as 
notions of autonomy and consent. 
 
The aim of the chapter has been to visibilise women’s agency in armed conflict by identifying 
marginalised female subjectivities that have not formed part of the dominant narrative around 
the Yugoslav conflict, and that might well tell another story or wartime, or provide an 
elsewhere to the dominant narratives. At the same time, the chapter has showcased that 
female agency, however unlikely under conditions of extreme coercion, was a reality in 
wartime Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the examples of female testimony drawn upon in the case law 
analysis have demonstrated. In this way, the analysis has gone against the grain of a majority 
of feminist texts on the Yugoslav war, as those have deployed highly essentialised and 
ethnicised readings of female identity in wartime, having conceived of Bosnian Muslim women 
in particular as victims of war. The chapter concluded by following Janet Halley’s call for 
feminism to ‘Take a Break’ from itself, not as a way of diminishing its normative value, but in 
order to consider its own institutional investments with power and reassert its emancipatory 
purchase. Attention to this type of argument may promote a more complex and insightful 
feminist analysis, as well as make room for other discourses, which may provide refreshingly 
new insights into questions that feminists engage with. These insights would hopefully avoid 
falling into the trap of position-taking, and steer clear of reducing war to a neatly delineated 
struggle between those ‘have culture’ and ‘those whom culture has’.982 Once it returns from 
its ‘Break’, feminism will hopefully again contribute to a more imaginative and inclusive debate 
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         Chapter VII 
   
        Conclusion  
 
The thesis is a critical feminist analysis of ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence, as it is 
constructed in contemporary feminist legal scholarship and the surrounding debate. Today, 
wartime sexual violence is an endemic phenomenon that disproportionately affects women. In 
the Yugoslav context, sexual violence has firmly come to frame gendered and ethnic identity 
with the figure of the raped woman having turned into the metaphor for the conflict itself. As 
the thesis has shown, the ubiquity of sexual violence in conflict has provoked some strong 
regulatory responses, as well as much controversy about how to interpret the act-as violence 
directed exclusively against women because they are women, or as a group harm targeting an 
ethnic identity? The thesis has explored how the debate around wartime sexual violence is 
currently conducted, and what implications this might have for a critical feminist engagement 
with the issue. Put differently it has asked: What is wartime sexual violence jurisprudence 
considered to represent for women in the current historical and political moment?  
 
In brief, the answer depends on whether one conceives of wartime sexual violence through a 
structuralist lens and therefore as an act of male domination or whether violence against 
women is understood through a socio-economic context, where the manifestation of violence 
is the result of female poverty and lack of opportunity. For proponents of the culturalised, 
structuralist view of gender-based violence, the act signifies a blatant lack of autonomy and 
the near total oppression of women. Opponents of this view, in contrast, consider female 
agency possible and believe that even in a situation as coercive as wartime, women’s 
emancipation and empowerment are possible. In both cases, there is a characteristically 
‘feminist’ set of frames at play: the preoccupation with (women’s) autonomy and choice and 
the normative imperative of gender equality and justice. Rather than taking a position for or 




It has done so by using the methodological idea of counterpoint, which is an analytical 
technique, characterised by an anti-hegemonic sensibility and a deliberate practice of 
multiplicity and juxtaposition. In this way, the thesis has presented an elsewhere to the 
currently prevailing positions. Rather than being objective and/or comprehensive, the thesis 
has aimed to offer perspective. After giving some preliminary background, the thesis 
proceeded to an overview of the evolution of gender-based violence as a subject of 
international human rights law (which was carried out in Chapter II). Chapter II thus charted 
how the term gender replaced ‘the woman’ in human rights discourses; it documented the 
struggle faced by feminist activists in incorporating gender-specific terminology into the Rome 
Statute and it overviewed the salient human rights provisions and declarations, which have 
helped make gender-based violence visible as a subject of international law. At the same time, 
it adopted a critical angle in relation to the use of gender mainstreaming policies and 
illustrated some feminist concerns in this regard. This discussion was intended as a general 
sense of the debate. Chapter III carried forth in this vein by mapping out the trajectory of 
wartime sexual violence traditionally seen as a historical footnote to its recognition today as a 
core violation of international criminal law. It also introduced a feminist critique of 
international humanitarian law, while primarily focusing on the key legal developments in ICTY 
and ICTR wartime sexual violence jurisprudence that have contributed to the sense of ‘success’ 
accomplished by the tribunals in this area. Chapter IV provided a bridge between that account 
and the analysis pursued in chapters V and VI. Chapter IV was a largely ‘ground-clearing’ 
exercise as it overviewed various feminist approaches to human rights, gender, ethnicity, 
culture and armed conflict in order to highlight their advantages and disadvantages from the 
point of view of engaging with an issue such as wartime sexual violence. The types of 
approaches overviewed were liberal and universalist feminists, radical and ‘governmentality 
feminists’, poststructural and postcolonial feminists and intersectionality feminists. Finally, the 
chapter emphasised the value and contribution of non-feminist discourses, which constituted 
a vital element of the analysis pursued in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Chapters V and VI were the crux of the thesis, as it was there that the critical feminist analysis 
of the wartime sexual violence debate was crystallised. Chapter V thus provided an in-depth 
legal analysis of the landmark cases adjudicated to date in the Yugoslav Tribunal interjected 
with a brief historical background to the events and patterns of wartime sexual violence that 
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have defined the Yugoslav conflict in the popular imagination. In this way, it has highlighted 
the legal modalities through which gender became closely intertwined with notions of 
ethnicity. The chapter argued that dominant gender stereotypes continue to persist in 
international law partly because of the strong structuralist feminist tendencies permeating the 
tribunal’s legal reasoning and partly because of the ICTY’s failure to interrogate the ontological 
essence of the Yugoslav conflict. Finally, Chapter VI crystallised the critical feminist approach 
adopted in the thesis. It did so by explaining the constitutive elements of this approach. The 
first element was the value of critique as a feminist method. Second, the chapter addressed 
the perceived crisis of feminist subjectivity and normativity, by arguing that they are not in 
crisis. Third, the chapter explained that the thesis pursued a normative project, contending it 
was not necessary to have a strong, unified concept of the female subject. The final chapters 
were both guided by the idea of counterpoint in their structure and substance. In adopting this 
approach, the thesis has purported to resist the impulse of taking positions on one or the 
other side of the debate. Instead, it has been interested in highlighting, engaging with and 
interrogating the very parameters of the notions underlying gender, ethnicity, autonomy and 
choice as the characteristically ‘feminist’ sets of frames at play in the debate. It is believed that 
these also influence a range of other contemporary debates involving women-sex trafficking, 
pornography, or religious dress. If this is so, the analysis pursued in this thesis is of wider 
relevance to other gender-specific issues.  
 
The thesis has been concerned to outline both the legal victories as well as the questions that 
surround the criminalisation of wartime sexual violence in the contemporary political and 
historical moment. It has shown that while these legal developments might have been useful 
from a feminist perspective, as they allowed feminists a voice at the negotiating table, the 
institutionalisation of feminist concerns has not necessarily led to a better understanding of 
wartime identities, their interactions with each other and their overall experience under the 
extraordinary circumstances of armed conflict, regardless of the cultural context in which they 
materialise. The thesis has moreover shown that gender as a fluid and multiple social category, 
has not been visibilised in ICTY wartime sexual violence jurisprudence. In spite of the advances 
achieved in international criminal law to redress sexual violence against women, entrenched 
gender dichotomies have been resurrected, rather than dismantled. In designating 
‘governance feminists’ with a central role in shaping the tribunal statutes and its rule-making 
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processes, international law has authorised Western feminist ideas triggered by notions of 
‘protecting’ or ‘saving’ other women from their fate. It thus appears as if structuralist feminists 
have won the debate within the current human rights and international legal order.  
 
In reverting to a fixed gaze on female subordination as the cause of female injury, ‘governance 
feminism’ has been complicit in the reproduction of reified gendered identities in international 
law, while at the same time abandoning its critical origins based on the questioning of 
sovereignty, authority, mastery and control. The thesis has, thus, argued that feminism is 
today transmitting a new tradition for which it may be the sovereign authority itself. It has 
suggested that if feminism carries forth in this vein,  it won’t comprehend late modernity, or 
the age in which we live as marked by economic exploitation of women in the ‘Global South’, 
or be able to unmask the use of tropes like  ‘humanitarian intervention’ as empty slogans that 
camouflage the real power dynamics underlying today’s global order. In particular, as Anne 
Orford has suggested, a feminist reading of international law has to avoid seeing the world in 
terms of a ‘battleground of male and female individualism’, in which the goal of feminism 
would be merely to move women from the female domain of sexual reproduction to the male 
domain of ‘social-subject production’ via the sacrifice of the ‘Other Woman’.983  
 
It is therefore perhaps more important than ever to pay careful attention to the context of the 
increasing economic integration and the context of globalisation within which stories of war 
are narrated and represented to a wider audience. International legal texts produce 
knowledge about ‘other’ people and tell stories about the horrors and atrocities that occur in 
distant lands. They, therefore, wield immense power in the reproduction of power relations 
and reinforce the imperialist discourses of the past when they pit the ‘uncouth and 
infantilised’ native against the morally sound liberal, who in his invasion of foreign lands acts 
for entirely altruistic motives seeking to rescue ‘the uncivilised’ from themselves. In the 
context of the armed conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, which has often been portrayed in 
strongly ethnicised terms, the imperialist desire to know and to gain access to ‘other’ people 
has served as a strong impulse in the creation of the international criminal tribunals 
authorising Western ‘experts’ to speak about those, who were constructed as in need of ‘our 
                                            
983
 Orford (2006), at 66.  
293 
 
help’, while denying those deemed as ‘undeserving’ the same treatment. The failure to 
consider the involvement of international organisations or the role of international law in 
contributing to the kind of crisis, which ultimately manifested itself in the brutality marking the 
Yugoslav and the Rwandan conflicts, has meant that rather than examining the role played by 
the international community in contributing to modern-day conflicts, legal texts have 
continued to understand the causes of such conflicts as rooted in ethnic or nationalist 
attributes in this way removing the phenomenon of the violence witnessed from the historical 
powers that created and sustained it in the first place. The thesis has argued that the process 
of ‘culturalising’ wartime identities in the age of ‘ethnic conflict’ has been symptomatic of a 
wider trend in late modernity of depoliticising structural problems such as inequality, 
subordination and social conflict as personal and individual, on the one hand, and as neutral, 
religious and cultural on the other. In this way, certain subjectivities, such as the Bosnian 
Muslim rape victim have been visibilised, as this was deemed a personalised war against their 
group identity, while other subjectivities such as the everyday woman in wartime Bosnia, who 
tried to make a living, regardless of her ethnic identity, but rather because of a basic human 
instinct for survival (full well in the knowledge that she could be targeted next), were occluded 
from the dominant legal narrative. These powerful stories of everyday individual agency and 
courage in the face of horror have gone missing from the dominant account of war, yet are so 
central to an understanding of the dynamics of armed conflict.  
 
The aim of this thesis has thus been to highlight how the framing of issues through certain 
discursive practices ‘presumes the creature it needs to explain,’984 in this way erasing the 
structural conditions in which subjectivity is formed. The thesis has argued that the framing of 
wartime sexual violence issues as human rights claims under available legal frameworks has 
assigned deep political social problems to a rather impoverished analytical spectrum, which 
evades power and history, understood in a broader, more materialist sense. Rather than 
ignoring the materialist and structural dimensions the aim of the thesis has been to bring them 
to light. Feminism has been complicit in this project in its refusal to see beyond its traditional 
preoccupation with subordination theory, as well as its refusal to see beyond identity politics 
as the means by which to explain deeply political and complex situations of power that have 
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often created the conditions of inequality, poverty and injustice. The type of ‘Break’ from 
feminism advocated by this thesis is therefore done not against women, or in the interests of 
destabilising female subjectivity to deny normative feminist ideas their rightful place in the 
historical struggle for gender equality and justice. Instead, the impulse of this project has been 
strongly informed by the interests of those women, who have been sidelined from dominant 
narratives and left out of mainstream feminist strategies. The thesis has sought to create a 
more imaginative portrayal of women by seeing past injury as constitutive of female 
subjectivity. In this way, different types of female subjectivity that neither necessarily conform 
to pre-determined norms and modes of thinking, yet are indispensable for a sustained 
advocacy based on justice and equality have been reinvigorated to allow for a broader 
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